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I. INTRODUCTION
To most Americans 'boycott' is a word of ill-omen. The pictures it calls up
are of acts like those charged against striking coal miners .... '
If this is a correct picture, the thing we call a boycott originally signified
violence, if not murder.2
W a number of persons combine together in an organized ef-
frt to withdraw and induce others to withdraw from social or
business relations with another, it is sometimes called a boycottY
The word, steeped in mystery and clouded with ambiguity, is at-
tributed to an infamous pariah, Captain Charles Conningham Boy-
cott, an Englishman ostracized for evicting a group of poor Irish ten-
ants from his estate. The tenants, along with the Irish Land League
and Irish nationalists, refused to have anything to do with Captain
Boycott or his family.4 No one would work for Captain Boycott, and
no one would supply him with food. Captain Boycott and his wife
were thus forced to work their own fields under the "shadows of
armed constabulary ever at their heels."' Thus, as Justice Scalia re-
1. HARRY W. LAIDLER, BOYCOTTS AND THE LABOR STRUGGLE: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ASPECTS 17 (1914).
2. State v. Glidden, 8 A. 890, 897 (Conn. 1887) (Carpenter, J.).
3. See, e.g., RANDOM HOUSE ENCYCLOPEDIA 1988, at 2507 (3d ed. 1990); 2 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 468 (2d ed. 1989); WEBSTER THIRD INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) 264 (1981). I say "sometimes" because sometimes what may
appear to fall within the standard dictionary definition of the word "boycott" is not found
to be a boycott. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decision last term in Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993). There, the issue was whether the
term "boycott" as used in section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b)
(1993) (which denies antitrust immunity to group boycotts by insurance companies) cov-
ered an alleged conspiracy by foreign and domestic insurance companies to force other
primary insurers to change the terms of their standard liability policies. It was alleged
that the goal of the conspiracy was to limit the availability of a basic insurance policy to
limit the defendant's liability exposure for long-term pollution and environmental dam-
age. Justice Scalia, for a slim five justice majority, ruled that the standard dictionary
definition of the word "boycott" was limited to those refusals to deal that are "unrelated"
or "collateral" to the objective sought by the refusal to deal. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,
113 S. Ct. at 2912-13. Justice Souter, and three other dissenters, however, complained
that the Court had adopted an "overly narrow definition" of the word boycott. Id. -at 2903.
Justice Souter argued that the majority's definition of the term boycott was arbitrarily
limited to "unitary phenomenon" because the majority wanted to make it difficult for the
moving party to prevail. Id. at 2908. In Justice Souter's view, the majority had
"concoct[ed] a 'precise definition' of the term [boycott]" to reach a particular outcome. Id.
at 2908 n.19. As the disagreement between Justices Scalia and Souter in Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. indicates, dictionary definitions of the word "boycott" may indeed be elusive
in getting at the meaning of the word boycott.
4. See LAIDLER, supra note 1, at 23-27; see also Glidden, 8 A. at 896-97.
5. WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1139 n.2 (8th ed. 1988)
(quoting BOVIER'S LAw DICTIONARY 387 (Francis Rawle ed., 1914)). The events which gave
rise to the story of Captain Boycott were reported by the American journalist James Red-
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cently observed: "ITihe verb made from the unfortunate Captain's
name has had from the outset the meaning it continues to carry to-
day. To 'boycott' means 'to combine in refusing to hold relations of
any kind, social or commercial, public or private, with (a neighbor),
on account of political or other differences, so as to punish him for
the position he has taken up, or coerce."'6
In America, boycotts have become a common place occurrence
among a variety of groups (labor, business, political, and social) ad-
vancing myriad moral and social issues. The increasing frequency of
boycotts raging nationwide,' and the diversity of the causes involved
(running the gamut from abortion, gay rights and nuclear weapons
to dolphins, spotted owls, vulgar TV sitcoms, and Girl Scout Cook-
ies9), attests to the fact that an increasing number of groups are
taking action outside the normal political channels of government to
path in his Talks of Ireland published in 1881. See LAIDLER, supra note 1, at 26 (citing
Arthur D. Vinton, The History of 'Boycotting," in 5 MAG. OF W. HISTORY 211 (1886)).
According to Redpath, the word "boycott" was invented during a dinner conversation. As
Redpath purportedly explained:
I was dining with Father John O'Malley... and he asked me why I was not
eating. I said, "I am bothered about a word." "What is it?" asked Father John.
"Well," said I, "when a people ostracize a landgrabber we call it social excom-
munication, but we ought to have an entirely different word to signif* ostracism
applied to a landlord or a land agent like Boycott. Ostracism won't do. The
peasantry would not know the meaning of the word, and I can't think of any-
thing." "No," said Father John, "ostracism wouldn't do." He looked down, tapped
his big forehead, and said "How would it do to call it 'to boycott him?'"
LAIDLER, supra note 1, at 23. Reporters from Dublin and London subsequently used Red-
path's word to describe incidents involving the poor Irish tenants and Captain Boycott.
The "infamies of Captain Boycott were [thus] immortalized." Id. at 24.
6. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. at 2911 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 468 (2d ed. 1989)). The word boycott has
roots that can be traced to the ancient Greeks. What we now know as a boycott was used
by the wives of Greek soldiers to end a war-the wives refused to sleep with their soldier-
husbands until the fighting stopped. Lysistrata, in ARIsTOPHANEs AGAINST WAR: THE
ACHARIANS, THE PEACE LYSISTRATA 111-13 (Patric Dickinson trans., 1957); see Ronald E.
Kennedy, Political Boycotts, The Sherman Act, and The First Amendment: An Accommo-
dation of Competing Interests, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 983, 984 n.2 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Dennis E. Garrett, Consumer Boycotts: Are Targets Always the Bad
Guys?, Bus. & Soc. REV., Summer 1986, at 17; Andrew Liberman, Salvadoran Coffee, Go
Home, PROGRESSIVE, May 1990, at 15; Kenneth Sheets, Products Under Fire, U. S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, Apr. 16, 1990, at 44; Bruce Keppel, Bargaining With Boycotts, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1989, § 4 at 1; Jonathan Tasini, The Beer and the Boycott, N. Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 1988, § 6 at 19.
8. See Sheets, supra note 7 (reporting that there are more than 200 boycotts in pro-
gress at any moment).
9. See Dirk Johnson, Colorado Faces Boycott Over Its Gay-Bias Vote, N. Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 1992, at A16; Patrick M Fahey, Note, Advocacy Group Boycotting of Network
Television Advertisers and Its Effects on Programming Content, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 647
(1991); Sheets, supra note 7; Stroh Reviews Funding of Series After Protest, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1989, § 4 at 9.
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promote and protect their own interests by the collective assertion of
power for common cause." As the Supreme Court has recognized, a
"'[b] oycott' is a multifaceted 'phenomenon' that includes conditional
boycotts, punitive boycotts, coercive boycotts, partial boycotts, labor
boycotts, political boycotts, social boycotts, etc."" Boycotts have thus
become an important political and social activity, and it would ap-
pear that boycotts have come to represent part of the daily routine of
American culture. 2
The response of the legal system to activities of group boycotts
has been confused and inconsistent. Boycotts by labor, business and
citizen groups activities have been prohibited and protected under
common law doctrine, 3 federal labor legislation, 14 the Sherman
10. One reason cited for the recent surge of boycotts is that people regard boycott as
an effective vehicle for expressing and protecting their individual interests. See Sheets,
supra note 7, at 44. Consumer affairs specialists claim that consumer boycotts are a citi-
zen reaction to the policies of the Reagan Administration that brought a "dramatic dimi-
nution of support for consumer protection programs at all levels of government," thus
forcing consumer groups to take self-help measures for mutual aid and self-protection.
Monroe Friedman, Consumer Boycotts in the United States, 1970-1980: Contemporary
Events in Historical Perspective, 19 J. CONSUMER AFF. 96, 97 (1985). On the other hand,
political action groups with conservative ideologies, such as the National Federation for
Decency, the Church of Christ, and the American Life Lobby have become more vocal and
active, spurring more liberal groups to counter with their own political action measures.
Id.
11. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2913 n.3 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 447 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("From the colonists' protest of the Stamp and Townsend Acts to
the Montgomery bus boycott and the National Organization for Women's campaign to en-
courage ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, boycotts have played a central role
in our Nation's political discourse."). See also Friedman, Consumer Boycotts, supra note
10, at 110 (arguing that consumer boycotts are becoming "part of the daily routine of our
democracy and its most distinctive mark" (quoting Amitai Etzioni in M. S. Handler, Pro-
tests Found Likely to Endure, N. Y. TIMS, Feb. 16, 1969, at A60)).
13. Under common law, boycotts of labor and business groups were prohibited as
"tortious interference" with contractual or business relations. See, e.g., Ertz v. Produce
Exch. Co., 81 N.W. 737 (1900) (holding that boycott by suppliers against merchant is un-
lawful); Vegelahn v. Gunter, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896) (holding that labor boycott against em-
ployer is unlawful). Exceptions, however, were made in the case of certain boycotts, espe-
cially those involving business groups. See Bowen v. Matheson, 96 Mass. 499 (1867)
(holding that a merchant boycott is a lawful form of business competition). At common
law, courts adopted the view that business boycotts were legitimate as an economic
weapon for pursuing market objectives. Labor boycotts, however, were analyzed under a
view which saw worker boycotts as an unlawful conspiracy. See Gary Minda, The Com-
mon Law, Labor and Antitrust, 11 INDuS. REL. L. J. 461, 508-15 (1989) [hereinafter
Minda, Common Law]; Haggai Hurvitz, American Labor Law and the Doctrine of Entre-
preneurial Property Rights: Boycotts, Courts, and the Juridical Reorientation of 1886-
1895, 8 INDUS. REL. L. J. 307, 313-18 (1986).
14. See, e.g., Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (b)(4) (1988) (banning secondary labor boycotts). Under common law, secondary la-
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Antitrust Act, 5 and the First Amendment.16 It would appear that
the word boycott has become a judicial trope used to condemn or
condone expressive activity of different groups, a figurative device
used in judicial argument to conjure up different images of dissent
and popular sovereignty. The diversity of boycott images has
brought about deep doctrinal conflicts in the law of boycotts. Con-
sider, for instance, the doctrinal dissonance created by three leading
Supreme Court decisions dealing with labor, antitrust and civil
rights boycotts.
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware7 the Supreme Court unani-
mously held that the organizers of a civil rights boycott could not be
subject to a state tort because their boycott was protected by the
First Amendment. In the same term, however, the Court again held
unanimously, in International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Inter-
national, Inc.,8 that a political boycott organized by a labor union to
protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not protected by the
First Amendment. More recently in FTC v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass'n, 9 the Court held that a boycott staged by a group of
criminal defense lawyers, who refused to serve as court-appointed
defense lawyers until their hourly fees were raised, constituted a per
se offense under the federal antitrust laws because the lawyers' boy-
cott, alleged to be a political boycott, was found to be a price-fixing
conspiracy.
This confusing trio of cases has established the curious result
bor boycotts were generally proscribed by most judges. See Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 386 (1969). The secondary boycott
provision of federal labor law, however, does not render so-called "primary" boycott activ-
ity unlawful. See Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB
(General Electric Co.), 366 U.S. 667, 672 (1961); NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co.,
341 U.S. 665 (1951).
15. Business boycotts in the past have been declared per se illegal under the Sher-
man Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. See, e.g., Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores Inc., 359
U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). The modern
view in antitrust law, however, is that boycotts are per se unlawful only if they involve
activity that falls within the category that antitrust law has defined as having predomi-
nantly anticompetitive effects. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Sta-
tionery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
447(1986).
16. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (holding that
secondary boycott by civil rights group is protected by the First Amendment); Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982) (holding that secon-
dary labor/political boycott is not protected); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers' Ass'n,
493 U.S. 411 (1990) (holding that secondary boycott by criminal defense lawyers aimed at
influencing governmental action is not protected).
17. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
18. 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
19. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
812 [Vol. 41
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that secondary boycotts seeking political objectives are protected
from governmental regulation unless a labor union is involved or
unless the boycott is for the purpose of advancing the participants'
own economic self-interest. 0 What is protected First Amendment
expression for civil rights or women's rights groups21 becomes for
other groups illegal activity subject to governmental suppression.
First Amendment doctrine applicable to boycotts has consequently
developed in a very context-specific manner-boycotts by labor
groups have been analyzed differently than boycotts of business or
civil rights groups.
22
As Justice Stevens explained in the Claiborne Hardware deci-
sion, group boycotts seem to have a "chameleon-like character"
which can exhibit "elements of criminality and elements of maj-
esty."2 Indeed, from the very first time the word boycott appeared in
a reported decision in America,24 judges have used the word to sig-
nify inflammatory, as well as sublime, legal meanings and connota-
tions.25 Judges have compared group boycotts to "blood thirsty ti-
gers," and they have analyzed boycott activity as if it were a
"disease" infecting the internal biological system of the body.
26
Judges have compared group boycotts to "soapbox oratory," and they
have concluded that boycott activity is "a special form of political
20. Taken together, the Supreme Court's decisions in Claiborne Hardware, Allied
International and Trial Lawyers suggest that the Court distinguishes between political
and economic boycotts, providing a higher degree of constitutional protection to those
boycotts perceived to be more political and less economic. Whether this distinction bodes
well for the labor movement is debatable. See James G. Pope, Labor-Community Coali-
tions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution,
69 TEX. L. REV. 889, 923 (1991) [hereinafter Pope, Labor Community Boycotts]; James G.
Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitu-
tional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 348-52 (1990) [hereinafter Pope, Republican Mo-
ments]; Gary Minda, Rediscovering Progressive Labor Politics: The Labor Law Implica-
tions of Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 16 VT. L.
REV. 71, 118-32 (1991) [hereinafter Minda, Progressive Labor Politics].
21. See Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.) (holding that a
boycott called by NOW aimed at securing ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment is
protected First Amendment activity and hence insulated from antitrust regulation), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
22. Many other similar contradictions have complicated the judicial interpretation of
federal labor and antitrust boycott legislation. See infra notes 130-88 and accompanying
text.
23. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, Co., 458 U.S. 886, 888 (1982) (quoting Krule-
witch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 447-49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
24. State v. Glidden, 8 A. 890 (Conn. 1887); see infra notes 261-66 and accompanying
text.
25. See Mills v. United States Printing Co., 91 N.Y.S. 185, 188 (Sup. Ct. 1904) ("Some
courts have defined [the term boycott] as necessarily implying violence or intimidation, or
the threat thereof; others as but necessarily implying abstention.").
26. See infra notes 250-55, 272-73, 351-58 and accompanying text.
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communication."27 In this article I will offer an explanation of how
judges have been able to understand boycotts alternately as acts of
violence, even murder, and as acts of legitimate political activity.
Explanations of boycott doctrine have been offered that attempt
to explain the seeming indeterminacy of the case law as either the
result of instrumental policy manipulation 28 or the product of a
mistaken understanding about the nature and meaning of boy-
cotts.' While some- have attempted to construct alternative theories
for rendering the law of boycotts coherent, 0 the theories offered thus
far have failed to explain away the inconsistencies in the law.3 For
some, the law of boycotts is but another "black hole"3 2 into which the
27. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 448 (Brennan, J.)
(1990) ("Like soapbox oratory in the streets and parks, political boycotts are a traditional
means of 'communicating thoughts between citizens' and 'discussing public questions.'"
(quoting Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
28. Harry Kalven, for example, has suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in
Claiborne Hardware can only be explained in terms of the Court's historical commitment
to the civil rights movement. See HARRY KALVEN JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 123-72 (1966); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES
(1985); Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Ex-
pression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4, 16-19 (1984); James G. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of
First Amendment Values: Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189
(1984) [hereinafter Pope, Ladder].
29. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 28, at 200-03; Getman, supra note 28, at 16-19.
30. See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80
CAL. L. REV. 1177 (1992) [hereinafter Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity]; Michael
C. Harper, The Consumers Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
and Its Implications for American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409 (1984); Kay P. Kindred,
When First Amendment Values and Competition Policy Collide: Resolving the Dilemma of
Mixed-Motive Boycotts, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (1992); Seth Kupferberg, Political Strikes,
Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 685 (1985); Pope, Republican Mo-
ments, supra note 20, at 348-52; Mark D. Schneider, Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and
the First Amendment, 82 COLUIM. L. REV. 1469 (1982); Cynthia Estlund, Note, Labor
Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech,
91 YALE L.J. 938 (1982); see also Einer R. Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104
HARV. L. REV. 667, 738-46 (1991) [hereinafter Elhauge, Antitrust Process]. Professor El-
hauge's and Pope's proposals are discussed infra at notes 205-45 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Getman, supra note 28, at 16-19; Pope, Ladder, supra note 28, at 224-
28; see also TRIBE, supra note 28, at 200-03.
32. See Pope, Ladder, supra note 28, at 196. As Professor Pope explains:
A Black Hole is a region of space ... into which matter has fallen, and from
which nothing... can escape.... In the vicinity of a Black Hole, and even more
so inside one, conditions become so strange that to describe them in everyday
language is well nigh impossible. Our common sense notions and our cherished
scientific laws take a very heavy beating, and right in the center of a Black Hole
they cease to have any meaning at all.
Id. at 189 (quoting I. NICOLSON & P. MOORE, BLACK HOLES IN SPACE 6-7 (1974)); see also
TRIBE, supra note 28, at 198-203 (describing the incoherences posed by the Court's
speech/conduct distinction applicable to expressive boycotts). Professor Pope has since at-
tempted to elaborate a normative theory for rendering boycott law coherent. See Pope,
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problems of legal indeterminacy and the incommensurability of
modem law have seemingly fallen, a place from which nothing can
escape. 3 One is left with the impression that the law applicable to
boycotts is a chameleon that camouflages the exercise of contestable
normative judgments about acceptable forms of group behavior
based on different conceptions of political behavior.
The problem in the law of boycotts is not the result of a black
hole in logic or policy, nor the consequence of instrumental manipu-
lation run wild.' Rather, doctrinal indeterminacy can be understood
as the logical consequence of the way judges have used a concealed
form of argument based on metaphor' to construct and analyze
their subject.36 What appears on the surface to be indeterminacy is
Republican Moments, supra note 20. I have argued that Pope's theory of "republican mo-
ments" is rendered incoherent by the fact that Pope's theory incorporates flawed concep-
tual distinctions between politics and economics and public and private. See Minda, Pro-
gressive Labor Politics, supra note 20, at 121-32.
33. For a discussion of the problem of indeterminacy and incommensurability in con-
stitutional law, see Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Consti-
tutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (1990) [hereinafter Winter, Indeterminacy].
34. See, e.g., Pope, Ladder, supra note 28, at 199-200 ("The results and reasoning of
the [First Amendment boycott] cases are consistent either with the view that noninstru-
mental values do justify the protection of such speech, but that political speech has prior-
ity because it is 'more than self-expression,' or with the view that protection of all speech
other than commercial and labor speech is justified primarily with reference to the politi-
cal system, but that some speech is more attenuated in value and thus merits less pro-
tection." (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).
35. Metaphor is a powerful "concealed form of argument by analogy... which is it-
self intimately connected to the growth of language and thought...." Michael Boudin,
Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 395, 395 (1986). Professor
Boudin illustrates how the "sway of metaphor" in antitrust opinions has influenced the
development of antitrust concepts such as the "bottleneck doctrine," "price-fixing theory,"
and "toehold." Id.
Until recently, legal scholars have ignored the importance of metaphor in legal
analysis. The conventional scholarship has understood metaphor as merely a colorful de-
vice used in legal descriptions to conjure up mental images. See David A. Anderson,
Metaphorical Scholarship, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1205, 1214-15 (1991) (book review). Steven L.
Winter, however, has persuasively demonstrated how metaphor is linked to cognitive un-
derstanding in a variety of legal contexts. See Steven L. Winter, Death Is the Mother of
Metaphor, 105 HARV. L. REV. 745 (1992) (book review); Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of
"Under Color of" Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323 (1992) [hereinafter Winter, Under Color of
Law]; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance,
40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988) [hereinafter Winter, The Metaphor of Standing]; Steven L.
Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for
Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, Transcendental Nonsense]; Ste-
ven L. Winter, Legal Storytelling: The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal
Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, The
Cognitive Dimension]; Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 639 (1990) [hereinafter Winter, Bull Durham]; see also HAIG BOSMAJIAN,
METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1992).
36. An inquiry into the process of how.legal meaning is created and produced in law
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in fact the intelligible practice of representing the meaning of reality
in the law-a process that entails the use of metaphor to construct
understandings about the real world events of boycotts. Judges
construct a reality of group boycotts for different contexts; that real-
ity has generated different legal meanings for boycotts in different
legal spheres.
By focusing on the relationship between the legal structure of
boycott doctrine and the subjectivity of human imagination, I will
explain how the seemingly indeterminate nature of boycott decisions
can be understood as a coherent practice arising from differentimaginative understandings about boycotts."5 What Justice Stevens
is often ignored in traditional legal scholarship. This article draws from the emerging
critical legal studies literature that examines the way meaning is created by subjects and
culture as a result of the dynamic of "social construction." See, e.g., James Boyle, Is Sub-
jectivity Possible? The Post-Modern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489
(1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Modera-
tion As a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 776-87 (1991) (discussing the
social construction thesis in the new public law scholarship); Jennifer Wicke, Postmodern
Identity And The Legal Subject, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 455 (1991).
This social construction thesis developed from the insight that legal meaning, as well
as thought, belief, and desire are the products of an actor who "creates" understandings
through experientially based knowledge and whose understanding is itself constructed by
social structures and by previously established social thought. The basic notion is that le-
gal meaning about the world "comes from within" the interpreter and is constituted by an
external social and cultural environment. See Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the
Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEo. L.J. 37 (1987); Pierre Schlag, Normative and No-
where to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990); Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi":
The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOzO L. REV. 1631
(1990); Winter, Indeterminacy, supra note 33; Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 35; see
also Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985).
37. The reasoning process that judges use to justify their work is a good example of
what Pierre Schlag has dubbed "the problem of the subject." See Pierre Schlag, The Prob-
lem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1991). The problem of the subject refers to the
many ways that we avoid focusing on the "question of who or what thinks or produces
law." Id. at 1629. According to Schlag, it is "[tihis forgetting of the 'we' who do the
'expounding,' this bracketing of the TI-in short, this eclipse of the problem of the subject-
[which] became a vital, pervasive, constitutive characteristic of American legal thought."
Id. at 1628. This question of "who is the subject" is also frequently ignored in legal aca-
demic work because legal academics sometimes assume that legal scholarship is an ob-
jective, autonomous enterprise unaffected by subjective influences of the author. The
subject, however, is always present and always affecting the authors construction of real-
ity. See Pierre Schlag, Legal Scholarship: Contradiction and Denial, 87 McH. L. REV.
1216, 1220 (1989); Pierre Schlag, The Critique of Normativity Article: Normativity and the
Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 834, 839 (1991).
38. In other words, the legal meanings of boycott are determined by the structures of
metaphoric reasoning, much in the same way that Claude Ivi-Strauss has shown how
myths of indigenous people depend upon the structure of cultural myths. See CLAUDE
LUvI-STRAuss, STRUCTURALANTHROPOLOGY (Claire Jacobson & Brooke G. Schoepf trans.,
Anchor Books 1967) (1963). Thus, this article will focus on the field of social practice that
other critical theorists have found to define and create law. See generally Rosemary
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took to be the "chameleon-like character" of boycott doctrine is in
fact the intelligible product of an imaginative process structured by
metaphor which judges have used to support their legal analyses
and conclusions about group boycotts. 9 My thesis is that the law of
boycotts can best be understood by considering how language and
power are mediated by a metaphoric structure of thought upon
which judges have relied for attributing legal meaning to social
events.
Part H will explore how the modern law of boycotts has been
plagued by four paradigmatic boycott problems that have resisted
resolution by scholars. Part M will then show how the law of boy-
cotts has been molded by a language of socially constructed and
highly contingent representations of real world events. Part IV will
examine the implications of the current state of the law of boycotts
for the constitutional right of citizens to boycott for political objec-
tives.40 Finally, in Part V, I will argue that an organic right of politi-
cal participation, developed from an understanding of cultural prac-
tices, offers a more meaningful basis for developing a constitutional
right to boycott as a political act.
II. THE CHAMELEON-LIKE NATURE OF BOYCOT DocTRINE
The modem crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies defini-
tion. Despite certain elementary and essential elements, it also, chame-
leon-like, takes on a special coloration from each of the many independent
offenses on which it may be overlaid.4 '
The boycott of white merchants in Claiborne County, Miss., that gave rise
to this litigation had such a character; it included elements of criminality
and elements of majesty.
4 2
There are terms in law, like conspiracy and boycott, that seem
to have a chameleon-like quality in the sense that their meaning de-
pends on what Justice Jackson once described as the special colora-
Coombe, Room for Manoeuver: Toward a Theory of Practice in Critical Legal Studies, 14
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 69, 115-17 (1989).
39. Legal concepts do matter, but metaphor provides an effective way to uncover the
meaning and complexity of law. See Winter, Under Color of Law, supra note 35, at 332;
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note 35, at 1374.
40. Several years ago Professor Michael Harper called for the recognition of a consti-
tutional right to boycott as a political act. See Harper, supra note 30, at 409. Professor
Harper argued that "[any secure basis for a right to boycott must trump a state's efforts
to protect its economy from disruption. An individual's decision to join a consumer boycott
must be protected precisely because it enables the individual to affect the economy, not in
spite of such effects." Id. at 421; see also Kupferberg, supra note 30, at 689 (advocating
the development of protected right of workers to engage in political strikes in labor law).
41. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 449 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
42. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 888 (1982) (Stevens, J.).
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tion of context. Contextual coloration refers to the way which legal
meaning is affected by the particular legal setting in which a legal
concept is analyzed. It was Justice Jackson's notion of "contextual
coloration" which led Justice Stevens to remark in NAACP v. Clai-
borne Hardware that legal concepts applicable to group boycott have
a "chameleon-like character."43 As Justice Scalia explained in 1991,
because "boycotts rarely exist in a vacuum,"' judges must consider
their contextual setting to determine the legal meaning to be at-
tributed to the activity. Legal doctrines applicable to group boycotts
do have a chameleon-like nature because context often plays an im-
portant, albeit submerged, role in determining how doctrine oper-
ates in litigation.
In our legal system, contextual coloration and chameleon-like
doctrines represent a threat to the system's claim to legitimacy be-
cause they conflict with principles of objectivity and neutrality upon
which judge-made law is thought to be justified.45 The idea that legal
decision-making should be contained and bounded by principled and
-consistent argument is a pervasive ethic of the legal profession. If
the meaning of the law changes like the color of the chameleon, then
how can it be said that law is fair, just, or legitimate?
Judges in boycott cases have responded to the problem by
evading it. Judges sometimes acknowledge that boycott doctrines
are chameleon-like, but when they do, they approach boycott prob-
43. Id.
44. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. 1842, 1852 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
45. See, e.g., MELviN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 8 (1988)
(arguing that '[in a society like ours, which is complex, impersonal, and not officially re-
ligious, courts derive their legitimacy in substantial part from [principles of] objectivity.").
I do not mean to suggest that judge-made law is or ought to be built on unitary con-
cepts, or that judges lack discretion in resolving hard cases. By objectivity, I mean an un-
derstanding of the legal reasoning process characteristic of the objectivist position in
cognitive theory. See, e.g., MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF
MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON, xxi-xxv (1987) [hereinafter JOHNSON, BODY IN THE
MIND]; see also GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD
GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR (1989); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS
THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987) [hereinafter LAKOFF,
WOMEN, FIRE]. The objectivist position rests upon three general epistomological claims
about meaning and rationality. As Steven L. Winter has explained:
First, it treats the world as filled with determinate, mind-independent objects
with inherent characteristics unrelated to human interactions. Second, it un-
derstands categorization either as about natural sets of objects in the world or,
when it recognizes categorization as humanly constructed, as about objects with
ascertainable properties or criteria that establish their commonality. Finally, it
treats reasoning as about propositions and principles that are capable of
"mirroring" those objects and accurately describing their properties and rela-
tions.
Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 35, at 1107-08.
818 [Vol. 41
19931 THE LAWAND METAPHOR OF BOYCOTT 819
lems in a surprisingly unreflective manner-they assume that they
can resolve boycott disputes under legal standards that apply to all
boycott cases in a similar manner. In some cases, judges ignore the
fact that boycotts are characterized differently in other fields of law.
In still others, judges wield the term boycott as an epithet for char-
acterizing as illegal some group activity, without bothering to con-
sider the fact that the word has enjoyed less disparaging meanings
in other areas of the law. Inconsistency in the case law is frequently
rationalized in terms of the bounded categories limiting, separating,
and containing different legal subjects.'
Thus, in some legal contexts the word boycott is used to signify
a threat or menace, or an ominous foreboding of mob violence, or
blacklisting and social ostracism, or even murder. For others, boy-
cott is a word associated with the exercise of freedom to abstain or to
dissent as an expression of political protest of civil rights groups and
other mass movements of popular sovereignty.47 In other contexts,
boycott is a word that is as American as apple pie; in others, boycott
signifies activity that is subversive of the very fabric of the American
way of life.4 In the case law of boycotts, one can discover rich49 but
46. These evasion strategies work because lawyers are trained to approach their
subject from the perspective of a "metaphoric container." An important metaphoric image
in law is the notion of a container which marks off a bounded mental space between ob-
jects, people, events, and ideas. Legal arguments are containers for conveying ideas as
objects. Legal categories distinguish by way of an "in-out" orientation. Rational legal
analysis proceeds on the basis of the principle "either P or not-P." The experiential orien-
tation of "in-out" enables judges to compare cases in applying the principles of stare deci-
sis. What connects all of these experiences in law is the basic metaphoric image of a con-
tainer. For a discussion of the metaphoric importance of the container in structuring our
ideas about the reasoning process generally, see JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note
45, at 21-40.
47. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 907.
48. Compare American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 248-49 (D.C.
Cir. 1942), affid, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (considering that the boycott called by the American
Medical Association was unamerican) with FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n,
493 U.S. 411, 447 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Expressive boycotts have been a
principal means of political communication since the birth of the Republic."). See also
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 888 (advancing the notion that political
boycotts can have elements of "majesty").
49. Professor Pope, for example, argues that the Supreme Court's leading boycott
decisions can be seen to reflect a "three-systems ladder theory" of constitutional order:
Order in the political system is at the transcendent end of the spectrum and re-
quires a high level of judicial scrutiny and intervention. Order in the labor sys-
tem is at the opposite, immanent end of the spectrum and can be safely left to
Congress. The commercial system lies between these two extremes.
Pope, Ladder, supra, note 28 at 200; see also Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitu-
tional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 224-29 (1981) (arguing that the
Court's understanding of Constitutional order has vacillated between a "transcendent"
vision which derives the essence of the Constitution from the text of the document, and
an "immanent" vision which develops the meaning of constitutional order from the spon-
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conflicting judicial images of dissent and popular sovereignty.6
A. Four Characteristic Boycott Problems.
While the current state of boycott doctrine remains mired in
indeterminacy, judges interpret boycott activity in ways that suggest
that they believe their decisions to be rational, objective and consis-
tent. Judges write boycott opinions that rationalize outcomes under
an objectivist understanding of legal analysis"' while ignoring the
attention drawn by commentators to the contrasting and inconsis-
tent result of the cases.2 Before explaining the role which metaphor
has played in this practice, it will be helpful to first review four basic
legal problems that have typically troubled judges in deciding legal
issues involving group boycotts.
There are many federal and state courts decisions, decided at
different historical periods, that could be utilized to demonstrate
why the chameleon-like nature of boycott doctrine is inconsistent
with traditional judicial notions of objectivity and legal neutrality.
In this part I will review four Supreme Court decisions which I be-
lieve serve to illustrate four paradigmatic boycott problems for the
law-the problem of "force," "political expression," "motive," and
"definition." This part will also examine the key legal distinctions
that judges have relied upon in solving these four problems.
1. The Problem of Force: Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.
5 3
The Supreme Court's 1911 decision in Gompers highlights one
meaning of boycott that has come to influence judicial understand-
ings about labor boycotts. In Gompers, the Court concluded that the
mere promotion of a threatened boycott could be enjoined because
"verbal acts" are like the "use of any other force whereby property is
unlawfully damaged."'
The labor leader Samuel Gompers and several high-ranking of-
taneous political struggle occurring in everyday life).
50. See generally Pope, Labor Community Boycotts, supra note 20.
51. That is, judges write opinions which reflect the epistomological and linguistic as-
sumptions that cognitive theorists have attributed to the objectivist theory of meaning.
See Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 35, at 1107-08.
52. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 28, at 200-03; Pope, Republican Moments, supra note
20, at 351-52; Getman, supra note 28, at 16-19; Harper, supra note 30, at 419, 427, 442;
Kupferberg, supra note 30, at 706, 715, 718, 727; Pope, Ladder, supra note 28, at 224-28.
53. 221 U.S. 418 (1911). The Supreme Court's decision in the Gompers case had been
largely ignored by labor law scholars until James Pope rediscovered its significance. See
Pope, Ladder, supra note 28, at 217-18. For the historical background of the decision, see
LAIDLER, supra note 1, at 134-50; HAROLD C. LIVESAY, SAIMEL GOMPERS AND ORGANIZED
LABOR IN AMERICA 144-47, 162 (1978).
54. 221 U.S. at 439.
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ficials of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) were convicted of
civil contempt for violating a court injunction which had prohibited
them from publicizing "in any manner" a boycott against the Bucks
Stove & Range Co.55 The stove polishers went on strike, ignored the
injunction, and declared a boycott of Bucks Stove & Range's prod-
ucts. The leadership of the AFL was subsequently asked by the
strikers to put the company on its "We Don't Patronize" list, pub-
lished regularly in the AFL's trade union newspaper, American Fed-
erationist.6 Gompers and the AFL agreed and a national boycott
was called and publicized by the international union.5
The Bucks Stove & Range Co. responded by obtaining an in-
junction against the AFL and its officers proscribing any interfer-
ence with the sale of Bucks Stove & Range Co. products "in any
manner," including "declaring or threatening any boycott... or as-
sisting such boycott."58 The Supreme Court reversed the contempt
convictions of Gompers and two other union officials on procedural
grounds,59 but the Court's approval of the use of injunction against
the promotion of a boycott constituted a stinging precedent for or-
ganized labor.5
Justice Lamar, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that
the publication of the boycott notice was a "force not inhering in the
words themselves," but served rather as an implied "agreement to
55. 221 U.S. at 419; see LIVESAY, supra note 53, at 146. The case arose out of a bitter
labor campaign to prevent the Bucks Stove & Range Company from ordering members of
the stove polishers' union to work a ten-hour day instead of the accustomed nine hours.
The controversy was bitter and highly publicized because James Van Cleve, president of
the Bucks Stove & Range Company, was, also, president of the National Association of
Manufacturers, an organization characterized within the labor movement as "a kind of
antilabor chamber of commerce and Lions Club combined." Id. at 145-46.
56. See LIVESAY, supra note 53, at 146. The American Federationist was established
in 1893 by the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Id. at 90. Gompers served as the
newspaper's editor, reporter, columnist, and proofreader. Id. The AFL's "Please Do Not.
Patronize" list was in fact compiled in response to the blacklist, one of the most insidious
but effective forms of boycott practiced by employer groups. Id. at 39.
57. Id. at 146.
58. 221 U.S. at 420-21 n.1. Gdmpers and two other union officers defied the court's
injunction and were subsequently cited for contempt of court. The conviction was upheld
by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and Gompers received a one-year sen-
tence. During the appeal process, however, the president of the Bucks Stove Company
died and his successor dropped the case against Gompers, allowing Gmpers to avoid a
term in jail. See LIVESAY, supra note 53, at 143-47.
59. 221 U.S. at 451-52. Because the union and the company settled the civil action
from which the civil contempt proceedings arose, the Court concluded that the contempt
convictions against Gompers and other union leaders could not stand. Id.
60. The Gompers decisioi, along with the Court's decision in Lowe v. Lawlor, 208
U.S. 274 (1908) [the Danbury Hatters case], ushered in the infamous era of the labor in-
junction. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
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act in concert when the signal [to boycott] was published .... "61 In
rejecting the union's claim that the mere act of publicizing a boycott
was entitled to First Amendment protection as an expression of the
"liberty of speech," the Court reasoned that the union's publicity in-
volved "verbal acts' and as much subject to injunction as the use of
any other force whereby property is unlawfully damaged."62
One weakness of the Court's decision was that only publicity
was enjoined; another was that the Court upheld the injunction de-
spite there being no lower court evidentiary finding that the union
had directed its membership to coerce or threaten anyone.6 While
the Court recognized that the judges may "differ as to what consti-
tutes a boycott that may be enjoined," Justice Lamar failed to ex-
plain the basis for concluding that the mere publication of a boycott
was "a means whereby a boycott is unlawfully continued, and...
amount[s] to a violation of the order of injunction.""
The Court was most concerned that the "vast power" of the
"multitudes of members" of a labor organization could render an in-
dividual "helpless" in the face of a boycott threat .6  Labor boycott
slogans such as "Unfair" and "We Don't Patronize" were interpreted
by Justice Lamar as signals for concerted action to be taken against
a helpless individual.6 Boycott publicity was understood to be
"verbal acts" which "signal" the use of "force" by a "multitudeI of
61. 221 U.S. at 439.
62. Id. at 439. Justice Lamar found two reasons why the union's "verbal acts" consti-
tuted enjoinable acts of coercion. First, the publication of slogans such as "We don't pa-
tronize" and 'Unfair" were publicized by an organization of "multitudes of members,"
giving these expressions a "force not inhering in the words themselves, and therefore ex-
ceed[ing] any possible right of speech which a single individual might have." Id. Second,
Justice Lamar concluded that the force of the words was coercive because the only way
that the employer could comply was by "purchasing peace at the cost of submitting to
terms which involve the sacrifice of rights protected by the Constitution; or by standing
on such rights and appealing to the preventive powers of a court of equity." Id. According
to Justice Lamar, "[wihen such appeal is made it is the duty of government to protect the
one against the many as well as the many against the one." Id. As Professor Pope has
noted, "the Gompers opinion set up an apparently neutral distinction-that between
'verbal acts' and speech-but let slip a strong hint that behind this distinction lay a vis-
ceral fear of organized working people." Pope, Ladder, supra note 28, at 218.
63. Gompers involved only the legality of the AFL's publication of the boycott notice.
The injunction issued against the union forbade it to interfere "in any manner with the
sale of the product" of the company or "from assisting in any such boycott, and from
printing, issuing, publishing, or distributing through the mails" any paper which
contained "any reference to the name of the complainant, its business or product in
connection with the term "Unfair,' or 'We don't patronize' list." 221 U.S. at 420-21 n.1.
64. Id. at 437. The Court cited in support of its conclusion a number of state and fed-
eral decisions that had found that publication of a boycott could be a means of continuing
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members. In the presence of such force the Court concluded that
an individual would be helpless, because such an individual would be
forced to sacrifice rights protected by the Constitution in order to avoid
the likelihood of property damage caused by the force of verbal action."
While Justice Lamar attempted to justify his conclusion on the
basis of his belief that the AFL, a powerful union with "multitudes of
members," was threatening to boycott someone, he also expressly
recognized the "right of workingmen to unite and to invite others to
join their ranks.... "69 But if publicity is coercive merely because a
group disseminates a message that causes others to act, then the
ostensibly Court-affirmed legal right of workers to join and associate
for a common cause would seem to be a hollow and ineffectual one. 0
Boycott slogans such as "Unfair" and "We Don't Patronize" would be
a force only if the union's message was found by others to be per-
suasive. The reasons why the promotion of a labor boycott, in the
absence of evidence of actual or potential coercion or physical force,





70. The publicity could be seen as analogous to so-called signal picketing which
courts have since treated as conduct involving "an automatic response to a signal rather
than a reasoned response to an idea." See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local
1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). Other justices have
made similar distinctions. See, e.g., Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S.
769, 776-77 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring) (distinguishing between speech and speech-
plus activity); see also Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 336 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); NAACP v. Buton, 371 U.S.
415, 453 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); THOIAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 80, 444-49 (1970) (discussing the distinction between action and expression).
This notion, however, has been criticized by both labor and First Amendment scholars.
See Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court 1979 Term-Foreword: Freedom of Expression in
the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1, 37-38 (1980) [hereinafter Cox, Foreword]; Archibald
Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574, 594-602 (1951); John H.
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1494-96 (1975); Harry Kalven Jr., The Con-
cept of the Public Forum: Coxv. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 23.
The problem with the theory of signaling is that it requires judges to make subtle
judgments about the motives and intentions of participants in a boycott. Because the in-
tended signal of a boycott may be ambiguous, judges would have to inquire into the con-
tent of communication to determine motives and intentions of the parties. Such an in-
quiry would grant to judges the power to restrict expressive conduct because of its mes-
sage, ideas or content. This would result in government censorship.
71. One explanation for the decision is that the message advanced by an organized
group of workers was itself coercive and dangerous. See Pope, Ladder, supra note 28, at
218. In Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, however, the Supreme Court invali-
dated an ordinance which prohibited picketing near public schools unless the picketing
was related to a labor dispute. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). As Justice Marshall argued for the
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Gompers has never been overruled and the legal meaning of
boycott upon which the decision rests is now deeply entrenched in
labor law discourse despite heavy criticism arguing the contrary72 . It
is now well accepted that state or federal governments may regulate
peaceful labor boycotts in order to protect society from the economic
disruption of boycotts.73 The courts have also accepted the notion
that the signalling effects of boycott publicity can be regulated as
"verbal acts."74
Judges have often concluded that boycotts involving physical
force and violence, activity that the state prohibits outside of a boy-
cott, should be enjoined and declared illegal,75 and that violent ac-
tors associated with the group boycott may be subject to civil and
criminal penalties.76 Judges have also had little trouble declaring a
boycott unlawful if it is found to pose a serious threat to the health,
safety and welfare of the community. 77 What judges have had diffi-
culty with is explaining why otherwise peaceful and non-violent boy-
cott activity may be enjoined simply because it has an impact on
targeted and non-targeted parties.
2. The Problem of Political Expression: NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware C0.78 In 1990, more than seventy years after Gompers, the
Supreme Court discovered a different legal meaning of a group boy-
cott staged by a civil rights group protesting the racially discrimina-
tory practices of white merchants and civic leaders in Claiborne
majority: "[The infirmity of the ordinance is] that it describes permissible picketing in
terms of its subject matter .... [Albove all else, the First Amendment means that gov-
ernment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its idea, its subject
matter, or its content .... " Id. at 95-96; see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)
(holding that communications concerning an employer's labor policies deserve as much
protection as communications concerning an employer's stand on civil rights or other po-
litical matters). As Kenneth Karst has argued, Mosley and its progeny establishes a
commitment to equality of expression as a fundamental principle of freedom of speech.
Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REv. 20, 29 (1975). Publicity concerning a labor boycott should be entitled to the same
equality of expression.
72. See Pope, Ladder, supra note 28, at 217-18.
73. While the Supreme Court recognized in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-
05 (1940), that picketing is a form of speech that cannot be absolutely prohibited by gov-
ernment, the Court has also recognized that picketing and boycotting involve non-speech
elements which can be regulated because such activity may affect a compelling govern-
mental interest. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 501 (1949);
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 612-13 (1980).
74. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607
(1980).
75. See Harper, supra note 30, at 432-34.
76.Id.
77. Id.
78. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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County, Mississippi. The local branch of the NAACP, attempting to
transform an entrenched cultural regime of institutional racism in
Claiborne County, petitioned private merchants and governmental
leaders to provide equal opportunity for African Americans.79 When
their efforts failed, several hundred citizen's churches voted unani-
mously to boycott white merchants. Citizen groups picketed white-
owned businesses, and an organized group known as the "Deacons"
or "Black Hats" enforced the boycott.80 Violators of the boycott were
characterized as "traitors" to the African-American community and
were socially ostracized; in a few isolated incidents traitors were
physically attacked.8 The Court unanimously held that the courts of
Mississippi could not constitutionally enforce tort judgments for re-
covery of economic losses attributed to the boycott. Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, concluded that the civil rights boycott in-
volved a form of political expression seeking to influence governmen-
tal action and economic change that was constitutionally protected
by the speech, assembly, association and petition clauses of the First
Amendment. 2
Justice Stevens depicted the civil rights boycott as a political:
act involving the assertion of collective economic power to achieve a
political objective. Recognizing that the boycott involved more than
peaceful assembly, Justice Stevens emphasized that the boycott re-
lied upon protected elements of speech to further its aims, explain-
ing:
Nonparticipants repeatedly were urged to join the common cause, both
through public address and through personal solicitation. These elements
of the boycott involve speech in its most direct form. In addition, names of
boycott violators were read aloud at meetings ... and published in a local
black newspaper. Petitioners admittedly sought to persuade others to join
the boycott through social pressure and the 'threat' of social ostracism.
79. See 458 U.S. at 889-900.
80. Id. at 903-04.
81. Id. at 904. There were four incidents of violence attributed to the boycott, includ-
ing two which involved gun shots fired into the homes of non-boycotters. Id. Charles
Evers, the Field Secretary of the NAACP, was reported to have threatened to break the
neck of any boycott violator. Id. at 902.
82. Id. at 911. The California Supreme Court, in Environmental Planning & Info.
Council v. Superior Court, extended the Claiborne Hardware decision to provide protec-
tion to a nonprofit environmental organization's boycott against a newspaper publisher's
editorial policies on environmental matters. 680 P.2d 1086 (Cal. 1984). In finding that the
boycott could not be enjoined under state law, the California Supreme Court rejected the
publisher's argument that only civil rights boycotts should be afforded constitutional pro-
tection. Id. at 1092 (quoting Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 914). The California Su-
preme Court emphasized that it was "precluded by the First Amendment itself from
gauging the degree of Constitutional protection by the content or subject matter of the
speech. .. ." Id. at 1092.
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Speech does not lose its protected character, however, simply because it
may embarrass others or coerce them into action.
s3
Justice Stevens failed to explain why the boycott did not pose
the type of compulsory force that courts in labor cases like Gompers
had found to justify the imposition of an injunction against labor
groups that utilize similar elements of speech and conduct to ac-
complish their objectives." The problem of force posed by the labor
boycott in Gompers was unrecognized even though the Court in
Claiborne Hardware acknowledged that the record revealed that the
boycott had involved elements of compulsory force.m
In Claiborne Hardware, the Court downplayed evidence of co-
ercion, force, and criminality and focused instead on what Justice
Stevens characterized as the majestic elements of the boycott. The
Court emphasized that the boycott was aimed at political objectives:
"Its acknowledged purpose was to secure compliance by both civic
and business leaders with a lengthy list of demands for equality and
racial justice.""6 In finding that the boycott was "a form of speech or
conduct" protected by the First Amendment, Justice Stevens also
emphasized that the boycotters "banded together and collectively
expressed their dissatisfaction with a social structure that had de-
nied them rights to equal treatment and respect."87 The boycott was
characterized as an attempt by a disempowered subordinate group
to oppose an arbitrary and unjust legal and social regime. In Clai-
borne Hardware, the boycott was thus linked with images of legality,
83. 458 U.S. at 909-10.
84. Justice Stevens relied upon a number of First Amendment cases dealing with
other forms of expressive conduct without considering their applicability to labor boycotts.
Id. at 910-13 (citing Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971)
(distribution of leaflets) and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning draft
card)). Gompers may have been overlooked because it was a labor case, while Claiborne
Hardware was litigated as a civil rights case.
85. While the boycott in Claiborne Hardware was in most respects peaceful and or-
derly, the trial record disclosed that the black community in Claiborne County was
threatened by the "Black Hats" or the "Deacons." Id. at 903-04. Several incidents, some
substantiated by the evidence, some of doubtful credibility, reflected a general attitude of
hostility towards violators of the boycott. Id. at 904-05. For instance, a brick was thrown
through a car windshield of a violator, in two instances shots were fired at a house, and
one violator was allegedly beaten. Id. Justice Stevens' response to this was that "there is
no evidence-apart from the speeches themselves-that... threatened acts of violence."
Id. at 929. Applying the Court's decision in Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941), which held that "insubstantial find-
ings" of "trivial rough incident[s]" and "moment[s] of animal exuberance" fail to invalidate
otherwise peaceful picketing, Justice Stevens concluded that the findings in the record
were "constitutionally inadequate to support the damages judgment against [the leader of
the boycott]." Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 929.
86. 458 U.S. at 907.
87. Id.
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and it was state tort law which became linked with ideas of crimi-
nality. The social context of the white Southern culture apparently
enabled the Court to downplay elements of force and see only the
majestic elements of this boycott.
When the Court in the same term considered the question of
whether to sanction political expression associated with a secondary
labor boycott, however, the image of force projected in federal labor
law controlled the legal meaning of boycott. In International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n v. Allied International, Inc.'s the Court held that a
secondary boycott by longshoremen of a ship bound for Russia to
protest the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan was an illegal
secondary boycott that could be enjoined by the courts, even though
the boycott was premised upon a purely- political objective. While
secondary boycotts seeking economic justice for African Americans
were found to be constitutionally protected, secondary boycotts by
labor seeking economic justice for workers, or boycotts seeking to
communicate a message about foreign trade and international jus-
tice, have not.
Allied International and Claiborne Hardware serve to highlight
two different colors of the chameleon-like character of modern boy-
cott doctrine. In emphasizing the constitutional and political charac-
ter of the Claiborne Hardware boycott, the Court adopted an inter-
pretation of the First Amendment that protects boycotts as acts of
political expression even when activity of the boycott threatens those
against whom it is directed. In Allied International, the modern day
equivalent of Gompers, the Court refused to apply that interpreta-
tion to protect a political boycott by labor because the boycott was
found to be proscribed by federal labor legislation. What makes the
civil rights boycott in Claiborne Hardware appear majestic, and
what makes the labor union boycott inAllied International threaten-
ing and dangerous, has since remained an enigma.
3. The Problem of Motive: FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n (Trial Lawyers). 9 In some instances the contextual coloration
of a boycott is unclear because the boycott is the product of mixed
motives. When this mixing occurs, the legal characterization of boy-
cott becomes more difficult, as FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n illustrates. The Trial Lawyers case involved an antitrust
challenge brought by the Federal Trade Commission against a boy-
88. 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
89. 493 U.S. 411 (1990). I have discussed the implications of the Trial Lawyers deci-
sion for labor and antitrust law in Minda, Progressive Labor Politics, supra note 20 at 74-
135; see also Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern
Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905, 986-99 (1990)
[hereinafter Minda, Interest Groups].
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cott organized by a group of criminal defense lawyers practicing
pursuant to the District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act. The law-
yers, who represented indigent criminal defendants under the Act,
conducted a boycott in an attempt to extract higher hourly fees from
the District of Columbia government. The lawyers argued that their
boycott was a constitutionally protected exercise of their First
Amendment right to petition government, and asserted also that the
boycott was necessary to advance the Sixth Amendment rights of
their clients. The Court rejected their argument, holding six to three
that the boycott constituted an illegal price fixing conspiracy, pro-
scribed per se under the Sherman Antitrust Act 90
Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court distinguished his opinion
in Claiborne Hardware, holding that First Amendment protections
for civil rights boycotts are limited to instances where the boycotters
seek no special economic advantage for themselves, but instead ad-
vance a constitutional principle that transcends the interests of the
individual." The lawyers' boycott was found to fall outside the con-
stitutional umbrella for expressive boycotts created by the Court in
Claiborne Hardware on a finding that that the boycott was moti-
vated by an economic incentive to fix the price of their services, not
the advancement of a transcendent constitutional valueY2 The criti-
cal factor distinguishing Trial Lawyers from Claiborne Hardware
was financial motivation: those participating in the civil rights boy-
cott did not "stand to profit financially from a lessening of competi-
tion in the boycotted market,"93 while those participating in the law-
yers' boycott were found to be financially interested.
After Trial Lawyers, financial motivation becomes a critical
factor in determining whether antitrust immunity will protect the
participants of a mixed-motive boycott.9 4 Constitutional objectives
may confer antitrust immunity upon a boycott if the boycotters are
not financially interested in the target of their boycott. Moreover,
after Trial Lawyers, "benign motivations, constitutional or other-
90.493 U.S. at 425-27; see Stephen Calkins, The October 1989 Supreme Court Term
and Antitrust: Power, Access, and Legitimacy, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 339, 341-55 (1991).
91. 493 U.S. at 426.
92. In separate concurring opinions by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, three Jus-
tices disagreed about the appropriateness of applying the antitrust standard of per se il-
legality to the lawyers' boycott, but agreed that the boycott could be regulated under the
less strict antitrust standard of the Rule of Reason. All nine Justices agreed that the law-
yers' boycott was subject to antitrust regulation. 493 U.S. at 436-39 (Brennan & Marshall,
JJ., concurring in part & dissenting in part); id. at 453-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part).
93. 493 U.S. at 427 (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486
U.S. 492, 508 (1988)); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915
(1982).
94. See Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 1208-11.
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wise, are not sufficient to confer immunity on a financially inter-
ested restraint used to seek governmental action."95 Unfortunately,
as the Court has acknowledged, "boycotts are not a unitary phe-
nomenon"96 that permit easy classification based on the single crite-
rion of motive.
When collective action is involved, it is naive to think that a
single motivating cause may be isolated. The Trial Lawyers boycott,
for instance, was conducted to improve the financial interests of le-
gal aid attorneys, but it was also conducted to obtain favorable legis-
lation that would increase the pool of legal aid attorneys and thus
benefit the legal representation of indigent defendants. The Trial
Lawyers boycott was therefore a mixed-motive boycott. It would be
naive to believe that a boycott aimed at influencing government
policy decisionmaking could be a single-motive boycott; there are
simply too many participants and too many motivations to expect
such unity of purpose. In a mixed-motive boycott, motive becomes an
unworkable standard for determining the right to boycott because
judges cannot be expected to determine what goes on in a person's
heart or mind to determine if the boycott was the product of legiti-
mate or illegitimate motives.
Justice Stevens' attempt in Trial Lawyers to distinguish be-
tween economic and political boycotts is also inconsistent with Allied
International,9 7 where the Court rejected the argument that a secon-
dary labor boycott seeking purely political objectives was protected
by the First Amendment. Indeed, the Allied International boycott
would seem to have been a prime candidate for First Amendment
protection because of all the boycott cases decided by the Court, it
was the furthest removed from the economic realm since the Union
was not seeking an organizational objective against the target of its
boycott; it was nevertheless found not to be constitutionally pro-
tected. Justice Stevens' decision in Trial Lawyers is also difficult to
square with the approach he took in Claiborne Hardware, where he
determined that political expression may provide a boycott with
First Amendment protection. Justice Stevens' attempt to distinguish
Claiborne Hardware on the purported factual ground that the civil
95. Although some have argued that an objective motivation test is warranted, El-
hauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 1208-11, all objective tests will
be constructed through the subjective perspective of judges. Motivation cannot be under-
stood in a vacuum. The Trial Lawyers Court ignored this problem; the Court simply found
that subjective motive was irrelevant to the question of antitrust petitioning immunity.
493 U.S. at 427 n.11.
96. St. Paul Fire & Marine, Inc. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 543 (1978) (quoting PHILLIP
AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYsIs 381 (2d ed. 1974)).
97. International Longshoremen's Ass'x v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
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rights boycotters "sought no special advantage for themselves" 8 ig-
nores the fact that the civil rights boycotters were protesting the fact
that African Americans were denied economic opportunities in Clai-
borne County.9
Apparently, when boycott activity takes place on the streets, as
it did in Allied International and Trial Lawyers, the Court is less
willing to find constitutional protection for the expressive compo-
nents of the boycott.' 0 Claiborne Hardware represents the rare ex-
ception to this phenomenon, but even that case is made problematic
by Trial Lawyers, because financial motivation was a motivating
factor in Claiborne Hardware; elimination of racially discriminatory
practices would have led to greater economic opportunities for mi-
norities. The problem is that sometimes the direct action of a finan-
cially interested economic boycott, as illustrated by the Claiborne
Hardware boycott, is necessary to further the political interests of
those unrepresented in the political process. Boycotts may be the
only vehicle for some groups to engage in a democratic process for
the advancement of their economic interests.10'
Unfortunately, the Trial Lawyers Court failed to instruct lower
court judges on how they should make choices about characterizing
other types of boycotts conducted for political and economic pur-
poses. The legal status of economic boycotts brought for such objec-
tives thus remains uncertain.
98. 493 U.S. at 426.
99. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 899, 900; see also Kindred, supra note 30, at
730 n.147.
100. When traditional forms of governmental petitioning have been involved, the
Supreme Court has had little trouble in recognizing that the right to petition government
is protected absolutely by the First Amendment. In Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, for example, the Court held that an association of railroads was pro-
tected under the First Amendment and allowed to engage in an anti-trucking publicity
campaign aimed at securing a governmentally imposed boycott of truckers through legis-
latively created restrictions applicable to the trucking industry. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). In
Noerr, the Court emphasized that the defendant's financial motivation in petitioning gov-
ernment was irrelevant. Id. at 139-40. In Trial Lawyers, however, the Court distin-
guished Noerr on the ground that the objective of the boycott (a concerted effort to fix
lawyers' fees) would be brought about by private rather than governmental action. The
immunity afforded to petitioning activity under the First Amendment was thus limited to
traditional lobbying campaigns and other political action activities seeking to influence
governmental decision-making. 493 U.S. at 425; see also Minda, Interest Groups, supra
note 89, at 990-91. Hence, where a boycott is sought by a special interest group in the
politics-as-usual sense, the Court has recognized that such activity is comparable to con-
stitutionally protected petitioning. The Trial Lawyers Court creates a new exception:
when those making decisions are not politically accountable then motivation is irrelevant
and antitrust immunity will not be justified. 493 U.S. at 412,421.
101. Economic boycotts may be the only effective vehicle through which labor groups
can express their social and political views and influence governmental and corporate
policy. See Minda, Progressive Labor Politics, supra note 20, at 124.
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4. The Problem of Definition: Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas.
10 2
In Summit Health, the Supreme Court considered the question of
the interstate commerce consequences of an alleged conspiracy to
boycott a single doctor who had complained about the loss of hospi-
tal medical staff privileges. At issue was whether the interstate
commerce requirement is a substantive or a jurisdictional basis for
determining a court's power to decide the Sherman Antitrust Act is-
sues raised by a commercial boycott.' 3
Dr. Simon J. Pinhas, a nationally respected corneal eye sur-
geon, requested that Midway Hospital Medical Center (Midway), the
hospital in which he practiced, eliminate a rule that required a sec-
ond surgeon to be in attendance at most eye surgeries. The require-
ment significantly increased the cost of eye surgery, but Medicare
determined the additional services to be unnecessary and refused
reimbursement.? l Midway refused to abolish its practice, but in-
stead offered Dr. Pinhas a "sham" contract that provided for mone-
tary payments for services not performed as an apparent effort to
compensate him for the loss in Medicare reimbursements. 10 5 When
Dr. Pinhas refused the contract and pressed his demand, Midway
initiated a peer review proceeding that resulted in Dr. Pinhas's sus-
pension. 10 6 The Hospital's Peer Review Committee also prepared an
102. 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991). Another example of the "problem of definition" is
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993). There, Justice Scalia,
for the majority, and Justice Souter, for the dissent, were unable to agree on how to de-
fine the term 'boycott' in section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Justice Scalia lim-
ited the definition of the term boycott as used in section 3(b) to those refusals to deal that
are "unrelated" or "collateral" to the objective sought by those refusing to deal. Hartford
Fire Insurance Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2911-16. Justice Souter, on the other hand, argued that
the term should be defined to include all concerted refusals to deal, even those that are
related collaterally to the objective sought by those refusing to deal. Id. at 2903. The de-
bate between Justice Scalia and Souter over dictionary definitions of the meaning of the
term 'boycott' serves to underscore how the problem of definition in the law of boycotts
has plagued legal decision-making. See also supra note 3.
103. See generally Stephen Calkins, The 1990-91 Supreme Court Term And Antitrust:
Toward Greater Certainty, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 618-37 (1992). In a commercial boycott,
boycotters utilize concerted action of the group to protect themselves from the competi-
tion of nonmembers, or they use such action to eliminate an actual or potential competi-
tor from the market. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966)
(concerted action by automobile manufacturers and dealers to eliminate discount dealers
from the market).
104. 111 S. Ct. at 1845.
105. The hospital offered Pinhas a contract for $36,000 per year (later increased by
an oral offer to $60,000) for services he would never be asked to perform. Id.
106. Id. at 1845. Midway's peer-review process of physicians was subject to federal
regulation under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101,
11111-15, 11131-37, 11151-52 (1988). The Act provides antitrust immunity if the hospi-
tal's peer-review process provides for adequate notice and fair procedures, allows for at-
torney representation and access to transcripts of proceedings, and recognizes the right of
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unfavorable report regarding Pinhas for distribution to all hospitals
to which he might apply for employment, for the alleged purpose of
"preclud[ing] him from continued competition in the market place,
not only at defendant Midway Hospital [but also] ... in California, if
not the United States." °7 Dr. Pinhas claimed that the hospital had
illegally conspired to prevent him from practicing medicine, in vio-
lation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. A major issue in the case con-
cerned the question of whether a conspiracy to boycott a single per-
son, in this instance Dr. Pinhas, affected interstate commerce so as
to establish jurisdiction under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The Ninth Circuit held that "jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act" had been established because Dr. Pinhas satisfied his require-
ment of showing that "the peer review process in general [had a] 'not
insubstantial' [effect on interstate commerce]'"-a point which, the
court said, "can hardly be disputed."0 8 The court's analysis of the
jurisdictional standard followed the commerce requirement test set
out in McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans.0 9 In McLain,
the Supreme Court concluded that the interstate commerce re-
quirements of the Sherman Act required a showing that
"'respondents' activities which allegedly have been infected by a
price-fixing conspiracy be shown 'as a matter of practical economics'
to have a not insubstantial effect on the interstate commerce in-
volved ... " o While it has never been clear what the Court meant
by "infected" activities, it had been assumed that the breadth of the
Commerce Clause gave the Sherman Act a sufficiently broad reach
to cover most illegal conspiracies, although a minority of appellate
courts have disagreed."' The Ninth Circuit in Pinhas concluded that
cross-examination of witnesses. Id. § 11112. Dr. Pinhas argued that Midway's peer-review
proceedings leading to his termination failed to conform with the Act's requirements. 111
S. Ct. at 1843.
107. 111 S. Ct. at 1846.
108. Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd., 894 F.2d 1024, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 1989). Profes-
sor Calkins has noted that the pleadings failed to satisfy this point since "the complaint
made no [jurisdictional allegation but merely alleged that the plaintiff and the defen-
dants, and one defendant hospital's medical staff, were engaged in commerce." Calkins,
supra note 103, at 625.
109. 444 U.S. 232 (1980). McLain involved an alleged conspiracy to fix real estate
brokerage commissions. The Court established that Sherman Act litigants need not make
a "particularized showing of an effect on interstate commerce caused by [an] alleged con-
spiracy to fix commission rates," in order to satisfy the interstate commerce requirement
for federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 242-43. As the McLain Court explained: "To establish
the jurisdictional element of a Sherman Act violation it would be sufficient for petitioners
to demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate commerce generated by respondents'
brokerage activity." Id. at 242.
110. Id. at 246 (citing Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 745
(1976)).
111. The phrase "infected activities" in the McLain decision has created confusion.
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the boycott against Dr. Pinhas had a sufficient nexus with interstate
commerce to confer jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court agreed that the boycott satisfied interstate
commerce jurisdictional requirements, holding that the competitive
significance of Dr. Pinhas' exclusion from the market was to be
measured "not just by a particularized evaluation of his own prac-
tice, but rather, by a general evaluation of the impact of the re-
straint on other participants and potential participants in the mar-
ket from which he [had] been excluded.""' A sufficient nexus with
interstate commerce existed, Justice Stevens reasoned for the ma-
jority, because the hospital's peer review committee served as the
"gateway that control[led] access to the market for [Dr. Pinhas's]
services.""' The Court measured the effect or threatened effect of
the boycott against Dr. Pinhas in particular by considering the po-
tential harm that might ensue if the boycott against a single doctor
were successful in closing the "gateway" to the market.
Relying upon McLain, the Court held that the interstate com-
merce requirement mandated only a showing of some actual or po-
tential connection between the restraint and interstate commerce." 4
While Dr. Pinhas alone had been the victim of the alleged boycott,
the majority relied upon the Court's earlier decision in Kor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,"5 which condemned a merchant boycott
as a per se restraint of trade, to find that the single target boycott
constituted an illegal activity. As Justice Stevens explained, "[IWf a
violation of the Sherman Act occurred, the case is necessarily more
significant than the fate of 'just one merchant whose business is so
small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy.'
116
Justice Scalia in dissent complained, however, that "[tlhe
See Calkins, supra note 103, at 624. Some courts read McLain as requiring proof that de-
fendant's alleged illegal conduct substantially affected interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
Shahawy v. Harrison, 778 F.2d 636, 640 (lth Cir. 1985); Western Waste Serv. Sys. v.
Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
Others, perhaps a majority, read McLain as merely requiring proof establishing some
nexus between defendant's challenged practices and interstate commerce. See, e.g., Hay-
den v. Bracy, 744 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (8th Cir. 1984); Furlong v. Long Island College
Hosp., 710 F.2d 922, 925-26 (2d Cir. 1983). Pinhas represents a brewing controversy over
the appropriateness of the antitrust jurisdictional test established by the Court in
McLain.
112. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. at 1848.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1847-48; see also Calkins, supra note 103, at 628.
115. 359 U.S. 207 (1959). The holding in Kor's that group boycotts are per se anti-
trust offenses is seen today as controversial and of doubtful authority. See HERBERT
HOVENKAMiP, EcoNoucs AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 277 (1985) ("The facts of Klor's
are perplexing, and there is some reason to think the Court would reconsider its decision
today.").
116. Pinhas, Ill S. Ct. at 1848 (quoting Mor's, 359 U.S. at 213).
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Court's suggestion that competition in the entire Los Angeles mar-
ket was affected by this one surgeon's exclusion from that market
simply ignores the 'practical economics' of the matter."117 According
to Justice Scalia, the Peer Review Committee's actions provided "no
basis for assuming that this alleged conspiracy's market power-and
its consequent effect upon competition, as opposed to its effect upon
Dr. Pinhas-extended throughout Los Angeles."15 Justice Scalia
went on to argue that group boycotts are per se violations under
Kor's only if it has first been shown that the boycott "affect[s] com-
petition in the relevant market,"1 ' and contended that "the question
before [the Court was] whether the Act does apply, and that must be
answered by determining whether, in its practical economic conse-
quences, the boycott substantially affects interstate commerce by
restricting competition or, as in [the Klor's case], interrupts the flow
of interstate commerce."120 Consequently, in the dissenters' view,
proper analysis of the jurisdictional issue would require the courts
to focus on the actual, rather than potential, effect of the boycott on
interstate commerce. As Justice Scalia explained, "boycotts rarely
exist in a vacuum; they are usually the means of enforcing compli-
ance with larger anti-competitive schemes."12" '
Commentators on antitrust law read Pinhas as establishing the
appropriate jurisdictional test for determining the interstate com-
merce requirement for antitrust law.'22 Pinhas is a highly unstable
117. Id. at 1851. Justice Scalia's dissent was joined by three other justices.
118. Id. at 1852.
119. Id. at 1851.
120. Id. (citing Mor's, 359 U.S. at 213).
121. Id. at 1852 (citing HOVENKAMP, supra note 115, at 275-76); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 207 (1976); cf. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 448-
49 (1957). Justice Scalia argued that the Hospital's boycott was not the same as a price-
fixing scheme for interstate commerce purposes. As Justice Scalia explained:
The economic effects of a price-fixing scheme are felt throughout the market in
which the prices are fixed; the economic effects of 'black-balling' a single sup-
plier are not felt throughout the market from which he is theoretically excluded,
but, at most, within the subportion of that market in which he was, or could be,
doing business.
Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. at 1851.
122. Louis B. SCHwARTZ ETAL., 1991 SUPPLEMENT: FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION: ANTITRUST 2, 71 (6th ed. 1991); see also Calkins, supra note 103, at 619-
24. The majority in Pinhas continues the McLain tradition of reading the jurisdictional
scope of the Sherman Act expansively. The dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia can be
seen to reflect the opinion of a number of lower federal courts that have criticized the
McLain jurisdictional test on the ground that it confuses the per se standard for substan-
tive violations with the jurisdictional standard for federal court intervention. As Justice
Scalia explained, as a result ofMcLain and the majority decision in Pinhas, federal courts
are now "available for routine business torts, needlessly destroying a sensible statutory
allocation of federal-state responsibility and contributing to the trivialization of the fed-
eral courts." Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. at 1854 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The problem with relegat-
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precedent, however, because the Justices relied upon two fundamen-
tally different boycott images."2 In the majority's view, the boycott
by the hospital's Peer Review Committee was understood to be like a
door shutting the gate that controlled access to the market. As Jus-
tice Stevens put it, "The gateway was closed to respondent, both at
Midway and at other hospitals, because petitioners insisted upon
adhering to an unnecessarily costly procedure."'"
In the dissents' view, however, the "uncontested facts" failed to
establish "that peer review process at Midway (hospital) [was] the
'gateway' to the Los Angeles Market in the sense of being the only
way (or even one of the few ways) to gain entry."" Under the dis-
sents' understanding of the jurisdictional issue, a boycott does not
affect interstate commerce unless it obstructs the flow of commerce;
a conspiracy to eliminate but one price-cutter in a local market does
not obstruct. 2 6 As Justice Scalia argued, the Commerce Clause re-
quirement requires allegations and a preliminary showing that "in
its practical economic consequences, the boycott substantially affects
interstate commerce by restricting competition or... interrupts the
flow of interstate commerce."'2 Since other means were available to
Dr. Pinhas as a means of gaining entry into the market, such as
other hospitals and peer review programs that might grant him ac-
cess, Justice Scalia rejected the notion that the peer review process
at one hospital was in any sense the gateway to the Los Angeles
market. 28 Moreover, because the alleged conspiracy was aimed at
excluding only Dr. Pinhas, Justice Scalia and the dissent found no
ing such problems to state courts and state tort law, is that federal anticompetitive poli-
cies under the Sherman Act may become fragmented.
123. Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Pinhas can be criticized. The dis-
sent can be criticized for confusing jurisdictional requirements with the substantive re-
quirements for determining whether conduct is per se unlawful, and the majority can be
criticized for downplaying the significance of the character of the market restraint in-
volved. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 122, at 71; see also Calkins, supra note 103, at 634-
37.
124. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. at 1848. Justice Stevens also emphasized that the hospital
peer-review process was Congressionally regulated. Id. at 1848 & n.12. However, while
Congress had exercised its authority to regulate peer-review programs, that regulation
does not explain why.
125. Id. at 1852. Justice Scalia noted that the parties acknowledged "that every hos-
pital in Los Angeles has its own peer review process, and that the complaint itself asserts
that, well before the offer of the 'sham contract,' 'nearly all' those hospitals had abolished
the featherbedding practice that is the object of this conspiracy." Id.
126. Id. at 1851. Hence, in the dissent's view, what counted for jurisdictional pur-
poses was the actual impact of the price-fixing conspiracy rather than the majority's test
of the likely or potential impact of Dr. Pinhas' exclusion on other actors in the market.
127. Id. at 1851 (citing KMor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213
(1959)).
128. Id. at 1852.
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basis for finding that interstate commerce, or the flow thereof, had
been substantially affected." 9
Pinhas can thus be read as highlighting two different ways for
understanding the meaning of a group boycott. One understanding,
advanced by Justice Stevens, seeks to evaluate the Interstate Com-
merce requirement by analogizing a boycott to a door closing the
passageway through a gateway. Boycotts block freedom of access
like a door, and thus have a potential restraining effect on the gate-
way to interstate commerce. Under this view, every boycott involves
restraining market consequences affecting interstate commerce
since someone's economic freedom would be actually or potentially
restrained. Every boycott will have an impact on interstate com-
merce so long as the challenged restraint involves a line of com-
merce that can be shown to affect interstate commerce in a substan-
tial way.
13 0
Under Justice Scalia's view, on the other hand, boycotts should
be the subject of federal regulation only if those boycotting have suf-
ficient market power to obstruct the flow of commerce. Boycotts are
not a door blocking a gateway; they are merely the medium for re-
straining trade when used by those having market power. Under
Scalia's view, therefore, proof of market power is a crucial factor for
determining the reach of federal antitrust regulation under the
Commerce Clause. The logic of such a view suggests that the Com-
merce Clause requirement for jurisdiction is in reality a substantive
concern-proof of market power and competitive effects would be,




129. Id. at 1851.
130. As Justice Stevens explained for the majority: "The competitive significance of
respondent's exclusion from the market must be measured, not just by a particularized
evaluation of his own practice, but rather, by a general evaluation of the impact of the re-
straint on other participants and potential participants in the market from which he has
been excluded." Id. at 1848. Or, as Justice Scalia put it for the dissent: "As I understand
the Court's opinion, the test of Sherman Act jurisdiction is whether the entire line of
commerce from which Dr. Pinhas has been excluded affects interstate commerce." Id. at
1850.
131. The oddity of this is that the Court has also concluded that proof of market
power is not relevant for determining whether a group boycott constitutes a substantive
antitrust violation. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990);
Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959). If there is no market power de-
fense for financially interested boycotts, why require proof of market power to establish
interstate commerce requirements? One answer is that, under Justice Scalia's view of the
commerce requirement, jurisdiction is substantive in nature. The practical significance of
this is that there would be a "shift [of] power from juries to judges" in antitrust litigation.
In other words, "antitrust plaintiffs [would be required under Scalia's test] to demon-
strate anticompetitive effects before courts had power to decide their cases." Calkins, su-
pra note 103, at 635. In Trial Lawyers, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that a
market power defense should be recognized to protect a symbolic lawyer boycott from an-
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For Justice Stevens, group boycotts are per se restraints of
trade that presumptively affect interstate commerce. For Justice
Scalia, however, proof of market power is necessary to establish that
boycotts do in fact affect commerce. Legal process issues in the law
of boycotts have thus become infected by the chameleon-like nature
of boycott doctrine.
B. The Key Legal Distinctions of Modern Boycott Doctrine.
In responding to the four boycott problems discussed above,
judges have attempted to resolve boycott problems by relying upon a
standard set of legal distinctions. These legal distinctions, drawn
from various substantive legal subjects, seek to define boundaries
between protected and unprotected boycott activities. Judges have
thus situated themselves as objective interpreters capable of de-
scribing the meaning of social events by drawing distinctions be-
tween different forms of boycott activity. There are four key legal
distinctions that have been utilized for resolving most boycott prob-
lems. These four distinctions have posed yet more paradoxes which
have stymied the development of a coherent law of boycotts.
1. The Speech/Conduct Distinction. Justice Lamar's statement
in Gompers, that the boycott publicity in that case involved "a force
not inhering in the words themselves," 32 was a product of the dis-
tinction traditionally drawn between speech and conduct.33 Since
titrust liability. Justice Scalia, who agreed with the majority in Trial Lawyers, was able
to reject a market power defense because he, along with the majority, believed that the
boycott involved a per se antitrust violation. Id. at 780-81 & n.15. The per se violation
rule in antitrust law applies to cases involving particular types of market restraints, such
as price-fixing agreements, that pose an obvious danger to competition and are not bal-
anced by any plausible procompetitive virtue. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
132. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911). As Justice La-
mar saw it, the expressive components of the workers' boycott involved a force independ-
ent of the words used, and therefore exceeded any possible free speech right.
133. For example, Justice Lamar's notion that boycott publicity involves "verbal acts"
of "force not inhering in the words themselves," assumed that the "verbal act" components
of concerted action of a boycott could be distinguished from the purely expressive or
speech components. Id. In Gompers, the idea of 'force" enabled the Court to distinguish
between action and speech. Because boycott publicity involved the threat of group action
against a single individual, the Gompers Court concluded that the words involved a
"force" independent of the expression. Id. The speech-conduct distinction has a long his-
tory. See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 70, 17, 444-49 (arguing that the distinction between
expression and action establishes "[tihe central idea of a system of freedom of expres-
sion"). For a critique of the speech/conduct distinction in the First Amendment context,
see, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH, 70-73 (1989); Law-
rence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 109-10 (1989); Ely, supra note 70, at 1493-96.
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boycotts involve various forms of concerted action (picketing,
handbilling, patrolling, etc.) in addition to verbal expression, con-
certed activities of boycotts are a hybrid expressive activity; they in-
volve more than just purely verbal speech. Judges have used this
distinction to justify restraining the verbal acts of a boycott without
offending the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment.
1 4
The problem is that the speech/conduct distinction assumes
that there is such a thing as pure speech or pure conduct, but there
is not. All verbal communication can be understood as a form of ac-
tion.135 Moreover, the process of understanding words spoken can
have a variety of causal effects on a hearer's actions." 6 For example,
The leading modem precedent for the speech/conduct distinction in the First
Amendment context is United States v. O'Brien which established the principle that a
government can regulate and even suppress peaceful expressive conduct if the govern-
mental interest is substantial and unrelated to the content of the expression suppressed,
provided that the governmental restriction is no greater than is necessary to further the
government's interest. 391 U.S. 367, 337 (1968). It is now accepted that state and federal
governments have substantial authority to regulate expressive conduct in order to
maintain community interests. For example, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., the Supreme
Court relied upon the O'Brien precedent to uphold the constitutionality of a state statute
forbidding nude dancing on the ground that the statute served the state's interest in
protecting "order and morality." Ill S. Ct. 2456, 2457 (1991).
134. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607,
614-15, 615 n.11 (1980) (finding that product picketing would be illegal if designed to in-
duce a product boycott that is likely "to induce customers not to patronize" a neutral
business and to threaten that neutral business with "substantial loss").
135. See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas Mc-
Carthy trans., 1984); Solum, supra note 133, at 110. Habermas reconstructs from anthro-
pology and linguistics a modern theory of human communication that explains how
speech can be understood as conduct or action. HABERMAS, supra, at 55. For Habermas,
the starting point of all communication is a speaker and a hearer who are motivated to
reach a mutual understanding that can be possible only if they both share and recognize
certain views about comprehensibility, truth, and the normative rightness of knowledge.
See id at 93-94. As Lawrence Solum has explained, Habermas' notion of communicative
action is a distinctive type of speech act theory-the type developed from the linguistic
theorist John Searle which explains how communication coordinates individual behavior
through the process of understanding. Solunm, supra note 133, at 87-91.
Cognitive theorists have developed similar models of communication. See JOHNSON,
BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 178-79 (developing a non-objectivist theory of the
speech-acts theory developed from the linguistic theory attributed to John Searle). See
also JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 16
(1970). Cognitive theorists, however, reject the objectivist assumptions of linguistic theory
attributed to the work of Searle. Mark Johnson, for example, argues that Searle's theory
of speech acts is flawed to the extent that it fails to recognize that meaning and rational-
ity are embodied within linguistic meaning. JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45,
at 182. The theory of speech acts advanced by Habermas and developed for First Amend-
ment analysis by Lawrence Solum can be criticized for the same reason.
136. See Solum, supra note 133, at 88-90. "Communication does much more than
merely convey information; knowing the full meaning of a sentence requires the hearer or
reader to know more than its truth conditions." Id. at 88. The words spoken to communi-
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the call for a boycott can result in concerted action against the target
of the boycott, or it may result in action taken against the boycotter,
or those requested to boycott may laugh in the boycotters face. It is
difficult to see why otherwise peaceful concerted activity is coercive
merely because it may induce action."' 7 Because all speech signals
action from the intended audience, all speech associated with a boy-
cott involves, to use Justice Lamar's words, "a force not inhering in
the words themselves." 8 The legal distinction drawn between
speech and conduct is therefore false.
The Supreme Court, however, has invoked the speech/conduct
distinction to justify governmental regulation of concerted activities
by labor groups in ways that have sharply curtailed the development
of a right to boycott.3 9 In doing so, the speech/conduct distinction
has contributed to persistent and serious doctrinal anomalies in la-
bor law. In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree
Fruits),140 for example, the Supreme Court held that labor picketing
that follows the product' could not be enjoined as a secondary boy-
cott if the picketing was "only to persuade customers not to buy the
struck product, [and] the union's appeal is closely confined to the
cate a message to another frequently require action to establish the meaning of what is
said. There are also "forces" within the conversational interaction itself. Id. at 88;
JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 60. These forces are structured by a
metaphoric background that orients the listener to comprehend the message of a com-
munication in a particular way. See id. at 181-82. The key point is that metaphoric rea-
soning structures the background assumptions we rely upon for interpreting and compre-
hending the speech acts of communication. Id. at 187.
137. See TRIBE, supra note 28, at 198-203; Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial
Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938, 951-54
(1982).
138. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911). Indeed, Justice
Stevens recognized this in Claiborne Hardware in stating that "[sipeech does not lose its
protected character... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ac-
tion." NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 768, 910 (1990). Justice Stevens rec-
ognized nonetheless that governmental regulation of otherwise protected expression may
be justified in "certain narrowly defined instances." Id. at 912 (citing United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). He specifically noted that this might be the case when "[a]
nonviolent and totally voluntary boycott may have a disruptive effect on local economic
conditions." Id.; see also NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447
U.S. 607, 616 (1980).
139. The speech/conduct distinction has served the role in labor law of allowing fed-
eral officials to regulate the motives and purposes underlying the exercise of labor's col-
lective liberties. See TRIBE, supra, note 28 at 198-99. For example, the signal theory al-
lows judges to evaluate the subject matter of speech in the course of determining the
speaker's purpose or motive. Judges must distinguish between activity intended as pure
expression or that intended as a signal for conduct. See id. at 200.
140. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
141. A labor picket that "follows the product" is a picket of a store that carries the
product produced by the target of the picket.
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primary dispute."4'2 Seven years later the Court reversed course in
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco),43
holding that "product picketing that reasonably can be expected to
threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss" was not pro-
tected by the Tree Fruits exception to federal labor regulation of sec-
ondary boycotts.'
More recently the Court, in Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Flor-
ida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trade Council (Debartolo II), 145 re-
fused to extend the signal theory of Safeco to peaceful handbilling
publicizing a boycott and labor dispute.' In doing so, the Court rec-
ognized that peaceful leafletting, unlike peaceful picketing and boy-
cotting, involves protected First Amendment activity that cannot
lawfully be curtailed on the basis of mere speculative fears that such
142. 377 U.S. at 71-72. The Tree Fruits Court thus found that consumer picketing
limited to the struck product was not coercive of neutral employers even though the ap-
peal of such picketing had the effect of signaling consumers not to buy the product from
such employers. Id. Tree Fruits implicitly rejected the verbal acts or signaling justifica-
tion used by the Gompers Court to enjoin boycott publicity. See id. at 72. On the other
hand, the Court also indicated that the product boycott would violate the secondary boy-
cott provision of federal labor law if the appeal to consumers sought to persuade them to
stop doing business with a neutral employer altogether. Id.
143. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
144. Id. at 614-15 & n.11. The approach taken in Tree Fruits and Safeco for analyz-
ing the legality of product picketing cannot be reconciled. As Julius Getman and John
Blackburn explain:
The Tree Fruits opinion virtually ignored the statutory language in order to
permit peaceful picketing that was, in form, related only to the primary em-
ployer. In Safeco, the Court stressed the statutory language. The resulting test-
whether the picketing "is reasonably likely to threaten the neutral party with
ruin or substantial loss" -is obviously a vague one. How much loss is substantial
is bound to be the subject of considerable litigation .... The ironic result, of
course, is that the closer the so-called neutral employer is tied economically to
the primary employer, the greater its insulation from picketing publicizing the
dispute with the source of its sole or major product.
JuLius GERMAN & JOHN BLACKBURN, LABOR RELATIONS: LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY 257
(1983).
As a result of Safeco, labor union picketing found to signal a secondary boycott is
likely to be declared unlawful even though only informational expression may be in-
volved. Professor Harper has persuasively argued that Safeco infringes on the right of
consumers to boycott by permitting more intrusive state regulation of boycott activity and
"restrict[ing] ordinary consumers from using their limited buying power to try to affect
the employment relations of society." Harper, supra note 30, at 443-44. According to Pro-
fessor Harper, Safeco denies consumers the right to "influence lawful decisions of sellers"
by convincing the sellers to concede to the union's demands. Id. "[If we take seriously the
right to boycott and the right to publicize the boycott, sellers' interests in maintaining
high sales that are not themselves protected as rights cannot override the boycott right.
There is no right to continued sales that trumps political rights to refuse to purchase." Id.
at 446-47 (footnote omitted).
145. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
146. Id. at 579-80.
19931 THE LAWAND METAPHOR OF BOYCOTT 841
leafletting will incite others to take action against a neutral secon-
dary employer.47
As a result of the speech/conduct distinction, concerted activity
is understood either as a force with the potential to sweep individu-
als along to commit prohibited acts or as a "signal" to others to take
action. On the other hand, Tree Fruits and Debartolo II seemed to
recognize that the federal regulation of product picketing and con-
sumer handbilling calls into question the constitutionality of the
current federal regulation of secondary boycotts under federal labor
legislation. 4 ' For this reason the Supreme Court concluded in De-
Bartolo II that labor handbilling must be constitutionally insulated
from secondary boycott regulation of federal labor law.
If handbilling does not become coercive merely because it effec-
tively persuades consumers to boycott, then it follows that peaceful
147. Hence, what is coercion in the case of peaceful economic boycotting becomes le-
gitimate free expression in the case of handbilling. As the Court inDebartolo II explained:
The loss of customers because they read a handbill urging them not to patronize
a business, and not because they are intimidated by a line of picketers, is the
result of mere persuasion, and the neutral who reacts is doing no more than
what its customers honestly want it to do.
Id. at 580.
148. In 1947, secondary boycotts by labor unions were made unfair labor practices by
section 8(b)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982). The words secondary
boycott do not appear in the statute. Section 8(b)(4) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents... to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce, where.., an object thereof is... forcing or requiring any
person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in
the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease do-
ing business with any other person ....
Id. The legislative history underlying the provision indicates that Congress was con-
cerned with the potential spreading of industrial strife through boycotts of neutral par-
ties. The need to make a primary/secondary distinction for labor boycotts is itself recog-
nized to be necessary to render federal labor regulation of secondary boycotts constitu-
tional. See GETmIAN & BLACKBURN, supra note 144, at 245-46.
Congress was also concerned about protecting the right of workers to engage in in-
formational activities. Hence, a proviso protects certain union boycott-organizing tactics
by exempting from all of the section's proscriptions "publicity ... for the purpose of truth-
fully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization that a
product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has
the primary dispute and are distributed by another employer ... ." Id. On the other hand,
this proviso denies protection to union efforts to inform customers through picketing or
any union publicity, including handbilling or newspaper publications, which have a sec-
ondary effect of inducing any employee of the distributing employer to refuse to perform
any services. Id. In DeBartolo II, the Supreme Court held that the proviso could not be in-
terpreted to render handbilling unlawful even if it had a secondary effect. Id. at 582-83.
By removing peaceful handbilling publicity from Section 8(b)(4), the Court rendered the
publicity proviso to what the Seventh Circuit called "so much blather." Boxhorn's Big
Muskego Gun Club, Inc. v. Electrical Workers Local 494, 798 F.2d 1016, 1024 (7th Cir.
1986); see also Pope, Labor-Community Boycotts, supra note 20, at 937.
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publicity of a boycott should be accorded similar treatment and thus
be exempted from federal regulation. 149 The peaceful publicity of a
boycott should not be deemed coercive merely because customers
find the publicity persuasive and thereby act in ways that harm the
target of the boycott.' 50 The reason why the signal of a handbill
should be considered more coercive or threatening than the signal of
peaceful picketing and boycotting has not yet been explained by the
courts.' 5 1
149. Handbilling involves action that can serve as a signal to incite action in con-
sumers to boycott a firm or its products. Handbilling can call for an economic boycott and
thus lead to the same consequences that would be involved with labor picketing and boy-
cotting. The fact that handbilling normally accompanies picketing and boycotting sug-
gests that these forms of activity are related in a common enterprise. The attempt to dis-
tinguish handbilling from picketing and boycotting would thus seem to be doomed to fail-
ure; however, the distinction between handbilling and picketing and boycotts has become
an important feature of labor law doctrine. In Debartolo II, for example, the Court
unanimously concluded that peaceful leafletting does not constitute prohibited "coercion,"
because the Court found that a contrary holding would raise "serious [First Amendment]
questions" about the constitutional validity of federal labor regulation of secondary boy-
cotts. DeBartolo H, 485 U.S. at 575, 580. Once the Court concluded that leafletting raised
important First Amendment concerns, it proceeded to find that the secondary effects at-
tributed to the leafletting were normal First Amendment consequences. Id. As James
Pope argued, the Court's DeBartolo H decision "appears to embrace the view, long ad-
vanced by critics of the picketing decisions, that the government has little or no legiti-
mate interest in suppressing peaceful communication merely because it persuades citi-
zens to engage in lawful action that harms someone." Pope, Labor Community Boycotts,
supra note 20, at 937. As Professor Pope also notes, once leafletting is "[vliewed through a
first-amendment lens, what was coercion to the NLRB became nothing more than the
normal operation of free speech." Id. at 936. The NLRB held that peaceful leafletting was
coercive and hence unlawful under section 8(B)(4) because customers were persuaded to
withhold their patronage. Florida Building Trades Council (DeBartolo Corp.), 273
N.L.R.B. 1431, 1432 n.6 (1985), enforcement denied sub nom. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.
v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
150. Cf DeBartolo H, 485 U.S. at 580 (holding that peaceful handbilling is not coer-
cive). With labor boycotts, however, the Supreme Court has appeared to accept the idea
that regulation is necessary in order to permit government to protect economic relations
from disruption. See Harper, supra note 30, at 413-14 (illustrating how Supreme Court
First Amendment doctrine "recognizes that unless all other rights are to be drastically
subordinated to expression, the state must have authority to regulate expressive conduct
when the regulation protects countervailing rights and is not directed at the content of
the expression."). Perhaps the long standing fear that judges have had about the eco-
nomic disruption and coercion caused by successful labor boycotts may explain this dis-
tinction.
151. As James Pope has argued, the only basis for distinguishing leafletting from
picketing or boycotting is Justice Stevens' theory of signaling-picketing and boycotting
are seen to go beyond "mere persuasion" because "[they] call[] for an automatic response
to a signal rather than a reasoned response to an idea." See Pope, Labor Community Boy-
cotts, supra note 20, at 940 (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001
(Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)). Picketing is thought to go be-
yond mere persuasion because it may "signal the obedience of workers to a pre-existing
agreement to boycott, perhaps backed up by the threat of union discipline," and perhaps
1993] THE LAWAND METAPHOR OF BOYCOTT
2. The Primary/Secondary Distinction. Labor union boycotts
have been regulated under the federal labor laws in accordance with
a basic distinction drawn between primary and secondary union
boycotts. 52 Primary boycotts are those brought directly against the
target of the boycott; secondary boycotts are those aimed at so-called
innocent secondary parties who have a business or social relation
with the target. Under the federal labor laws, primary boycotts are
generally considered lawful, but secondary boycotts are not. The
primary/secondary distinction in labor law has been justified as nec-
essary in order to avoid constitutional questions that would be
raised by an all-encompassing ban on labor boycotts, especially
those boycotts involving the expressive conduct necessary for the ex-
ercise of labor's collective rights. '
The primary/secondary distinction has led to the curious result
that unions can lawfully picket and boycott an employer with whom
they have a controversy, but they cannot exert the same pressure
upon so-called secondary employers who have a business relation
with the target, even though a successful primary boycott has pre-
cisely the same effect as an unlawful secondary boycott. In NLRB v.
International Rice Milling Co.,' 53 for example, the Court held that
union picketing at the situs of the struck employers' premises was
lawful even though the picketers had urged the drivers of suppliers'
trucks not to cross the picket line, thereby engaging in an activity of
a clearly secondary nature. The Court found that the secondary ef-
fects of the picketing were mere incidental effects of an otherwise
lawful primary activity. 54 The primary/secondary distinction has
because picketing may "trigger deeply held class or union 'loyalities' embodied in the
principle that a good person simply does not cross picket lines." Id. at 940. As Pope has
also noted, however, the assumptions underlying these distinctions have been "heavily
criticized." Id. at 940 & n.276; see, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 28, at 200 (arguing that the
distinction between speech and conduct adds merely a "superficially neutral facade to
cover the Court's consistent denial of protection to labor picketing").
152. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub.L. No. 86-
257, § 704, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988)). The pri-
mary/secondary distinction is fundamental to the law of secondary boycotts. Without the
distinction, the statutory prohibition created to forbid secondary labor boycotts, read lit-
erally, would "ban most strikes historically considered to be lawful, so-called primary ac-
tivity." Local 761, Int'l Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S.
667, 672 (1961). However, as Justice Frankfurter once observed, the primary/secondary
distinction of federal labor law "does not present a glaringly bright line." Id. at 673.
153. 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
154. Id. at 670-71. Every lawful primary boycott, if successful, will bring about the
secondary effects federal labor law otherwise prohibits. A primary strike called against a
nationally distributed product that is assembled from components parts produced by
other suppliers and distributors will have precisely the same effect as a secondary boy-
cott.
Statutory regulation of secondary boycotts has mainly involved construction site
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permitted judges to hold unlawful boycott activity necessary to pro-
tect the rights of workers to join a union and engage in peaceful con-
certed activity, while simultaneously proscribing the secondary ef-
fects upon third parties.
3. The Naked/Ancillary Distinction. The courts have created
under the Sherman Act a somewhat different set of legal distinc-
tions for regulating boycotts and concerted refusals by business to
deal.155 Modern antitrust law in some cases condemns concerted re-
fusals to deal and group boycotts by business combinations as per se
illegal, but courts have been inconsistent in their condemnation. 6'
Indeed, antitrust boycott doctrine, like its labor law counterpart, has
exhibited considerable elasticity when it comes to group boycotts.
There is little disagreement that boycotts and refusals to deal
can be vehicles utilized by competitors to accomplish illegal con-
spiracies in restraint of trade-what antitrust experts term "naked"
restraints of trade. 57 On the other hand, courts have also recognized
that competitors sometimes engage in group boycotts to achieve
wholly beneficial objectives such as policing against unethical and
shoddy rivals, enhancing operational efficiency, and administering
cooperative activities essential to sports, tournaments and similar
activities.5 " Hence, concerted business boycotts are sometimes found
cases where either the primary or the secondary employers are working on a common si-
tus. See, e.g., Denver Building & Const. Trades, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). This is because labor
union activity on the premises of a single primary employer is "presumptively primary" as
a result of the Rice Milling decision. See GEmMAN & BLACKBURN, supra note 144, at 247.
The Labor Board and courts have thus been more willing to find picketing at a common
construction situs to violate the secondary boycott provision of federal labor law. This has
led to what Julius Getman and Bertrand Pogrebin have called an "economically deceptive
and ideologically confusing" law of secondary labor boycotts. Id. at 259.
155. In antitrust law, a group boycott by competitors is defined as "a concerted re-
fusal to deal with others or to deal only on unfavorable terms in order directly or indi-
rectly to discipline or exclude a target." ELEANOR M. FOX & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 383 (1989). In point of fact, however, the term boy-
cott is used by judges as an "epithet" to characterize outcomes deemed unlawful under the
Sherman Act. See generally ROBERT H. BORiK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLIcY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 330-46 (1978).
156. See BOR, supra note 155, at 330 ("According to conventional wisdom, boy.
cotts... are illegal per se. But that proposition is easily shown to be false .... The cate-
gories of lawful and unlawful boycotts have never been defined, however, so that the law
makes many mistakes and does much harm.").
157. Id. at 334 ("Since the naked boycott is a form of predatory behavior, there is
little doubt that it should be a per se violation of the Sherman Act."); see also, Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 210 (1959).
158. BOR, supra note 155, at 332-38. An ancillary boycott, for example, "is a con-
certed refusal to deal that contributes to the efficiency of a cooperative economic activ-
ity .... The law must develop doctrine to accommodate such boycotts." Id. at 334-35, 337-
38; see, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
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to be lawful because they are seen to be "ancillary" to otherwise le-
gitimate activities. 159
While the naked/ancillary restraint distinction has been used
in antitrust law mainly for analyzing substantive violations, the
distinction has also influenced process issues, as it did in Pinhas. In
Pinhas, the majority and dissent utilized the naked/ancillary dis-
tinction to bolster their respective jurisdictional arguments. The
majority relied upon the naked restraint strand of the distinction in
concluding that the alleged boycott of a single merchant substan-
tially affected interstate commerce. The dissent relied upon the an-
cillary restraint analysis in arguing that a boycott is merely an in-
strument that may or may not substantially affect interstate com-
merce. In the dissent's view, the interstate commerce effects re-
quirement, for court jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, requires
proof that a boycott has the potential to restrict competition and
thus substantially affect interstate commerce.
Boycotts that are seen to be based upon objectives found to be
ancillary to some beneficial purpose are normally deemed to be rea-
sonable restraints, and hence lawful. Those boycotts found to be lacking
such redeeming qualities are struck down per se as naked restraints of
trade.160 Unlike in labor law cases, however, where the presumption is
that labor boycotts are unprotected forms of conduct, judges in antitrust
cases have applied the naked/ancillary restraint distinction in ways
472 U.S. 284, 297 (1985) ("[Not all concerted refusals to deal should be accorded per se
treatment ... ."); James A. Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act:
Some Reflections on the Kor's Case, 45 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1168-73 (1959).
159. See BORI , supra note 155, at 334, 337-38. Judge Bork's widely cited decision in
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987) illustrates how in antitrust law the ancillary restraint dis-
tinction has generated the opposite result. In Rothery Storage, Judge Bork reviewed the
current antitrust case law applicable to group boycotts and concerted refusals to deal and
concluded that "it has always been clear that boycotts are not, and cannot ever be, per se
illegal." Id. at 215. In finding that "any comprehensible per se rule for [group] boycotts...
is out of the question," Judge Bork stated that the per se rule is too rigid, simplistic, and
destructive of many common and entirely beneficial business arrangements. Id. (quoting
Rahl, supra note 158, at 1173). The Supreme Court adopted Judge Bork's analysis in
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. in concluding
that "not all concerted refusals to deal should be accorded per se treatment... ." 472 U.S.
284, 297 (1985). However, the Court held that when the boycott is found to be an illegal
price fixing conspiracy, then it will be condemned per se. FTC v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 432-36 (1990); Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46,
48 (1990) ("We explained that '[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price
of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.").
160. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (per curiam decision finding




that favor the legality of some business boycotts.16'
4. The Public/Private Distinction. In response to boycotts
aimed at influencing governmental decisionmaking, the Supreme
Court developed the antitrust petitioning immunity doctrine,
162
which adopts the principle that group boycotts brought to influence
governmental decision-making are immune from the antitrust laws
even if they are intended to restrain trade and in fact have that ef-
fect. In Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc.,1' the Court concluded that a publicity campaign con-
ducted by a group of railroads against truckers seeking to influence
governmental officials to enact pro-railroad/anti-trucking regula-
tions was immune from antitrust liability because the attempted
boycott was "incidental" to "political" activities genuinely intended
to influence governmental action.'6 The Noerr Court emphasized
that it did not matter that the purported boycott was motivated by a
financial interest'6 or that the publicity campaign was unethical or
deceptive; 66 the boycott was saved by its political nature.
In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n,16 ' however, the
Court held that the direct action of a citizen boycott organized by a
group of legal aid attorneys and aimed at influencing District of
Columbia officials to provide the higher attorneys fees for criminal
defense assignments could be enjoined as a per se antitrust offense
because the purpose of the boycott was aimed at securing the private
economic interest of those boycotting." In finding that the lawyers'
boycott was subject to antitrust liability, Justice Stevens distin-
guished Noerr under a publicprivate distinction:
[In the Noerr case the alleged restraint of trade was the intended conse-
161. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 472 U.S. at 297 (concluding that rule
of reason analysis, not per se rule, was appropriate standard for determining whether
group's boycott of producers violated antitrust laws). But see Superior Court Trial Law.
yers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 432-36 (applying per se rule to boycott found to be a price fixing
conspiracy); Palmer, 498 U.S. 46 (acknowledging importance of adhering to per se rule for
regulating classic restraints of trade).
162. Antitrust immunity doctrine is premised upon the simple principle that "Uloint
efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended
to eliminate competition." United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965);
see also Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
163. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
164. Id. at 134-36.
165. Id. at 138-39.
166. Id. at 140-42.
167.493 U.S. 411 (1990).
168. Id at 421-25; see also Minda, Progressive Labor Politics, supra note 20, at 94-96;
Minda, Interest Groups, supra note 89, at 989-92.
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quence of public action; in this case the boycott is the means by which [the
trial lawyers] sought to obtain favorable legislation. The restraint of trade
that was implemented while the boycott lasted would have had precisely
the same anticompetitive consequences during that period even if no legis-
lation had been enacted. In Noerr, the desired legislation would have cre-
ated the restraint on the truckers' competition; in this case the emergency
legislative response to the boycott put an end to the restraint.
169
In other words, the Noerr boycott was held lawful because the re-
straint of trade was the result of permissible political action. In
Trial Lawyers, the boycott was held unlawful because the restraint
of trade was the result of the private activity of the boycotters. 170
Determining whether a boycott is public or private has failed to
guide judges in how to adjudicate cases, and it has failed to ade-
quately signal to parties about how to conform their activities to the
law. The public/private distinction for determining antitrust peti-
tioning immunity has instead resulted in doctrinal confusion. 171
Judges lack a method for consistently defining and distinguishing
between private and public action. 72 The problem is that our un-
derstanding of what constitutes private activity is dependent upon
our understanding of what is public activity.173 The public actions of
government influence private action, and the private activities of
individuals and groups determine every element that is public. The
public/private distinction fails to recognize that in the real world the
categories and boundaries separating public and private activity are
169. 493 U.S. at 424-25.
170. As Professor Elhauge has noted, Justice Stevens' reading of the Noerr case was
inaccurate to the extent that he found that Noerr only involved restraints caused by pub-
lie action. See Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 1188. The pub-
licity campaign involved in Noerr also restrained trade by directly affecting economic re-
lations between truckers and their customers. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129, 133, 142.
171. See Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 1185-93.
172. See Elhauge, Antitrust Process, supra note 30, at 682-96 (acknowledging the im-
possibility of resolving public/private questions on the basis of formal criteria). Professor
Elhauge, however, has offered a functional "process-oriented" approach for distinguishing
between public and private boycotts. See Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra
note 30, at 1196-97. According to Professor Elhauge, -'[pirivate decisionmaking' is...
merely a shorthand for financially interested decisionmaking, and 'public decisionmaking'
is a shorthand for decisionmaking that is financially disinterested and politically ac-
countable." Id at 1197. The contradiction posed by the public/private distinction is not
solved by Professor Elhauge's proposal, it is merely deferred or moved to a different level
of abstraction. Professor Elhauge's proposal for defining public and private decisionmak-
ing is discussed infra notes 207-31 and accompanying text.
173. See Gerald Frug, Property and Power: Hertog on the Legal History of New York
City, 1984 Ax. B. FoUND. RES. J. 673, 681 (reviewing HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC
PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN
AtiERICAN LAW 1730-1870 (1983)). The public/private distinction thus suffers from acute
manipulability.
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too ephemeral, fluid, and messy to be easily categorized. 74
Manipulation of the public/private distinction allows judges to
reach inconsistent decisions. Consider, for example, the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision in Missouri v. National Organization for Women
(NOW),17 upholding the right of the National Organization for
Women to engage in a convention boycott as a means of pressuring
states to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). The Eighth
Circuit held that the NOW boycott was immune to antitrust liability
because the objective of the boycott was not a "financial," "economic,"
or "commercial piece of legislation," and because the objective of the
parties in seeking to support or defeat the ERA was "not one of
profit motivation."176 The court thus applied the public/private dis-
tinction to find that the political activity in NOW did not involve the
type of private restraints deemed unlawful by the Sherman Act.
177
Circuit Judge Stephenson, who authored the court's opinion in
NOW, was able to reach a different outcome than the Trial Lawyers
Court because he interpreted the National Organization for
Women's boycott as a political tool utilized not for a competitive or
private economic purpose, but rather for the public purpose of influ-
encing ratification of the ERA. The court characterized the boycott
as a legitimate political activity even though it was shown to have a
serious disruptive consequence in the market independent of any
governmental action. 7 Of course, NOW might be decided differently
today given Justice Stevens' opinion in Trial Lawyers. 17 On the
174. See generally Karl E. Kare, The PubliclPrivate Distinction in Labor Law, 130
U. PA. L. REv. 1358 (1982).
175.620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); see also Minda, In-
terest Groups, supra note 89, at 983-984.
176. NOW, 620 F.2d at 1311-12. The Eighth Circuit concluded that a boycott called
by the National Organization for Women aimed at securing ratification of the Equal
Rights Amendment was immune from Sherman Act liability even though the purpose of
the boycott was to inflict economic harm in the target states. Id. at 1315. The state of
Missouri, one of the targets of the NOW boycott, argued that NOW's activities amounted
to a "secondary boycott" and hence were not a "legitimate effort to influence the legisla-
ture ..... Id. at 1312. Missouri argued that NOW's activities represented more than a
"mere attempt" to influence the passage of laws. Id. at 1313.
177. Id. at 1315; see also Minda, Interest Groups, supra note 89, at 983.
178. As in Trial Lawyers, the "restraint of trade that was implemented while the
boycott lasted would have had precisely the same anticompetitive consequences.., even
if no legislation had been enacted." FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S.
411, 425 (1990).
179. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp, for example, acknowledge that the Eighth
Circuit's decision in NOW might have come out differently if evidence established that
some of the participants in the boycott stood to gain financially from the boycott. As they
explain: "[Sluppose that the boycott organizers [in Missouri v. National Organization for
Women] included a hotel chain from a state that had already ratified the ERA. To the
extent that the boycott shifted business toward ratification states, the hotelier would gain
economically such that a First Amendment defense should presumptively be denied him,"
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other hand, the NOW decision appears to be well entrenched in the
case law and is not likely to be ignored or rejected in the future. 180 A
comparison of Trial Laywers and NOW provides an illustration of
how different outcomes can be reached under the open-ended pub-
lie/private distinction.
C. Attempt of Legal Scholars to "Make Sense" of Boycott Doctrine.
A number of scholarly attempts have been undertaken in an
attempt to supplement the case law in clarifying the "fuzzy" chame-
leon-like character of boycott doctrine.' 8 ' To date, these attempts
have tended to focus on the development of a theory of boycotts un-
der one or more of the many distinctions put forth by the courts to
justify their decisions. Legal scholars have formulated theories that
seek to defend the current state of boycott doctrine under analyses
that accept the necessity of making primary/secondary,'8 2 na-
ked/ancillary,'83 speech/conduct, 4 and economic/political8 5 distinc-
tions. Others have argued that inconsistency in the cases is a conse-
quence of the Supreme Court's commitment to the underlying cause
of certain groups' boycotts, 86 or an implicit commitment to a
"process" view of what courts can and cannot do.'87
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 113.1, at 6 (Supp. 1992).
180. Missouri v. National Organization for Women has since been cited for the view
that economic boycotts for political purposes are immune from antitrust regulation be-
cause neither "the Sherman [nor] Clayton Acts were designed to be applied to noncom-
mercial activities." HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMIcS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 280
(1985).
181. See, e.g., Elhauge, Antitrust Process, supra note 30, at 738-46; Getman, supra
note 28, at 16-19; Harper, supra note 30, at 409; Kupferberg, supra note 30; Pope, Ladder,
supra note 28, at 224-28; Pope, Republican Moments, supra note 20, at 352; TRIBE, supra
note 28, at 200-03; Estlund, supra note 30; Schneider, supra note 30, at 1489 n.132.
182. See Howard Lesnick, The Gravamen Of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLuii. L.
REV. 1363 (1962).
183. See BORK, supra note 155.
184. EMERSON, supra note 70.
185. See Pope, Republican Moments, supra note 20, at 349-52 (arguing that the eco-
nomics/politics distinction provides a theoretical explanation for the Court's political boy-
cott decisions); Elhauge, Antitrust Process, supra note 30, at 738-46 (arguing a similar
distinction helps to explain the Court's state action antitrust doctrine).
186. For example, Harry Kalven has suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in
Claiborne Hardware favoring civil rights boycotts as protected First Amendment activity
can be explained in light of the Court's historical treatment and commitment to the civil
rights movement. See KALVEN, supra note 28, at 123-72; see also Pope, Ladder, supra
note 28, at 223.
187. For example, the legal process idea that courts lack the institutional compe-
tence to regulate group activity in the political arena of government. See, e.g., Elhauge,
Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30.
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1. Professor Harper's "Electoral Voting" Analogy. Professor Mi-
chael C. Harper has argued that the Supreme Court's creation of a
new consumers' right to boycott, in Claiborne Hardware, can be
constitutionally justified under what Harper calls an "electoral vot-
ing" analogy. According to Harper, the consumer right to boycott is
"a right in accord with our social and constitutional values" that
should be judicially "cast as a broad political right to influence social
decisionmaking." I' In his view, the act of "[lloining a consumer boy-
cott should be conceived as a constitutionally protected political act
by which individuals can influence their society."
189
In a consumer boycott, the boycotters seek to affect the economy
for the purpose of dramatizing grievances or bolstering public sup-
port for some cause. In Claiborne Hardware, for example, the civil
rights boycotters sought to influence private and governmental de-
cision-making that had denied African-Americans equal employ-
ment opportunities. The objective of the boycotters was thus to in-
fluence social decision-making, an objective which, according to Pro-
fessor Harper, should have been recognized as "a constitutionally
protected political act by which individuals can influence their soci-
ety."'90 In his view, "[r]egistration of the intensity of beliefs in the
economic marketplace is no less legitimate than registration of the
intensity of beliefs in the political marketplace." 91 He would thus
accord the same protection to boycotts aimed at influencing private
decisionmaking and governmental decisionmaking, since both can
be "viewed broadly as means by which citizens can influence impor-
tant social decisionmaking."192
Harper's attempt to develop a constitutional right of consumer
boycotts rests on the view that consumer boycotts are political acts
intimately related to other legitimate forms of activity seeking to af-
fect social decisions. Harper's approach to consumer boycotts can
thus be analogized to electoral voting. According to Harper, the co-
ercive effect of a political boycott is little different from the influence
citizens may exercise, and should be encouraged to exercise, by vot-
ing out of office elected officials whose views or actions the boycot-
ters reject. 93 Harper argues further that such public influence ought
to be permitted to influence private businessmen who possess sig-
188. Harper, supra note 30, at 410, 420-26. Seth Kupferberg has similarly argued
that political strikes by labor unions should be accorded a First Amendment protection
analogous to that accorded civil rights boycotts. See Kupferberg, supra note 30, at 689.
189. Harper, supra note 30, at 422.
190. I&
191. Id. at 423.
192. Id. at 422.
193. Id. at 425.
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nificant political influence. 1"
Harper's "electoral voting" analogy is persuasive when, as in
Claiborne Hardware, private entrepreneurs who are the target of
the boycott are large public corporations or when the boycott is
brought against individuals who hold political office.'95 As Harper
admits, however, the electoral voting analogy is less persuasive
where the boycott target is an undefined, diffused and mixed audi-
ence. 196 Professor Harper argues nonetheless that the Supreme
Court should recognize a consumers right to boycott as a "broad po-
litical right to influence social decisionmaking."197
Professor Harper argues that his "electoral voting" analogy
should lead judges to the position that most consumer boycotts, even
those organized by labor unions, are constitutionally protected po-
litical acts. 98 As the decision in the Trial Lawyers case illustrates,
however, consumer boycotts may be motivated by private self-inter-
ests; the desire of boycotters to affect social decisionmaking may be
the result of purely selfish economic interests. Nevertheless, accord-
ing to Harper, the electoral voting analogy still applies, and the boy-
cott remains protected under the First Amendment.' 99
The problem with Professor Harper's electoral voting analogy is
that the analogy works just as easily to deny the very constitutional
protection he seeks to extend because his analogy rests upon an es-
sentially contested image of boycott. In the early labor boycott cases,
for example, boycotts were understood as coercive forces that had
the effect of sweeping away individuals who might object or not sup-
port the goals of the boycotters. Boycotts were also understood in the
labor cases as criminal acts, akin to murder or mugging. This alter-
native understanding of boycott projects a picture of the unruly mob
threatening the tranquility of the community, or as a disease that
spreads the detrimental economic effects of a labor dispute to inno-
194. Id.
195. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 889 n.3 (1982); Harper,
supra note 30, at 426.
196. Harper, supra note 30, at 426. Professor Harper argues that even in such cases
he would not compromise the right of consumers to boycott. In his view, "[clonsumer boy-
cotts have usually targeted businessmen with special political influence" and "to expand
popular participation in social decisionmaking, a democratic society can appropriately
deny some citizens economic protection in order to secure all citizens a right to engage in
consumer political action." Id.
197. Id. at 410.
198. Id. at 438-53 (arguing that statutory restrictions of federal labor law applicable
to consumer boycotts incident to labor disputes infringe upon the consumers' right to boy-
cott).
199. Id. at 437. Professor Harper relied upon "settled First Amendment jurispru-
dence" that has accorded "political acts motivated by economic self-interest as much pro-
tection as political acts motivated by visionpry altruisms." Id. at 437-38.
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cent third parties. In the business restraint-of-trade cases, boycotts
were understood as vehicles for predation in the marketplace, with
the objective of forcing competition from the market. These alterna-
tive judicial images of boycott conjure up mental pictures that en-
courage us to understand boycott phenomena as something that is
different from, or even antithetical to, Professor Harper's electoral
voting analogy. The point is that Harper's analogy may "cohere" only
with the facts of Claiborne Hardware, but with few of the other boy-
cott cases.
There is another reason to question Professor Harper's under-
standing of the "electoral voting" analogy. Electoral decisionmaking
is typically thought to be an orderly and highly regularized activity,
taking place in the privacy of the election booth. Voting seeks to in-
fluence governmental decisionmaking through a majoritarian proc-
ess designed to affect governmental action. The political campaign
which precedes voting, unlike a consumer boycott, does not seek to
drive from the electoral market non-complying constituents. While
mass demonstrations are frequently conducted in electoral cam-
paigns, they are not directed at forcing someone to vote for a particu-
lar candidate or election measure.
In Noerr, for example, the Supreme Court found that a tradi-
tional lobbying campaign aimed at removing truckers from the
freight transport market, in other words a boycott instituted
through governmental lobbying, was constitutionally protected by
the Right to Petition Clause of the First Amendment because the
boycotters sought to influence governmental decisionmaking
through the normal channels of representational government. In
Trial Lawyers, however, the Court viewed a lawyers' boycott to gain
higher statutory fees as an attempt to impose a restraint of trade
independent of governmental action: "In Noerr, the desired legisla-
tion would have created the restraint on the truckers' competition;
in this case the emergency response to the boycott put an end to the
restraint." 0 The Trial Lawyers boycott fell outside the constitu-
tional umbrella of the right to petition because the Court found that
the boycotters sought to influence governmental decisionmaking
outside the normal political channels of government.
The right to petition, upheld in the Noerr decision, has thus
been limited to the traditional forms of lobbying which seek to influ-
ence policy decisions of the government. The different result reached
in Trial Lawyers can be explained in part on the Supreme Court's
recognition of the fundamental difference between the normal gov-
ernmental process of voting and representation and "non-normal"
electoral activities involving direct action boycotts. Professor
200. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 425 (1990).
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Harper's constitutional right to boycott was consequently rejected by
the Supreme Court in Trial Lawyers.
2. Professor Lesnick's "Difference in Kind" Test. Professor
Howard Lesnick has argued that the primary/secondary distinction
of federal labor law could be best understood in light of a "difference
in kind" test.201 Under Lesnick's test the secondary boycott proscrip-
tion of federal labor law would permit boycott pressure upon secon-
dary employers only if the pressure is no different in kind from that
generated by a successful primary strike (against an employer with
whom the union has a dispute). According to Lesnick, the secondary
boycott provisions of federal labor law apply only to those labor un-
ion boycotts that impose effects that are different in kind from a suc-
cessful primary strike. Thus, the secondary boycott provision of fed-
eral labor law should, in Lesnick's view, prohibit only those boycotts
which cause secondary affects that are different in kind from those
which normally occur in an otherwise successful primary strike.
The primary/secondary distinction was, for Lesnick, the prin-
cipal judicial basis for regulating secondary activity of labor unions.
In Lesnick's view, federal judges understand that the legislative
purpose underlying secondary boycott provision of federal labor law
was containment of labor disputes, "the legislative desire to discour-
age what may be called the metastasis of labor disputes: the fanning
out of unrest from the struck plant to those doing business with
it." 202 Lesnick's "difference in kind" test, derived from his reading of
the case law, sought to provide a functional standard for making the
primary/secondary distinction required by federal labor law.
Whether pressure brought against a secondary employer is dif-
ferent in kind from that exerted by a primary action is a question
not easily answered in most boycott cases. In Professor Lesnick's
scheme the key question is whether the union intends to cause sec-
ondary impacts broader than would be caused by a primary strike. If
the union intended to subject the secondary employer to a loss
broader in impact than would be caused by a successful primary
strike then the picketing is secondary; if not, it is primary.20 3 The
problem with Lesnick's "difference in kind" test is that it fails to
demonstrate how the line between secondary and primary activity
should be drawn when the union intends to boycott a national
manufacturer that produces a product assembled from other prod-
201. Lesnick, supra note 182.
202. Id. at 1415 (citing 93 CONG. REC. 4323 (daily ed. April 29, 1947), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1107 (1985)
(remarks of Senator Taft)).
203. Id. at 1414.
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ucts. A successful primary strike of such a manufacturer will cut off
the flow of the primary employer's goods just as surely as it would
cause the loss of services of the primary's employees.20 4 The differ-
ence in kind distinction fails, however, to explain why secondary
boycotts brought against the national manufacturer's dealers and
suppliers would be unlawful. It is this weakness in Lesnick's test
that has raised serious difficulties when attempts are made to ex-
plain the primary/secondary distinction in the law of labor union
boycotts.
Professor Lesnick's test seeks to enforce the purpose of the sec-
ondary boycott provision by limiting the proscription of secondary
boycotts that broaden the effects of a primary economic dispute. The
difference in kind test, however, allows the secondary boycott provi-
sion of federal labor law to mean different things to different em-
ployers, and thus allow economic disputes to spread in some indus-
tries and not others. This result is odd in light of the attempt of
Congress to forbid secondary boycotts in labor union disputes. This
also seems difficult to justify in cases where a weak union needs the
support of secondary employees to make common cause against a
much more powerful employer who enjoys the benefit of economic
relations with secondary employers.
3. Professor Elhauge's Antitrust "Process-Oriented" Approach.
Professor Elhauge has argued that the puzzles posed by the Su-
preme Court's antitrust petitioning immunity cases could be solved
by what he calls "an objective process approach."20 5 By an "objective
process," Professor Elhauge means an approach that objectively sets
"boundaries between the competitive and governmental proc-
esses."2 6 Under Elhauge's process view, antitrust immunity would
not apply to group boycotts seeking to influence governmental deci-
sionmaking if the relevant decisionmaker is financially interested,
unless the activity both does not involve market behavior and is not
separable from otherwise valid input into the governmental proc-
ess. 2
0 7
Elhauge argues that his approach is "process-oriented" because
it "turns on objective indicia about the incentives of the decision-
204. See Donald S. Engel, Secondary Consumer Picketing-Following the Struck
Product, 52 VA. L. REV. 189, 211 (1966); see also supra note 154.
205. Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 4. Elhauge's Anti-
trust Petitioning Immunity article builds on his earlier article dealing with state action
immunity. See Elhauge, Antitrust Process, supra note 30. Both articles attempt to ad-
vance an "objective" process approach for rationalizing antitrust doctrine.
206. Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 1180.
207. Id.
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makers."0 8 Financially interested decisionmaking is therefore de-
nied antitrust immunity because such decisionmaking is not likely
to be politically accountable,0 9 and because "competitive markets
[should] provide a mechanism for harnessing that financial interest
in the public interest."210 Elhauge's framework of analysis for anti-
trust petitioning immunity attempts to distinguish between private
and public decisionmaking affected by a boycott. Under his analyti-
cal framework, private decisionmaking is shorthand for financially
interested decisionmaking, and public decisionmaking is shorthand
for decisionmaking that is financially disinterested and politically
accountable. 1
Elhauge attempts to reconcile the inconsistency in antitrust
cases dealing with governmental petitioning claims by relying upon
a basic precept of process theory-the idea that an objective legal
process can be developed to evaluate boycott incentives on the basis
of whether or not they seek to interfere with a competitive or gov-
ernmental process of decisionmaking. When boycott incentives cre-
ate a financial interest in restraining market competition, antitrust
immunity is unwarranted because the competitive process is the
better mechanism for protecting the public interest.212 When a group
boycott is directed at persons without financial interest and with
public accountability, antitrust immunity is warranted even if those
actors making the decisions "act [out] of financial motivation."213 The
"operative factor" in either case is "whether the objective incentives
of those making decisions provide some realistic assurances that the
decisions will further the public interest."214
According to Elhauge, "[firom an objective process perspective,
courts adjudicating antitrust immunity issues emerge as the
switchmen of democratic capitalism: guiding decisionmakers down
the tracks of either the competitive or governmental process depend-
ing on which is most appropriate, but not substituting a track or ju-
dicial decisionmaking for either process."21 5 Professor Elhauge's
208. Id. at 1197.
209. Id. at 1203.
210. Id. at 1197.
211. Id.'see also Elhauge, Antitrust Process, supra note 30, at 682-96.
212. Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 1197.
213. Id. at 1199 ("[Pletitioners' financial interest in the government's action is irrele-
vant because our assurance that the restraint furthers the public interest comes not from
the petitioners' decisionmaking process but from the government's.") (citation omitted).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1250. Apparently, train metaphors have become popular among
contemporary legal scholars. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE--FOUNDATIONS
98-99 (1991) (comparing the American republic to a train moving through constitutional
history). Steven L. Winter argues that Ackerman's train metaphor is too quaint and
European for mobile America. Winter instead places the judge in the driver's seat of a car
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metaphor of courts as "switchmen" guiding "decisionmakers down
the tracks" assumes that judges can objectively evaluate the
"incentives of decisionmakers" and classify them as either public or
private.
216
There are a number of problems with Elhauge's approach.
First, boycotts seeking to influence governmental decisions are
likely to be motivated by a mix of factors; some may involve compe-
tition policy, others may not. In Trial Lawyers, for example, the boy-
cotters attempted to assert the constitutional rights of their clients
in addition to protecting their own financial interests. The Trial
Lawyers boycotters were advised to do "something dramatic to at-
tract attention" since they lacked a political constituency to lobby on
their behalf.217 From the perspective of the lawyers boycotting, the
boycott was merely a means to gain public support for their cause.218
The lawyers' boycott was thus the only way they could effec-
tively influence governmental action. If the public supported their
boycott, District of Columbia officials would learn that voters sup-
ported the lawyers' cause. The boycott thus had political objectives,
even though the boycotters also had a direct financial stake in the
boycott. The point is that boycotts seeking to influence governmental
action can not always be as easily characterized as Professor El-
hauge seems to think.
Professor Elhauge accepts the Court's characterization of the
Trial Lawyers boycott as anticompetitive. 219 According to Elhauge,
the "record (in Trial Lawyers) contained clear evidence of anticom-
driving down a modem freeway. In Winter's view, judges are in the thick of it-always on
the freeway and always looking forward, backward, and side-to-side at all other drivers.
Winter, Indeterminacy, supra note 33, at 1522.
Consider, for a moment, that Elhauge's judge is a "switchman of democratic capital-
ism" on Ackerman's train. Elhauge's switchman metaphor assumes that judges can ob-
jectively guide the train "down the tracks of either the competitive or governmental proc-
ess depending on which is most appropriate, but not substituting a track of judicial deci-
sionmaking for either process." Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30,
at 1250. Under Ackerman's metaphor, however, the judge sits in the caboose and con-
stantly looks backward to see that the train remains on the right tracks. (While the pas-
sengers (citizens of the republic) choose new engineers to direct the course of the train,
the Supreme Court must "remain in the caboose, looking backward.") ACKERIMAN, supra,
at 99. These metaphors do not give me confidence in Elhuage's discovery of an objective
process approach for uncovering the functional operation of the judge as the "switchmen
of democratic capitalism."
216. Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 1250.
217. A major obstacle to seeking higher statutory fees was the belief of governmental
officials that there was limited public support for higher fees. Superior Court Trial Law-
yers Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 493 U.S.
411 (1990).
218. See id. at 229-30.
219. Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 1211.
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petitive effect: severe shortages of lawyers willing to take indigent
defendants."20 The lawyer shortage during the boycott was, how-
ever, likely caused by the extremely low fees set by legislation;221 the
District of Columbia could have purchased legal services by offering
lawyers the prevailing market fee to work during the boycott. The
District of Columbia, not the lawyers, had the advantages of market
power. The price of legal services were effectively set by a single
customer, the government, making the market for court appointed
attorneys essentially a buyer's market controlled by monopsony
power.222
There is also a serious problem presented by Elhauge's belief
that boycotts can be classified in terms of whether or not they affect
a market or governmental process. In Claiborne Hardware, the boy-
cott was ostensibly aimed at shutting down local businesses that
had discriminated against minorities, but the real targets were gov-
ernmental officials who had encouraged the development of negative
racial attitudes. It is conceivable that official decisionmakers who
were the target of the civil rights boycott also perceived that they
had an economic stake in putting down the boycott, since any other
action may have cost them their jobs. Moreover, since the decision-
makers included voters as well as elected state officials, decision-
makers were both public and private. One therefore cannot categori-
cally say whether the class of decision-makers were governmental or
private.
While Professor Elhauge acknowledges that the public/private
distinction is troublesome, 2  he argues that judges can make this
distinction by "asking why society allows financially interested pro-
220. Id.
221. This was because the pre-boycott fees were substantially lower than the market
price for similar legal services in the District. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n,
493 U.S. at 443 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
222. See Kindred, supra note 30, at 725. The fact that the District lacked complete
power to control the lawyers' fees does not mean that the government lacked market
power. "While there was a limit to the District of Columbia government's capacity to ex-
ploit the CJA lawyers, it was, nonetheless, able to exploit them by paying a less than
competitive price." Id. at 726.
223. Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 1196. Elhauge ac-
knowledges that legal doctrines structured by the private/public distinction "have
prove[n] difficult to resolve by any purely formal criteria." Id. In dismissing this problem
as merely a "formal" technicality, however, Elhauge invokes John Wiley's "evocative
phrase, 'that no difference exists between... Congress and 535 strangers waiting for the
bus,'" as justification for ignoring the incoherence of the public/private distinction. Id.
(quoting John S. Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV.
713, 773 (1986)). The difficulty posed by the public/private distinction cannot be so easily
ignored. Functional factors seeking to make "real world" distinctions will merely
reproduce the difficulties of formal theory if our analysis fails to face the incoherence of
public/private thinking. See also supra note 173.
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ducers the authority (enforced by state protection of property rights)
to make important resource allocations for society."2"' He concludes
that "a major answer is that competitive markets provide a mecha-nism for harnessing that financial interest in the public interest be-
cause the process of competition causes producers to provide goods
at the lowest cost to those that value them the most."
225
Elhauge's framework of analysis thus incorporates the basic
process filter of 1950s Legal Process ideology,226 the dogma that the
private economic world and the public political world are separate
because the private world of markets is ruled by the objective invis-
ible hand rather than by subjectively chosen policies. Elhauge be-
lieves that the invisible hand of the competitive process establishes
the basic structure of antitrust law, thereby justifying an objective
antitrust process approach to antitrust petitioning and boycott
problems. In Elhauge's understanding, federal regulation is some-
thing added to the objective realm, in which the invisible hand op-
erates as an objective process. Elhauge thus argues that "as with
state action immunity, petitioning immunity reflects the Court's
implicit functional process views about how best to set the bounda-
ries between the competitive and governmental process. " 2 1 The in-
visible hand theory of competitive markets assumes, however, that
an objective baseline of property, liberty, and exchange rules ex-
ists.2" These baselines are themselves the result of contingent policy
decisions about the exercise of public, social power.229
The metaphor of the invisible hand is illusory; there is no such
thing as an objective competitive process. Any regulation of boycott
activity invariably requires judicial determinations to be made
about the exercise of social power. Judicial acceptance of the values
of the competitive process cannot be made independent of the judge's
subjective understanding of private markets and governmental
regulation. The notion that the competitive process has a pure,
apolitical starting point ignores the contingent nature of power ex-
ercised in the day-to-day relations of social culture. There is no ob-
224. Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 1197.
225. Id. at 1197-98.
226. See Gary Peller, The Politics of Reconstruction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1985)
(book review) (discussing a similar tendency within the process-oriented approach of
Bruce Ackerman's constitutional law theories).
227. Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 1180; see also El-
hauge, Antitrust Process, supra note 30.
228. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and The Functional Ap-
proach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 8, 8-14 (1927); Robert C. Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty,
43 COLUMi. L. REV. 603 (1943); Robert C. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923).
229. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUii. L. REV. 873, 910-11 (1987).
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jective way to engage in what Elhauge calls an "objective-process
oriented" approach.
Finally, Elhauge's idea of the judge as a switchman assumes
that judges can identify essential natural categories that distinguish
between public and private decisiomnaking. But the categories upon
which Elhauge relies are socially constructed; they do not exist in-
dependent of a particular social or political understanding about the
proper role of federal regulation, the importance of respecting the
competitive market process, and what does and does not affect the
public interest. The public/private distinction essential for sustain-
ing Elhauge's objective process approach becomes merely an excuse
for allowing judges to make fundamental policy determinations
about the legitimacy of different forms of governmental petitioning.
Such a result is hardly a good example of an objective approach.
4. Professor James Grey Pope's Theory of Republican Move-
ments. Other imaginative theories have been offered to explain the
inconsistencies in the case law. Professor James Pope, for example,
has developed a novel constitutional theory from the civic republican
tradition of constitutional law and history as a means of defending
and explaining the Court's political boycott decisions2 0 Professor
Pope has argued that political boycotts have traditionally been pro-
tected by the First Amendment only when they are found by the
Court to involve what he calls "republican moments"--that is, when
the boycotts resemble those transitory moments of social activism
that have been considered to involve purely "political" objectives
aimed at securing the "virtues of popular republicanism: namely, the
pursuit of interests broader than immediate pecuniary gain, and an
appeal to fundamental ideals.""'
According to Professor Pope, decisions such as Claiborne
Hardware, Allied International, and Trial Lawyers can be under-
stood as extending First Amendment protection only to those boy-
cotts that represent freely chosen expressions of popular dissent and
political aspiration. Claiborne Hardware, in his view, exemplifies
what he calls a "republican movement" because the civil rights boy-
cotters sought to achieve constitutional objectives that transcended
their immediate economic interests. s2 The boycotts in Allied Inter-
230. See Pope, Republican Moments, supra note 20, at 294 (discussing general theo-
retical and normative arguments for justifying popular protest under a theory of civic re-
publican thought that avoids the large size problem of modern representative democra-
cies).
231. Id. at 351.
232. According to Professor Pope, the Trial Lawyers boycott lost its constitutional
shield of protection as a republican moment because the lawyers' "immediate objective
was to increase the price that they would be paid for their services." Id. at 349 (quoting
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national and Trial Lawyers, on the other hand, lost First Amend-
ment protection; in Allied International because workers were or-
dered by their union president to boycott,23 and in Trial Lawyers,
because the boycotters had a direct economic interest at stake.24
The boycotts in Allied International and Trial Lawyers were denied
constitutional protection because they were motivated out of private
economic interests that failed to reflect the democratic and com-
munitarian values associated with a republican moment.
Professor Pope's reliance on the distinction between political
and economic activity pressed by the Trial Lawyers Court falls prey
to the type of problems that infect Professor Elhauge's process ori-
ented approach to these same cases. Pope's economics/politics dis-
tinction, like Elhauge's public/private distinction, is highly prob-
lematic, especially when viewed in light of the commercialization
and consumerization of nearly every aspect of American life.2 13 The
publicprivate distinction in labor law has served the historical pur-
pose of denying the perspective of most working people, who under-
stand that labor's collective effort to gain control at the workplace is
intrinsically a political as well as an economic endeavor.
3a
Professor Pope argues that the result reached in Allied Inter-
national and Trial Lawyers can be justified because in each case the
boycott failed to foster broader social goals. In Allied International,
he regards the Longshoremen's boycott as the product of coercive
power of the Union's leadership, which "ordered ILA members to
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 427 (1990)).
233. The rank and file union membership thus had no choice in deciding whether to
join the boycott. Id. at 352.
234. Id. at 349.
235. See generally Alan Hyde, Economic Labor Law v. Political Labor Relations: Di-
lemmas for Liberal Legalism, 60 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1981); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The
Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981); Karl Kare, The
Public/Private Distinction In Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358 (1982); Getman, supra
note 28; Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of
Democracy: Some Lessons From Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 689. The emergence of
labor-community boycotts, for example, illustrates how boycotts involving an alliance be-
tween labor unions and consumer groups attempt to displace marketplace power by utiliz-
ing boycotts by coalition groups to accomplish economic and political objectives. See Pope,
Labor Community Boycotts, supra note 20, at 898-908. Labor-community boycotts call
into question the dichotomous public/private thinking of the courts. The notion that labor
and industrial issues can be limited to an economic realm, and "political" issues can be in
the realm of politics through democratic processes fails to reflect the realities of labor and
consumer groups who experience political and economic concerns as interrelated and
dependent issues. See Minda, Progressive Labor Politics, supra note 20, at 125-27.
236. Professor Pope has recognized the importance of this understanding in his
earlier work. See James G. Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to Deindus-
trialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1104-12 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
commercial version of labor protest has worked to deny the experience of workers who
understand their protest as a "right of personhood").
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stop handling cargoes." The boycott was not regarded as an exer-
cise of popular republican politics "[gliven the long history of autoc-
racy in the ILA, the coercive power [the Union President] Gleason
held over individual workers, and the workers' inability to leave the
union's jurisdiction...."11 The Trial Lawyers boycott was found not
to be a republican moment because the lawyers' immediate objective
was to increase their own hourly fees, an objective that failed to
transcend the "day-to-day conduct of business as usual."29
The problem with Pope's characterization of these cases is that
he, like Elhauge, overlooks aspects of each boycott that support
contrary characterizations. While it is true that the union members
in Allied International were "ordered" by their leadership to boycott
ships trading with Russia, it is also true that the "Deacons" and
"Black Hats" who organized the civil rights boycott in Claiborne
Hardware ordered their members to honor their boycott. While the
Longshoremen's union in Allied International was autocratic, so was
the civil rights leadership responsible for organizing the Claiborne
Hardware boycott. If boycotts are to be denied constitutional protec-
tion because organizers order their members to act, or because boy-
cott organizations are operated under a military-type structure of
leadership, then nearly every effectively organized boycott would fail
to qualify for constitutional protection under such a theory. The fact
that the longshoremen were ordered to obey the ILA boycott, and the
fact that the union was autocratic, fails to explain why that boycott
was treated differently than the boycott in Claiborne Hardware.
The boycott in Trial Lawyers was analogous to economic labor
strikes during the New Deal era, one of the few moments in United
States history that Professor Pope understands to be the closest ap-
proximation to his "ideal type" of republican moments.240 "If unions
and workers are to enjoy the civic republican values advocated by
Professor Pope, they must have the freedom to participate and affect
corporate decisions that determine their economic interests."24' Con-
certed activity designed to advance a common wage demand involves
more than mere selfish economic interests; such activity is also
aimed at advancing worker control at the workplace. Such activity is
237. Pope, Republican Moments, supra note 20, at 352 (quoting International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 214 (1982)).
238. Id. at 352. According to Pope, the longshoremen in Allied were not engaged in
constitutional political activity because "[flar from engaging in an exercise of positive
freedom, the longshoremen acted '[i]n obedience to' Gleason's order." Id. (quoting Allied
Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. at 214).
239. Id. at 349.
240. Id. at 312.
241. See Minda, Progressive Labor Politics, supra note 20, at 124.
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intrinsically political activity. 2
While Professor Pope's characterization of the Claiborne Hard-
ware boycott may to some seem persuasive, it is far from apparent,
given the chameleon-like quality of boycott doctrine, that Pope's
characterization of that case will control the way the case will be
interpreted by future judges. Political and legal ideas attributed to a
legal opinion can and frequently do "change their political valence
over time from progressive to conservative and back again."
243
Indeed, Justice Brennan in his partial dissent in Trial Lawyers,
stated that he was "surprised" by Justice Stevens' majority opinion
finding that the lawyers' boycott was not protected speech, given
what Justice Stevens had said in Claiborne Hardware about the
importance of protecting the "[tihe established elements of speech,
assembly, association, and petition" of expressive boycotts. 24
Professor Pope, like Professor Elhauge, also assumes that
judges can identify those boycotts whose objective and motive are
immediately related and casually connected to political, as distin-
guished from economic, objectives. As Professor Pope recognizes, the
economics/politics distinction is difficult in several respects. 5 Not
only does Pope's distinction require judges to separate political from
economic interests, a Herculean task in most mixed motive boycott
cases, but more significantly his distinction fails to address how lan-
guage and cognitive imagination have socially constructed the very
categories that the distinction seeks to recognize. The legal catego-
ries of economic and political activity are assumed to establish an
objective baseline for legal analysis, when the categories themselves
reflect contingent and highly contestable and socially constructed
ideas about the nature of markets and politics. Trial Lawyers and
Claiborne Hardware are too chameleon-like to be tamed by either
legal distinctions such as public/private or by political inspiration of
civic republicanism.
Efforts to reconcile boycott cases have faltered because judges
and commentators have assumed that the problem of incoherence
may be solved by some chain of reasoning that can be discovered and
242. See id.
243. Jack M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831, 1833
(1991) (describing the phenomenon of "ideological drift" in legal thought) [hereinafter
Balkin, Legal Semiotics]; see also Jack M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal
Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 383-84 (providing an ex-
ample of ideological drift in legal thought); Jack M. Balkin, Ideological Drift, in ACTION &
AGENCY 13 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1991) [hereinafter Balkin, Ideological Drift].
244. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 449 (1990) (quoting,
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982) (Stevens, J.)).
245. Pope, Labor Community Boycotts, supra note 20, at 924. ("Most [labor-commu-
nity boycotts] fall between the extremes, where determining the appropriate degree of
protection will involve difficult value judgements.").
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articulated to correct logical mistakes in the case law. The problem
in the case law is not mistakes in logic, but rather a more basic
problem involving the manipulability of the language used for dis-
tinguishing the cases. Language is not a distortion-free vehicle for
describing what has gone wrong in the law of boycotts; language is
itself socially constructed, and is implicated in the process of produc-
ing different meanings of boycotts for the law. What is needed is an
inquiry into the role of language in generating the chameleon-like
meanings that judges and commentators have attributed to different
group boycotts.
D. Boycotts understood metaphorically.
Judges and commentators have failed to consider the possibil-
ity that their tool of analysis-language-may fail to objectively
capture the meaning of the events they seek to describe. In Gompers,
for example, Justice Lamar sought to describe the legal meaning of a
threatened worker boycott by describing how the vast power of a la-
bor group could coerce an individual to take unwanted action. The
idea of force provided the legal justification for the Court's conclu-
sion, but the Court's explanation of force depended upon non-objec-
tive criteria. One could not ascertain the meaning of force without
knowing something about the way Justice Lamar understood the
problem of force in Gompers.
The problems of political expression and motive highlighted by
the Claiborne Hardware and Trial Lawyers decisions illustrate a
similar point. One cannot understand why Justice Stevens charac-
terized the Claiborne Hardware and Trial Lawyers boycotts as ex-
pressive political or private market activity without first knowing
something about the imaginative process he employed in depicting
the civil rights boycott as involving primarily elements of majesty.
Similarly, the problem of definition represented by the Pinhas case,
and the disagreement between the majority and dissent, would seem
to require an analysis that is capable of grasping how different ideas
about boycotts influence judicial thinking about different legal
meanings of boycott.
If we assume that reality reflects an objective image of the
world like a mirror, then language may be capable of mirroring that
reality. If on the other hand the words we use to mirror reality ac-
tually reflect contingent, socially constructed images of that reality,
then there is reason for questioning the representative function of
language used for the discovery of meaning. The different images of
boycott found in the law suggest that there is a mechanism at work
which has permitted judges to capture some, but not all, of the real-
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ity of boycotts for different doctrinal areas of the law. 6 In Part HI, I
will attempt to show how a study of metaphor provides a more pow-
erful and deeper understanding of boycott decisions, and how such a
study may provide insight for resolving and clarifying the confusion
and uncertainty surrounding the current doctrinal puzzles applica-
ble to group boycotts.
M. THE METAPHORIC STRUCTURE OF BOYCOTT DOCTRINE
To live in a legal world requires that one know not only the precepts, but
also their connections to possible and plausible states of affairs.
In this Part, I will offer an explanation for the chameleon-like
character of boycott doctrine that links the structure of legal doc-
trine to the forms of metaphoric reasoning utilized by judges in de-
ciding boycott cases. My goal will be to show how the indeterminacy
of boycott doctrine can be understood as an intelligent and determi-
nant practice generated by metaphoric reasoning." Boycott doctrine
246. I do not claim that it is possible to determine the truth of the legal descriptions
of boycotts found in the case law; indeed, this article makes no claims about whether the
law's understanding of boycotts is true in an objective sense. The point of this article is to
understand the process of truth finding as a process of discovering different legal mean-
ings of boycotts which judges have constructed for the law. As Professor Jack M. Balkin
has explained, "[tihe only truly 'authentic' discourse is the discourse of a situated subject
in some form of language game. To demand more than this is to demand the impossible."
Balkin, Legal Semiotics, supra note 243, at 1848. It is sufficient for my purposes that
judges have used different metaphoric images in their opinions as a means of creating le-
gal meaning. By exploring the nature of metaphoric reasoning in law, we can discover the
key for unlocking the mystery surrounding the chameleon-like mechanism of boycott doc-
trine. By discovering what generates the structure of legal interpretation, we can also
discover new hermeneutic lessons for resolving boycott issues in the law.
247. Robert N. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1983) (arguing the importance of tracing the connections be-
tween the legal world and "other worlds" of cultural practices in society). Others have
since focused their analysis on uncovering the missing connections between legal mean-
ing and cultural practice. See, e.g., Boyle, supra, note 36; William N. Eskridge, Jr., A So.
cial Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal
Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333 (1992).
248. In cognitive theory, metaphoric reasoning refers to knowledge derived from our
understanding of the experience of one kind of thing in terms of another. For example,
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have illustrated how the metaphor ARGUMENT IS
WAR helps to explain how we have come to understand and talk about arguments in
terms of war: "Your claims are indefensible. He attacked every weak point in my argu-
ment. I demolished his argument .... " GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS
WE LIVE BY 4 (1980). Lakoff & Johnson's definition of metaphor is conceptual in that "a
metaphorical concept, namely ARGUMENT IS WAR structures, at least in part, what we
do and how we understand what we are doing when we argue." Id. at 5. Metonymy, as
distinguished from metaphor, is primarily a referential concept that allows us to use one
entity to represent another. Id. at 36. The metonymy THE FACE FOR THE PERSON
helps us to understand the meaning of the statement: "She's just a pretty face." Id. at 37;
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will be interpreted metaphorically, as a structure of symbolic repre-
sentations or socially constructed mental images about the nature
and meaning of the cultural practices of groups. When viewed meta-
phorically, legal reasoning can be understood as an imaginative
process that is both constrained and enabled by basic embodied ex-
periences. 249
Metaphors that are experientially based on knowledge about
animals and about our own bodies have dominated the judicial
imagination of the law applicable to group boycott.20 Judges have
compared boycotts to blood-thirsty tigers, to disease infecting the
internal biological system of the body, and even to murder. Boycott
metaphors used in written legal opinions are more than interesting
analogies; metaphors have swayed judicial opinion251 by performing
a silent, but important, conceptual role in the law, through which
judicial reasoning is made possible. 22 Metaphors function concep-
see also Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 35, at 1189-206. Metaphor and me-
tonymy are central to the intellectual process in that they are utilized to construct and
communicate legal meaning derived within a culture of idealized cognitive models.
249. See JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45; LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, supra
note 45.
250. Cognitive theorists have shown how we make use of patterns of prereflective
thought based on our physical and cultural experiences as a means of organizing abstract
understanding about the world. See JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at xv.
For example, the metaphor CORPORATION IS A PERSON in law seeks to define the
meaning of a corporate entity in terms of the personality of a person. Many metaphors
used in the law, like CORPORATION IS A PERSON, are based on physical images which
cross categorical boundaries for establishing the coherence of meaning on basis of nonob-
jectivist criteria. Id. at 67 ("[Mietaphors assert cross-categorical identities that do not ex-
ist objectively in reality."); see also Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 35, at 657-64
(illustrating how the antifoundationalist arguments of Stanley Fish are committed to an
objectivist view of rationality that fails to take into account the multiplicity of meanings
that are made possible through human imagination). I thus use the word metaphor in a
special sense, understood by cognitive theorists like Lakoff and Johnson, which highlights
the experiential nature of metaphoric reasoning. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 248,
at 3-32; JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 15. Metaphor is thus the means
by which we understand what we experience. We think, act, and even dream by using
metaphors. A metaphor relates, or "maps," knowledge about the domain of one thing to
the domain of something else.
251. As Michael Boudin has written about antitrust law: "After case citations and
market share figures have faded from memory, the judge or lawyer who has read an anti-
trust opinion is likely to remember, if anything, a metaphor." Boudin, supra note 34, at
395. The same can be said of the case law of group boycotts. Metaphoric images are util-
ized unconsciously and automatically in the human reasoning process. Metaphors, mental
images and metonymy allow us to communicate with each other and to categorize diverse
physical, social and historical phenomena. "Metaphor resides in thought, not just words."
LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 45, at 2.
252. Metaphors perform a "constitutive role" in structuring our experience. As Gary
Peller has posited, "our experience of the world is constructed through the adoption of
particular metaphors and the exclusion of other metaphors for organizing perception and
communication." Peller, supra note 36, at. 1175; see also Coombe, supra note 38, at 91
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tually by evoking images that become the logical determinants of
comprehension and communication."
It is important to emphasize at the outset that the study of
metaphor seeks to reveal two basic aspects of human understanding.
First, metaphor limits and constrains legal thought by relating ju-
dicial understanding about one kind of thing or experience in terms
of another.2-4 Metaphors are by their very nature, only partial repre-
sentations of reality. The partiality of metaphoric reasoning can lead
to distortion and enable misunderstanding.255 In the case law of boy-
cotts, metaphors have constrained the legal meaning of boycotts be-
cause judges have tended to confuse metaphors with real world
events; they have used words literally in their decisions when the
context implies that they should have understood the words meta-
phorically, and they have failed to appreciate the partiality of the
imagined metaphors they use for comprehending aspects of complex
events.1S6
Second, while the basic conceptual metaphors used in the case
law of boycotts have the capacity to change their meaning over
time,2 7 a number of basic experiential metaphors derived from
("Metaphor is one way (and an incredibly powerful way) in which people socially create
new meanings within restricted fields of representation...."). Steven L. Winter has
noted how the word "metaphor" is itself a metaphor derived from physical experience.
The word metaphor is derived from the Greek words pherein, "to carry," and meta, "over."
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note 35, at 1384 n.69 (citing and quoting
TERRANCE HAWKES, METAPHOR 1 (1972)). Metaphors project or "carry over" meaning
across different domains of experience by structuring our understanding about the world,
and in doing so, metaphors can bring about paradigmatic shifts in legal theory. See Win-
ter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 35, at 1162, 1199.
253. See LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 45, at 6. For example, the metaphor SET-
TING SUN conveys knowledge about death and old age by evoking the image of twilight
at day's end. The basic metaphors LIFETIME IS A DAY or DEATH IS GOING TO A FI-
NAL DESTINATION work in conjunction with the image of"setting sun."
254. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 248, at 5.
255. Of course, not all metaphors in the law distort legal interpretation. Some meta-
phors can improve judicial understanding by translating abstract legal concepts into con-
crete and understandable notions about real world phenomena. For example, Michael
Boudin notes that the metaphor created for the antitrust concept of"tying" has worked to
capture the literal language of Section 3 of the Clayton Antitrust Act. Boudin, supra note
35, at 403.
256. The more general point is that "[a]ll human practices ... are the creation of
people who are themselves shaped by historically specific structures of meaning that both
constrain and enable practice." Coombe, supra note 38, at 121.
257. It is generally thought that "dead metaphors" are no longer real metaphors in
that they have been widely accepted in ordinary conversational language. See Boudin, su-
pra note 35, at 404 (illustrating how the BOTTLENECK metaphor in antitrust opinions
dealing with monopolization and attempts to monopolize has exhausted itself). The Dead
Metaphor Theory is based on what George Lakoff and Mark Turner see as a basic mis-
conception of Literal Meaning Theory: the notion "that those things in our cognition that
are most alive and most active are those that are conscious." LAKOFF & TURNER, supra
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knowledge about our bodies and how our bodies interact in the
physical world have been used over and over again in the law of boy-
cotts. My claim is that the legal categories and doctrinal distinctions
used in the boycott cases have developed from recurring body meta-
phors and image schemataM8 to make sense of real world phenom-
ena.29 In the following part, I will attempt to show how these ele-
mental metaphors have operated to create different metaphoric do-
mains or idealized cognitive models (ICMs) 2 0 for making sense of
the economic and political practices of different groups in society.
A. The Metaphoric Origins of Boycott Doctrine.
The metaphoric origins of boycott doctrine in America can be
traced to State v. Glidden, 6' the first reported decision to use the
word boycott. In Glidden, a labor union sought to compel a non-un-
ion publishing company in Connecticut to hire only union workers.
In its effort to unionize the firm, union sympathizers distributed
leaflets to the public in an effort to induce the public not to patronize
the firm. The leaflets carried slogans such as, "A word to the wise is
note 45, at 129. Metaphors "that are most alive and most deeply entrenched, efficient, and
powerful are those that are so automatic as to be unconscious and effortless." Id. at 130.
This does not mean that culture and tradition are irrelevant to meaning. Metaphoric un-
derstandings of the physical and social world take on new meaning as each generation
imaginatively reproduces its own culture and tradition. See Steven L. Winter, Contin-
gency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 998-1001 (1991)
(discussing the concept of "slippage.").
258. The concept of an image schema has been developed by cognitive theorist to de-
scribe the imaginative devices we use to organize our thoughts in patterns and relations
in order to comprehend and reason about complex data. See JOHNSON, BODY IN THE
MIND, supra note 45, at 28-29. Because image schemata are linked to our experience,
they give rise to what cognitive theorists call "prototypical" effects, for example, recurring
or corresponding relations between the culturally shared experiences of individuals in a
given society and the cognitive process. See Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note
35, at 113742 (describing the neurophysiology of color perception of different cultures
and languages).
259. These images and metaphors are what Gary Peller has called the "codes of
'common sense'" of cultural experience that enable legal interpreters to organize percep-
tion and engage in legal communication. See Peller, supra note 36, at 1155.
260. Idealized cognitive model (ICM) is a technical term used in cognitive theory to
describe detailed imaginative narratives drawn from human experiences to organize
complex knowledge about the world. See, e.g., LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, supra note 45, at
68-76. ICM's are like stock stories, folk theories, or image-schemata upon which we in-
tuitively rely to organize and categorize our knowledge about the diverse inputs of daily
life. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 35, at 2232-34. ICM's share certain core
features. All ICM's are: (1) grounded in direct physical or cultural experience; (2) highly
generalized to capture some, but not all, of a covered fact situation; (3) unconscious or in-
tuitive structures of thought that operate automatically in the thought process; and (4)
neither determinant nor objective characterizations of reality. Id. at 2234.
261. 8 A. 890 (Conn. 1887) (Carpenter, J.).
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sufficient, boycott the Journal and Courier!"26 2 The leaflets were
dropped on the streets by two persons who walked together on pub-
lic sidewalks. 63
In an opinion ripe with colorful mental images and rich meta-
phors the Connecticut Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Carpenter, upheld the injunction and the criminal conspir-
acy charges. In considering whether the defendants had a legal right
to act as they did, Justice Carpenter observed that "[tihe bare as-
sertion of such a right is startling."216 As he explained:
If the defendants have the right which they claim, then all business en-
terprises are alike subject to their dictation. No one is safe in engaging in
business, for no one knows whether his business affairs are to be directed
by intelligence or ignorance,-whether law and justice will protect the
business, or brute force, regardless of law, will control it .... If a large
body of irresponsible men demand and receive power outside of law, over
and above law, it is not to be expected that they will be satisfied with a
moderate and reasonable use of it. All history proves that abuses and ex-
cesses are inevitable. The exercise of irresponsible power by men, like the
taste of human blood by tigers, creates an unappeasable appetite for
more.
265
In Justice Carpenter's mind, the defendants had acted irre-
sponsibly because they had allowed their collective desire for more
(that is, higher wages) to become an animal-like passion. This pas-
sion was seen to be analogous to that of a wild tiger, thirsting for
human blood. In Glidden, the mental image of a wild tiger thus
structured the meaning the court attributed to the extralegal collec-
tive action of the defendants. It was the metaphoric image of animal
passion and the brute force of a tiger which generated the court's
understanding of the workers' concerted activities. This can be ex-
plained by the existence of a certain sense of the order of things de-
veloped from proverbs based on the Great Chain of Being metaphor.266
1. The Great Chain of Being Metaphor. As George Lakoff and
Mark Turner have explained, the "Great Chain of Being is a cultural
model that concerns kinds of beings and their properties and places
them on a vertical scale with 'higher' beings and properties above
'lower' beings and properties."267 Our common sense understanding
262. Id. at 898.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 894.
265. Id.
266. See LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 45, at 166-69.
267. Id. at 166. The "Great Chain of Being" is a cultural model utilized in proverbs
and story telling since ancient times for understanding "mans place in the universe." Id.
Great Chain of Being "[p]roverbs concern people, though they often look superficially as if
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of the nature of things allows us to think of humans as "higher-order
beings" than animals. 65 What makes the Great Chain of Being
metaphoric is that we tend to rely upon our knowledge of the generic
attributes and behavior of lower-order beings to comprehend specific
attributes and behaviors of people. 69 We thus characterize our
knowledge about specific people or groups by making comparisons
based on our understanding of the generic attributes and behavior of
other beings.
For example, in comparing the worker boycott in Glidden to a
blood-thirsty tiger, the Court was able to associate the boycott with a
lower-order being and thus place it on a level with animals known to
have bestial instincts and animal drives. The lower-level attributes
of a wild tiger thus became attributed to the workers' boycott and
consequently helped legitimate the need for the court's injunction.
What defined the boycott were the attributes and behaviors of a
lower-level being.
In Glidden, the Great Chain of Being metaphor permitted the
court to translate boycott activity into a concrete and vivid image of
a tiger, thereby shaping the meaning of the activity by placing the
boycott in the order of things. It was the Great Chain of Being meta-
phor that permitted the court to see the workers' boycott as "a com-
bination of many [seeking] to impoverish and oppress a few."270 The
workers had utilized a "dangerous instrumentality"2 71 because they
had acted out in concert bestial instincts and animal drives. The
workers' boycott in Glidden was dangerous because the court asso-
ciated the defendant's contemplated activity with a beast on the
lower level of the chain of being. Persuasive as rhetoric, the Great
Chain of Being metaphor and the image of a blood-thirsty tiger were
concealed forms of argument.
In Glidden, the plausibility of the Great Chain of Being meta-
phor depended partly upon the validity of the analogy which the
court drew between boycott activities and the attributes of a wild
and dangerous animal. Wild tigers are understood to be aggressive
they concern other things-cows, frogs, peppers, knives, charcoal. We understand proverbs
as offering us ways of comprehending the complex faculties of human beings in terms of
these other things." Id. The English proverb "All bark and no bite," for example, serves to
arouse our commonplace understanding about dogs to convey a specific understanding
about certain people. Id. at 180.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 170-72. -By linking the Great Chain with the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC
metaphor, [the Great Chain metaphor] allows us to comprehend general human character
traits in terms of well-understood nonhuman attributes; and, conversely, it allows us to
comprehend less well-understood aspects of the nature of animals and objects in terms of
better-understood human characteristics." Id. at 172.
270. State v. Glidden, 8 A. 890, 895 (Conn. 1887).
271. Id. at 897.
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and dangerous; we thus comprehend boycott phenomena by making
an analogy to the attributes of a wild animal. When the Glidden
court attributed the characteristics of lower-level beings to people,
the court invoked the metaphoric image of the animal for under-
standing something about the nature of a group boycott. The
mechanism by which this analogy works is the Great Chain of Being
metaphor: behavior of a higher-order behavior is understood in
terms of dangerous lower-level instinct. This is why it might seem
plausible to understand a boycott in terms of the traits of a wild ti-
ger.
Something more than a simple analogy which compared the
properties of boycotts to the traits of wild tigers was in operation in
Glidden. As George Lakoff and Mark Turner have argued, the "real
metaphoric work" of the Great Chain of Being metaphor "concerns
not the properties in the source and target schema but rather the
structures of those schemas."272 When the court understood the na-
ture of the boycott in terms of the character of a wild tiger, the court
was associating a relation between tigers and animal-like behavior;
that relation was then used to map the court's understanding of the
relation between the worker boycott and a propensity for violence. In
other words, Justice Carpenter's image of a wild tiger focused on the
instinctual propensity that tigers have for violence; that trait was
then used to establish the appropriateness of relating the boycott
with ideas of violence. As Justice Carpenter put it, "[tihe exercise of
irresponsible power by men like the taste of human blood by tigers,
creates an unappeasable appetite for more."273
In Glidden, the Great Chain of Being Metaphor concerned not
272. LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 45, at 196. Consider, for example, ancient folk
tales based on the idea that "Achilles is a lion." Lakoff and Turner observe that folk tales
based on the assertion that Achilles is a lion merely assert that Achilles is courageous:
First, independent of the metaphor involving Achilles and the lion, the meta-
phorical schema evoked by the word "lion" makes use of a conventionalized in-
stance of the GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR, through which we understand non-
human attributes in terms of human character traits. We thus begin with a
conventional understanding of a certain behavior of the lion in terms of the cou-
rageous behavior of a human.
Second, the expression "Achilles is a lion" makes use of the GREAT CHAIN
METAPHOR going in the opposite direction, inviting us to understand human
behavior in terms of animal behavior .... The two processes are converses of one
another, which is why they cancel each other out. This is why it seems plausible to
say "Achilles is a lion" does no more than say that Achilles is courageous.
Id. at 195-96. The "real metaphoric work" of the GREAT CHAIN metaphor is created by
understanding "the steadfastness of Achilles' courage in terms of the imagined rigidity of
the lion's animal instinct." Id. at 196. The metaphor thus concerns not the properties of
the source and target domains (Achilles and the lion), but rather the structures of those
schemata.
273. Glidden, 8 A. at 894.
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the traits of tigers and boycotts as such, but rather the structure of
the images of irresponsible men and tigers thirsting for human
blood. It is the property of bestial and instinctual behavior which
structured the relation and gave meaning to tigers and boycotts, on
the one hand, and murder and violence, on the other. In the court's
understanding of boycott, the idea of violence and murder was high-
lighted as the distinguishing characteristic of boycott. The instinc-
tual propensity for violence was marked as being a special charac-
teristic of tigers and boycotts. The real power of the Great Chain of
Being metaphor is that it invites us to conceptually understand one
thing in terms of the essential attributes of another.274
2. The Story of Captain Boycott. Recognizing that the "word
[boycott] is not easily defined,"275 Justice Carpenter retold the story
of Captain Boycott. His retelling of the story set the stage for the
court's startling conclusion that "boycotts originally signified vio-
lence, if not murder."276 The clues for uncovering the metaphoric
sway of the court's opinion can be discovered by considering the de-
scriptive phrases Justice Carpenter used in his telling of the story
about Captain Boycott:
Captain Boycott was an Englishman, an agent of Lord Earne, and a
farmer of Lord Mark, in the wild and beautiful district of Connemara. In
his capacity as agent he had served notices upon Lord Earne's tenants,
and the tenantry suddenly retaliated in a most unexpected way by, in the
language of schools and society, sending Captain Boycott to Coventry in a
very thorough manner. The population of the region for miles round re-
solved not to have anything to do with hem, and as far as they could pre-
vent it, not to allow any one else to have anything to do with him. His life
appeared to be in danger-he had to claim police protection. His servants
fled from him as servants flee from their masters in some plague-stricken
Italian city. He and his wife had to work in their own fields themselves, in
most unpleasant imitation of theocritan shepherds and shepherdesses,
and play out their grim eclogue in their deserted fields with the shadows
of the armed constabulary ever at their heels. The Orangemen of the
north heard of Captain Boycott and his sufferings, and the way in which
he was holding his ground, and they organized assistance and sent him
down armed laborers from Ulster. To prevent civil war the authorities had
to send a force of soldiers and police to Lough Mark, and Captain Boycott's
harvests were brought in and his potatoes dug by the armed Ulster labor-
ers, guarded always by the little army.
277
274. See LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 45, at 196-99.
275. Glidden, 8 A. at 896.
276. Id. at 897.
277. Id. at 896-97 (quoting the story as narrated by Mr. Justin McCarthy, "an Irish
gentleman of learning and ability," who, acgording to Judge Carpenter, was recognized as
871
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Tigers are instinctively aggressive and violent; they live in wild
jungles and they are known to act suddenly. Thus, Justice Carpen-
ter began his telling by emphasizing that the District of Connemara
was "wild and beautiful."278 He states that the poor Irish tenants
who were evicted by Captain Boycott from his estate "suddenly re-
taliated in a most unexpected way."2 79 The tenants retaliated in the
"language of schools and society, sending Captain Boycott in a very
thorough manner." ° Captain boycott and his family were depicted
as helpless victims; their "[lives] appeared to be in danger" and, ac-
cording to Justice Carpenter, soldiers and police had to be sent in
order to "prevent civil war."25' In the wild district of Connemara,
boycotters suddenly retaliate like wild tigers, forcing helpless prop-
erty owner's off their land. The picture invoked is one that stigma-
tizes the tenant boycott as uncivilized and animal-like.
In Justice Carpenter's mind, the instinctual animal-like nature
of wild tigers was linked conceptually with boycotts, an association
that made it possible to understand the story about Captain boycott
and all boycotts as signifying violence and murder. Irresponsible
men, hungry for power, have an "unappeasable appetite for more,"
just as a wild tiger, having tasted "human blood," desires more. 2 As
Justice Carpenter put it, "[if this is a correct picture the thing we
call a boycott originally signified violence, if not murder."' If boy-
"good authority") (emphasis added).
278. Id. at 896.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 897.
282. Id. at 896. Had Justice Carpenter relied upon a different metaphoric image for
understanding the nature of the boycott, for example, the image of a lion, a different story
might have been told. Because our common folk understanding of the nature of lions is in-
vested with different human traits (lions are normally thought to be courageous and no-
ble, see LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 45, at 194), the Great Chain metaphor might have
led Justice Carpenter to a different understanding about the nature of boycotts. Boycotts
might be seen as courageous and noble rather than wild and violent. The court could have
understood the boycott as an example of worker solidarity and political struggle, a story
about how the courageous effort of a group of poor farm laborers engaged in political and
economic struggle for mutual aid and self-protection. The boycott against Captain Boy-
cott, for example, may have been a justifiable response to redress a grave injustice, a
transformative act aimed at changing the economic system that favored the landlord
class, an event in an ongoing political struggle that was transforming fundamental social
and economic institutions in England.
283. Glidden, 8 A. at 897. In choosing to focus on the coercive elements of the work-
ers' boycott, the courts understanding of the meaning of boycott in Glidden was charac-
teristic of the way most courts understood labor boycotts at the turn of the century. An
Ohio court in 1897, for example, cited Justice Carpenter's opinion to support the view
that even otherwise peaceful labor boycotting represented a coercive combination that ex-
tended beyond "the limits of law and order." Consolidated Steel & Wire Co. v. Murray, 80
F. 811, 819-20 (N.D. Ohio 1897). While it was recognized that workers had the right indi-
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cotts are like a wild tiger thirsting for human blood, then boycotts
are like the violence of murder."'
Justice Carpenter's understanding of the boycott in Glidden
may seem strange today because he attributed to the boycott traits
which may now seem wildly out of place.25 Wild tigers and murder
are no longer the images used today to describe the legal meaning of
worker boycotts in the context of a legal regime that has granted la-
bor the basic legal rights necessary for self-organization and collec-
tive bargaining. When Glidden is viewed within its historical and
cultural context, the metaphors and mental images invoked by Jus-
tice Carpenter seem plausible. By the late 1880's, the time period in
vidually to engage in peaceful assemblies to persuade others not to enter into a relation
with the employer, it was, also, recognized that "persuasion, with the hootings of a mob
and deeds of violence as auxiliaries, is not peaceable persuasion." Id. at 828. Labor boy-
cotts were thus associated with images and meanings which were associated with ideas of
"illegality," "disorder," "insurgency" or "hooting mobs." Hence, "[s]ome judges denounced
boycotters' motives as 'wicked,' 'insolent and truculent.' Others described their behavior
as 'cruel, heartless and unrelenting,' or showing 'Wantonness and malice' with the
'grossest tyranny." Hurvitz, supra note 13, at 311 (quoting People v. Wilzig, 4 N.Y. Crim.
403, 426-28 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. of Oyer and Terminer 1886)). As one court boldly proclaimed:
"[i]ntimidation and coercion are essential elements of a [labor] boycott." Gray v. Building
Trades Council, 97 N.W. 663, 666 (Minn. 1903); see also Casey v. Cincinnati Typographi-
cal Union No. 3, 45 F. 135, 143 (6th Cir. 1891) (The "word 'boycott' is in itself a threat.");
Toledo A. A. & N.M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 730, 738 (6th Cir. 1893) ("As
usually understood, a boycott is a combination of many to cause a loss.., by coercing
others ... ."); Oxley Stove Co. v. Coopers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 72 F. 695, 698-99 (D.
Kansas 1896) (noting that the term boycott carries with it a menace, as acquired in
popular vocabulary). See generally Dianne Avery, Images of Violence in Labor Jurispru-
dence: The Regulation of Picketing and Boycotts 1894-1921, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1989).
284. Justice Carpenter's decision in Glidden was thus structured by a basic meta-
phor that associated a labor boycott with murder or death. Cognitive theorists have dis-
covered that there are a small number of basic metaphors that are part of our cultural
knowledge which allow us to communicate with each other, and to engage in fundamental
cognitive processes. See LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 45, at 1-56. Basic metaphors are
cognitive in nature, and are, thus, more than mere linguistic expressions in communica-
tion. Id. at 50. For example, LIFE IS A JOURNEY, DEATH IS A DEPARTURE, and A
LIFETIME IS A DAY are some of the basic conceptual metaphors used to comprehend
aging and death. Id. at 51-56.
285. The cognitive link between the threatened boycott and the legal meaning at-
tributed to it by the Glidden court could not be proved objectively; Justice Carpenter's de-
scription of the boycott was not based on anything that could be established in objective
reality. This does not mean that metaphoric reasoning in Glidden was completely free
and unconstrained. Nor does this mean that the court's legal analysis was arbitrary, or
"mushy," in the sense that it lacked a logical structure. Though wide-ranging metaphori-
cal interpretations in law are possible, they are neither arbitrary nor groundless. The
plausibility of the metaphoric reasoning depends on the degree to which such reasoning
appears logical and objective. The coherence of metaphoric reasoning depends on the ex-
tent to which metaphoric reasoning is grounded in non-metaphoric experiential under-
standings, such as metaphoric reasoning grounded in understandings about basic physi-
cal and culturally defined experiences. See tLAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 45, at 113-14.
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which Glidden was decided, both labor and mob disturbances and
violence had reached epidemic proportions.2 6 By the end of the
1880's, "[R]abor and capital battled with a ferocity seldom equaled in
the annuals of labor warfare."21m When Glidden is read within its
own cultural context, it may not be all that surprising that the
courts of that period could find that even a peaceful union boycott
presented a threat not unlike that of a blood-thirsty hungry tiger.285
While cultural coloration helps to explain why certain meta-
phors are favored in legal opinions such as Glidden,289 contextual
coloration does not, and can not, explain the real power of metaphor
286. American society during this era was on the edge of civil anarchy: "Many thou-
sands of workers lived in habitations that were filthy, badly crowded, and poorly venti-
lated. Tragic proof of such conditions was furnished by the high mortality rate from the
dreadful epidemics that swept through the reeking slums of the large cities during the
post-Civil War era." ALMfONT LINDSEY, THE PULLMAN STRIKE 2 (1942) (citing ALLAN
NEVINS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICA 1865-1878 at 319-20 (1932)); SIXTH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF LABOR 503 (1875); SAMUEL P. ORTH,
THE ARmIES OF LABOR 66 (1919). As John Swinton, journalist and author, wrote of the
events in 1894, seven years after the Court's decision in Glidden:
Do we hear cries of distress from a million idle people? The wail of hunger from
men, women and children? The groans of anguish from the multitudes who suf-
fer in many a great city? Do we see hordes of men, mingled with women, looking
for work by which they may earn their daily bread? Does strife rage between the
workers and the capitalists? Do we hear the tramp of a hundred thousand sol-
diers, bearing guns, with which they are ready to shoot their own countrymen?
Do we hear Grover Cleveland ordering his generals to whet their swords for
blood? Do we see dread spectacles of human degradation all over the coal area of
our country? Have we seen a half million workers on the strike in a single
month of the year 1894?... Who can tell the weird and ghastly story of the last
quarter of the nineteenth century?
LINDSEY, supra, at 1 (quoting JOHN SWINTON, STRIKING FOR LIFE 297 (American Manufac-
turing and Publishing Co., 1894)).
287. LINDSEY, supra note 286, at 16. For example, by the end of the decade the na-
tion had experienced the emotionally and politically wrenching events of the Haymarket
riot, the Homestead strike, and the Pullman coal strike.
288. The images of violence are vividly described in many early labor picketing and
boycott decisions. See Avery, supra note 283.
289. I do not mean to suggest that there is an objective or a true cultural meaning of
boycott which is independent of human understanding and imagination.
The literal meaning theory of language postulates that "[ilf an expression of a lan-
guage is (1) conventional and ordinary, then it is also (2) semantically autonomous and (3)
capable of making reference to objective reality." LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 45, at
114. The general thrust of this study is that the literal meaning theory of language is
false; language is not a mirror of objective autonomous reality, because the very notion of
truth and falsity is relative to conceptual frameworks which are the product of human
imagination. Id. at 113-28 (discussing the "grounding hypothesis" of cognitive theory and
criticizing the "literal meaning theory" of objective linguistic understandings of language).
Cognitive theorists have shown that language does not operate as a mirror of objective
reality, because many, if not all, words we use in language are "fundamentally and in-
eradicably metaphoric." Id. at 116.
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in legal opinions. This is because metaphors transcend cultural
contexts. For example, the Great Chain of Being metaphor employed
in Glidden, has its counterpart in modern boycott legislation that
has justified prohibitions against secondary labor boycotts by com-
paring such activity to lower-level organisms of a "disease" or
"cancer."29 Thus, secondary boycotts by labor groups are proscribed
today because they are thought to spread the effects of a labor dis-
pute to healthy parts of the economy.
While judges no longer invoke the same metaphoric images of
boycotts in their opinions today, they do rely upon the same basic
conceptual metaphors, often unconsciously, in comprehending com-
plex phenomena of boycotts.29" ' The law of boycotts therefore cannot
be simply explained as the product of different cultural attitudes
about the nature of boycotts. Metaphors used in legal descriptions of
boycotts are affected by cultural coloration, but basic conceptual
metaphors which shape judicial understandings about boycotts have
remained relatively constant over time.2 92
3. The Role of Metaphor: "The Body In the Mind.' 93 The con-
ventional understanding of boycott in the law seeks to define the
word as a term of art that has a particular technical meaning de-
rived from cultural practices as described in the reported legal deci-
sions. The study of the use of metaphor attempts to uncover the con-
cealed logic that shapes legal doctrine by identifying the ruling me-
taphors of legal doctrine. The tiger analogy in Glidden, for example,
relied upon the logic of the Great Chain of Being metaphor to at-
tribute the characteristics of a wild beast to a workers' boycott. The
use of metaphor in Glidden provided more than just a linguistic aid
for describing a cultural practice; metaphor created the cognitive
structure by which the court made sense of the boycott. In boycott
cases, metaphors serve a basic conceptual function.
As cognitive theorists have demonstrated, the key to uncover-
ing the meaning of cognitive metaphors is the human body, and es-
290. See infra notes 373-75 and accompanying text; see also Lesnick, supra note 182.
291. The basic conceptual metaphors utilized in boycott case law are based on expe-
riential knowledge derived from an understanding of basic bodily functions. For this rea-
son, basic boycott metaphors remain relatively constant over time.
292. Thus, while the metaphors now used to describe boycotts have changed dra-
matically since the early common law, the underlying conceptual metaphors used by
judges to link their understanding and experiences of the world to gain insight and
meaning of unknown events have not changed. Conceptual metaphors are cognitive in na-
ture in the sense that they serve to structure the process of cognitive thought utilized to
derive meaning about reality. Conceptual metaphors are conceptual mappings. They are a
matter of thought, not merely language. See LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 45, at 50-51,
107-09, 111, 137-38.
293. JOHNSON, BODY IN THE IND, supra note 45.
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pecially understandings that emerge from our embodied experi-
ence.2 For example, by the late nineteenth century, judges ad-
vanced the idea that industrial organizations were like people, enti-
tled to "liberties" which the law would protect under a free trade
policy. 295 In talking about business entities as people, common law
judges invoked ontological metaphors that personified objects as
people. 296 The personification of business entities enabled judges to
conclude that corporations and private business entities, like people,
had legally protected liberties that were constitutionally protected
by the prevailing notions of substantive due process.
2 7
The metaphor CORPORATION IS A PERSON thus became a
rich and thickly textured imaginative device that enabled judges to
socially construct a law of business corporations based on the power-
fully simple idea that the corporation is an entity, having rights like
a person." s In talking about business entities as people, judges in-
voked ontological metaphors that personified corporations as enti-
294. Id. at xvi. There has been a recent interest in understanding how the idea of
"body" structures the law's discourse. Alan Hyde, for example, has undertaken the task of
describing how a metaphoric understanding of the human body has influenced legal dis-
course in such diverse legal fields as property, contract, labor and criminal law. Alan
Hyde, Bodies in the Eyes of The Law (unpublished manuscript, on file with author, 1993).
295. See Minda, Common Law, supra note 13, at 146-47.
296. Ontological metaphors enable us to view "events, activities, emotions, ideas,
etc., as entities and substances." LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 248, at 25. Ontological
metaphors thus permit us to understand aspects of reality as an "entity" which "allows us
to refer to it, quantify it, identify a particular aspect of it, see it as a cause .... Ontologi-
cal metaphors like this are necessary for even attempting to deal rationally with our ex-
periences." Id. at 26. While ontological metaphors might seem "unexceptional" in legal
analysis, it is important to note that they are "quite significant both in the kind of vision
law enabled as well as the kind of vision law excluded." Schlag, supra note 36, at 28.
297. In short, personification enabled judges to create detailed and idealized cogni-
tive models of law. See Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 35, at 1207-24.
298. Morton Horwitz has shown how the conception of "corporate personality" came
to dominate legal thinking at the turn of the century. See MORTON HORWITz, THE
TRANSFORIATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 111-
114 (1992); Morton Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate The-
ory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985) [hereinafter Horwitz, Santa Clara]. Business combina-
tions, organized as a single entity, were generally not perceived by judges as inherently
coercive groups because they created relatively silent, less visible pressures of induce-
ment and promise. Business conspiracies and boycotts were usually covert, involving only
a handful of key individuals. Business organizations, structured as they were by charter
and state law, exhibited to the world an orderly, legal appearance that could hide the
reality of violent action. It may be the perception of the corporate organization as a legal
person, and labor unions as potentially mob-like collectivities, explains the attitude of
most common law judges about labor and business boycotts in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. The image of the corporation as a person, restrained by law and reason, and the
contrary image of the labor union as a political association of rowdy and passionate work-
ers may explain why judges initially applied a double standard to labor and business
boycotts.
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ties having a particular location. 99 If a corporation were like a per-
son,0 0 then it would be possible to understand how such entities
might have a presence in a particular location or a "will" capable of
rational reason and capable of being coerced by force.301
In the Gompers case, the metaphor CORPORATION IS A
PERSON worked silently to enable the court to see the workers' boy-
cott as constituting a physical interaction between a group and a
fictional person, the Buck's Stove & Range Co. The metaphor COR-
PORATION IS A PERSON allowed Justice Lamar to conclude that
the Gompers' boycott constituted a power that had been "used
against one." In viewing the Bucks Stove & Range Co. as a person,
the court reasoned that the company was a helpless individual who
had to yield to superior force of many. The multitude of members in-
volved in the Gompers boycott were thus understood as a force being
directed against the body of a single person. This enabled the court
to ignore the fact that the Bucks Stove & Range Company was itself
an organization with considerable power to counter the workers'
boycott. For example, James Van Cleve, the president of the Bucks
Stove & Range Co., was also president of the National Association of
Manufacturers, an organization of small businesses that repre-
sented the interests of other businessmen devoted to the cause of de-
feating organized labor.0" The Bucks Stove & Range Co. thus had
access to powerful allies that might have been more than sufficient
299. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 35, at 1166.
300. As Steven L. Winter has noted, the word "corporate" is derived from the Latin
corporatus, meaning "formed into a body." Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note
35, at 1421.
By the turn of the century, corporations, like real persons, could sue and be sued.
For federal court diversity purposes, a corporation counted as one person. Corporations
were regarded as possessing and capable of exercising freedom of action. The result was
the rise, by the end of the nineteenth century, of "the modern business corporation, or-
ganized to pursue private ends for individual gains." MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860 at 111 (1977) [hereinafter HORWrrz,
TRANSFORMATION 1780-1860]. The spirit of individualism in the late nineteenth century
encouraged the notion that a corporation was like a person. As a fictional person, the cor-
poration was accorded the legal recognition accorded individuals but not groups. Also im-
portant, was the fact that the act of incorporation was originally a matter of royal pre-
rogative. Since the authority of the King ultimately derived from God, only the sovereign
could "create" a "legal person." Other groups and private associations could not claim to
be created by the sovereign, and thus, they lacked legal recognition as a "legal person."
Since the law did not recognize groups but only individuals, private associations lacked
legal rights as entities.
301. HORwlrZ, TRANSFORMATION, 1780-1860, supra note 300, at 111. The metaphoric
language of the corporation as a person has come to animate the new economic theory of
the firm in terms of contracting parties and transaction costs. See William W. Bratton,
Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407,
407-08 (1989).
302. LIVESAY, supra note 53, at 145-47.
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to countervail whatever power the union might have asserted with
its boycott. Moreover, it was quite possible that the Bucks Stove &
Range Co. could persuade its employees and customers to ignore the
boycott. In treating Bucks Stove & Range Co. as if it were a single
person, however, the court was able to see the boycott as a one-sided
struggle of the many against one. The rhetorical sway of the meta-
phor was powerful because the metaphor CORPORATION IS A
PERSON concealed the real power dynamic involved in the labor
dispute.
4. The Basic Image Schemata of Force. In the early labor boy-
cott cases, judges employed different experiential understandings of
force based on what cognitive theorists know as image schemata.3
An image schema is a "means of structuring particular experiences
schematically, so as to give order and connectedness to our percep-
tions and conceptions."3 4 An image schema creates the recurrent
pattern and order that structures our actions, perceptions, and con-
ceptions °.3 5 "Image schematas [sic] are those recurring structures of,
or in, our perceptual interactions, bodily experiences, and cognitive
303. An image schema is an "abstract pattern[ in our experience and understanding
that [is] not propositional in any of the standard senses of that term, and yet [it is] central
to meaning and to the inferences we make." JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45,
at 2. For example, image schemata provide us with general information for organizing
our understanding of the world. Hence, our understanding of ideas such as container,
path, cycle, link, balance, etc., allow us to make sense of relations among diverse experi-
ences. Id. at 208. Steven L. Winter provides a helpful example of the source-path-goal
schema basic to human cognition:
Early in life, we discover that we can obtain desired objects by moving toward
them through space. We imagine a source-path-goal structure to this experi-
ence. We then use this experience and its projected structure to elaborate all
kinds of more abstract purposive activities. Thus, when we complete fifty per-
cent of an intellectual task, like writing an article, for example, we say that we
are at the midpoint in our efforts or that we are halfway there. As we near the
end of our writing project, we see the light at the end of the tunnel. And, when
we finish that article, we say that we have achieved our goal, or that we have
completed what we set out to do.
Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 35, at 1132. The source-path-goal schema
also motivates a "systematic set ofjourney metaphors that are elaborated to conceptualize
'ffe." Id.
Thus, we give our children an education to give them a good start in life. If they
act out, we hope that it is just a stage (or something they are going through) and
that they will get over it. As adults, we hope they won't be burdened or saddled
with financial worries or ill health. We hope that they will go far in life. And we
know that, as mortals, they will eventually pass away. Another example of the
Life is a Journey metaphor is the familiar individualist who marches to the beat
of a different drummer.
Id.
304. JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 75.
305. Id. at 29.
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operations."0 6 The structure of many image schemata can be traced
to fundamental embodied experiences that we all share in com-
mon.
3 07
Early judicial notions about boycotts, in labor cases such as
Glidden and Gompers, for example, can be analyzed in light of the
most common image schemata of force and force relationships.30 8 We
experience physical force as action through external forces as our
bodies interact with gravity, light, heat, wind and bodily pressure,
and other physical objects and phenomena.0 9 We associate these ex-
periences in the process of making-sense of the idea of force. The
idea of boycott as force originates from basic bodily experiences such
as the experience of being moved by a crowd of people. As the cogni-
tive theorist Mark Johnson has explained, "When a crowd starts
pushing, you are moved along a path you may not have chosen, by a
306. Id. at 79. Early in life we rely upon information about how our bodies interact in
the physical world for processing and making sense of our worldly experiences. The image
of verticality, for example, based on the bodily experience of "standing up," allows us to
employ an up-down orientation for understanding quantity in vertical terms-more is up,
and less is down. The schemata of in-out and parts-whole, based on the experience of body
as containment, allows us to comprehend events, actions and activities in terms of a con-
tainer. Events and actions are "objects" and activities are "substances" having a discrete
entity like a container. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 248, at 30-32. The image
schema of balance, derived from knowledge of body movement, structures our basic no-
tion ofjustice. Justice, symbolized by a scale, is understood as the maintenance of"proper
balance." JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 90. The balance schema struc-
tures the way we understand rational legal argument: "[LIawyers want the jury to lean in
their favor, so they employ a confusing mass of facts, encourage weighty testimony, pile
one argument upon another, add the force of acknowledged authorities, and summon the
weight of the legal tradition." Id.
307. The key to understanding an important legal concept, like "standing... lies in
an appreciation that the term... is a metaphor ... motivated by our experience." Winter,
Standing, supra note 35, at 1383. As Winter has shown, "[tIhe metaphor of 'standing' is a
myth" that has been shaped by mental images about how individuals assert rights: "One
stands alone; one stands up; one stands apart; one stands out; one stands head and
shoulders above the crowd." Id. at 1387. Accordingly, the legal concept of standing has
come to embody the individualistic qualities modeled by the physical experience of
"standing." Thus, the images and values of "individualism" define the contours and re-
quirements of the law of standing. What has been obscured by the metaphor of standing,
however, is the reality that "individuals exist only as part of groups and larger communi-
ties of interest" and our "ability to think about how best to protect and effectuate those in-
terests in an interdependent world." Id.
This is the power of metaphor. As Steven Winter explains: "The power of a meta-
phor is that it colors and controls our subsequent thinking about its subject." Id. at 1383.
308. Mark Johnson has noted that there are at least seven common force image
schemata that operate constantly in structuring our experience of force. See JOHNSON,
BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 45. They are: compulsion, blockage, counterforce, di-
version, removal of restraint, enablement, and attraction. Id. at 45-48.
309. Id. at 13. Johnson notes, "[tihough we forget it so easily, the meaning of
'physical force' depends on publicly shared meaning structures that emerge from our
bodily experience of force." Id.
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force you seem unable to resist."310 We learn from what happens in a
crowd that the idea of force relates to basic bodily experiences such
as compulsion,3 1 attraction,312 or blockage.
For example, the meaning of boycott force might be drawn from
the bodily experience of being swept away by a crowd of people
moving in a particular direction. A fatal example of this occurred at
a rock concert given by The Who in Cincinnati, Ohio in 1979. At that
concert, the crowd trampled several concert goers to death. 4 The
force of the boycott might also be understood in terms of moral and
ethical persuasion or peer group pressure.3 15 Responsible people can
be swept along by the passion of the mob. Justice Holmes in Moore v.
Dempsey,31 s argued that a mob-dominated atmosphere at a capital
murder trial had the effect that "counsel, jury and judges were swept
to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion." 17 Peer
group pressure may also be the result of social force-compelling
conformity with the group's objectives."'
In Gompers, the Court concluded that the target of the union's
boycott was helpless to resist the force of the boycott. One way to
understand the Court's conclusion is to comprehend force in terms of
peer group pressure forcing someone to do something they would not
otherwise do. For example, Justice Lamar's conclusion in Gompers
that labor boycott slogans constituted "a force not inhering in the
words themselves" can be seen as an example of several differentimage schemata of force. The multitude of members of the boycott
was a force that could compel an individual to move along a path
defined by the boycott. This meaning of force, as a concealed form of
310. Id. at 45.
311. "Sometimes the force is irresistible, such as when the crowd gets completely out
of control; other times the force can be counteracted, or modified. In such cases of com-
pulsion, the force comes from somewhere, has a given magnitude, moves along a path,
and has a direction." Id.
312. "A magnet draws a piece of steel toward itself, a vacuum cleaner pulls dirt into
itself, and the earth pulls us back down when we jump. There is a common schematic
structure of attraction shared by these experiences." Id. at 47.
313.
When a baby learns to crawl, for instance, it encounters a wall that blocks its
further progress in some direction. The baby must either stop, ceasing its exer-
tion of force in the initial direction, or it must redirect its force. It can try to go
over the obstacle, around it, or even through it, where there is sufficient power
to do so. In such a case the child is learning part of the meaning of force and of
forceful resistance in the most immediate way.
Id. at 45.
314. See Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 35, at 1219 n.399.
315. JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 13-14.
316. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
317. Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
318. Id.
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argument, explains why the Gompers court interpreted the legal
consequences of boycott publicity as "any other force whereby prop-
erty is damaged."19
According to Justice Lamar, publicity of the Gompers' boycott
was a "verbal act" which contained "a force not inhering in the words
themselves."20 In the Court's understanding, the "multitudea of
members" associated with the boycott became the means for
"acquir[ing] vast power" that transformed the mere utterance of the
words "Unfair" and "We Don't Patronize" into a force.3 21 Boycott ut-
terances such as those involved in Gompers were understood to be
moving along a one-way directional path from a particular source to
a particular target.
The image schema known as the source-path-goal22 schema
helps to explain why judges might be motivated to understand boy-
cotts in a particular directional sense. Thus, "[wihen you enter an
unfamiliar dark room and bump into the end of a table, you are ex-
"1323periencing the interactional character of force, much in the same
way Justice Lamar understood the force of the threatened boycott in
Gompers. The source of the boycott, the starting point, was the dis-
semination of the boycott publicity. The goal or ending point was
Bucks Stove & Range Co. The boycott publicity aimed at the com-
pany was the path connecting the source with the goal.
The source-path-goal schema helps to explain why Justice La-
mar comprehended the force of boycott publicity in a directional
sense, as moving toward and threatening an impact with the Bucks
Stove & Range Co." The multitude of boycotters seen through the
lens of the image schema of verticality (more is up, less is down) en-
abled the Court in turn to gauge the degree of force threatened as
vast power. Hence, the brute force of men demanding more can be
seen as an "exercise of irresponsible power by men [for whom
power], like the taste of human blood by tigers, creates an unap-
319. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. As Lakoff and Johnson have argued, one of the chief metaphors for argument
and reasoning in our culture involves motion along a path toward some destination or
conclusion. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 248, at 56-57.
323. JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 43.
324. In Gompers, the Court considered only one of several possible boycott effects.
The request of boycotters to cease doing business with the Bucks Stove company might
have provoked other actions. Some might have grasped the boycott publicity as a com-
mand for action, but others might have responded differently. The boycott might have
had the effect of causing some to laugh at or to insult the boycotters. The point is that the
causal effects of the boycott expression were not limited to the ones emphasized by the
Gompers Court. The Court emphasized particular effects because the Court was predis-
posed to see the force of the boycott movingin a particular direction.
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peasable appetite for more."3
In Gompers and Glidden, the courts appear to derive meaning
about labor boycotts from knowledge about physical force, as move-
ment along a continuous path, an entity acted upon by the force, and
a potential trajectory the entity will traverse to reach a particular
goal or objective. 26 The collectivity and the utterances of its mem-
bers was the force, the entity acted upon were the individuals boy-
cotting, and the trajectory was the compulsion of the appeal. In this
way, the mental images of a boycott as a compulsory force help to
explain the legal meaning of boycott. Reasoning with the aid of boy-
cott image schemata serves to highlight an understanding of boy-
cotts as something that sweeps people along, to compel them to do
things they might not otherwise do.
In Gompers, the Court was thus able to conclude that publicity
of a boycott involved a moral force, and in Glidden the boycott was
understood as a physical force. The idea of force can thus be seen to
be structured by the experience of physical as well as moral com-
pulsion. Individuals can be forced to take action through physical
compulsion, the meaning of which is linked to knowledge about how
our bodies interact with external and internal physical forces.
327
B. The Chameleon-Like Quality of Boycott Metaphors At Early
Common Law.
While the history of labor boycott discourse has been dominated
by images and meanings that are quickly associated with ideas of
"illegality," "disorder," "insurgency," or the "mob,"328 the legal dis-
course dominating boycotts organized by business groups involved a
different vocabulary, one that projected dramatically different im-
ages about the meaning of boycotts. Following the famous English
325. State v. Glidden, 8 A. 890, 894 (Conn. 1887).
326. See JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 4.
327. Id. at 13-14. The meaning of compulsory force can also be understood, as it was
in Glidden, as a social or ethical schema in which action is brought about through moral
persuasion or group peer pressure. Id. at 14-15.
328. See generally Avery, supra note 283 (documenting early common law doctrines
that assumed that labor union activities encouraged violence).
The image of the mob has always served to signify illegal and lawless action by
groups. As Gary Peller has noted, "[probably the most powerful single image in the Am.
erican experience is the image of the Southern lynch mob-there, in the common under-
standing, the mob, ruled by irrational racism against Blacks, bypassed the orderly, ra-
tional, and judicial means of dispensing justice in favor of the 'pragmatic and the expedi-
ent.' See Gary Peller, Reason and the Mob, the Politics of Representation, 2 TIKKUN 28,
31 (1987). In the image of the Southern lynch mob, one can imagine how judges might
understand the "law" of boycotts as restraining the irrational forces of mob action by re-
quiring the participants of such activity to conform their irrational conduct to the law of
judges, guided by reason and "speaking from principles, objectivity, and dispassion." Id.
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case Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co.,329 for example,
American judges drew a distinction between boycotts that inflicted
economic losses by carrying legitimate competition to the bitter end
and boycotts that inflicted losses out of malice and spiteful will, to
inflict harm without reference to the defendant's economic gain.
330
In Bowen v. Matheson,33' for example, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court decided in 1867 that a combination of Boston
shipping masters could lawfully exclude competitors from the mar-
ket by refusing to deal with non-members. In finding the boycott
lawful, the Massachusetts court emphasized that the intention to
inflict economic injury on a competitor was an incident of lawful
competition, a result the court saw as a normal and natural conse-
quence of business competition. 32 According to the Bowen court, [i]f
the effect [of the boycott] was to destroy the business of shipping
masters who are not members of the association, it is such a result
as in the competition of business often follows from a course of pro-
ceeding that the law permits.333
The images of business boycotts projected in early common law
decisions such as Mogul and Bowen were based on an understanding
that associated boycotts with natural competitive market practices
necessary for maintaining competitive equilibrium or economic
329. 21 Q.B.D. 544 (1888), aft'd, 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1898); see also Minda, Common Law,
supra note 13, at 509-10.
330. The cases are discussed in Hurvitz, supra note 13, at 330-32; see also Minda,
Common Law, supra note 13, at 508-12. In determining the legitimacy of business boy-
cotts, the courts scrutinized the motive underlying the boycott. Under the illegal motive
test, judges were able to reach decisions that seemed to contradict the principle of Mogul
and Bowen. For example, the courts issued injunctions against boycotts that were prem-
ised upon a host of illegitimate motives. See, e.g., Doremus v. Hennessy, 52 N.E. 924 (Ill.
1898) (price-fixing); Finnegan v. Butler, 182 N.Y.S. 671 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (unlawful motive
to refuse to sell defendants newspapers to persons who may also deal with plaintiffs
newspaper); Peekskill Theatre, Inc. v. Advanced Theatrical Co. of New York, 200 N.Y.S.
726 (App. Div. 1923) (illegal purpose of driving a competitor out of business). Business
boycotts were declared illegal only after judges had decided that they went beyond ac-
ceptable norms of business practices.
331. 96 Mass. 499 (1867).
332. Id. at 503-04.
333. Id. Three years later in Carew v. Rutherford, the same court held, in an opinion
by the same judge, that a workers' association's refusal to work on a project with out of
state workers, unless the employer paid the union a fine of five hundred dollars, consti-
tuted an unfair method of competition. 106 Mass. 1 (1870). As in Bowen, the workers in
Carew engaged in activity that could be characterized as a boycott. While the Carew court
emphasized that the workers had attempted to extract an illegal fine, it is difficult to see
why this fact should serve to distinguish the two cases. "Why should the union's refusal to
deal in Carew be treated differently from the concerted refusal to deal in Bowen which
had the consequences of destroying a competitor's business, an injury which might far ex-
ceed $500?" Minda, Common Law, supra note 13, at 509; see also CHARLES D. GREGORY &
HAROLD H. KATZ, LABORAND THE LAw 55-59 (3d ed. 1979).
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"balance." Instead of regarding these boycotts as a force, judges re-
lied instead upon image schemata derived from experiential knowl-
edge about equilibrium, balance, and weight-image schemata that
were in turn derived from an understanding about how our bodies
interact in the physical universe.
The image schema BALANCE thus generated a different
meaning about business boycotts. Business boycotts were envisioned
as natural forces of movement, much like "our experience of systemic
processes and states within our bodies."33 4 By understanding the
nature of these boycotts within the metaphoric image projected by
balance, judges conceptualized most business boycotts as legitimate
practices necessary for competition. The word boycott thus displayed
a chameleon-like quality as judges used different metaphors and
image schemata to structure the legal meaning of boycotts for differ-
ent groups.335
Because judicial metaphors of boycotts were themselves only
partial imaginative representations of reality,336 common law doc-
trines applicable to boycotts of labor and business groups were vul-
nerable to the objection that judges were applying a double standard
to labor and business groups. This is what Justice Holmes argued at
the turn of the century in his famous dissent in Vegelahn v. Gunt-
ner,337 in which he argued that American workers should have a le-
gal privilege to picket peacefully and boycott for higher wages, even
if such activity was coercive.3
334. JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MND, supra note 45, at 75. For example, the meaning of
balance can be shown to be understood in terms of an image schema that structures our
understanding of balance in terms of our experience of body balance. "Despite the differ-
ent manifestations of balance, there is a single image-schema present in all such experi-
ences: a symmetrical arrangement of force vectors relative to an axis." Id. at 97. Our un-
derstanding of balance in various contexts (walking, standing, systemic, psychological,
etc.) can be shown to be variations of this prototypical schema.
335. The word boycott could thus be understood as a polysemy--"the phenomenon
whereby a single word has many meanings that are systematically related (e.g., newspa-
per in 'The ad's in the newspaper' and 'He works for the newspaper')." Id. at xii. Polysemy
can best be understood metaphorically. As Mark Johnson has noted, "[plolysemy involves
the extension of a central sense of a word to other senses by devices of the human imagi-
nation, such as metaphor and metonymy, and there is no place for this kind of account in
the Objectivist view." Id.
336. For example, a business entity is a collective entity that lacks a human persona;
labor boycotts can express legitimate and lawful objectives.
337. 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
338. In Vegelahn, Holmes argued that a labor dispute involving peaceful picketing
and boycotting for higher wages was essentially a political struggle between two groups
competing for social advantage. Holmes recognized the inherent political nature of eco-
nomic boycotts because he understood that the dispute between workers and employers
was a "free struggle for life." As Holmes explained in the following famous passage from
his dissent in Vegelahn:
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the ef-
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In Vegelahn, Holmes endeavored to explain why peaceful
picketing and boycotting should not be presumed to present a threat
of violence, as most judges presumed in the early labor cases. As
Mark Tushnet has noted, Holmes "premised his analysis on a fun-
damental disagreement with the majority's interpretation of social
reality.""9 The majority had adopted an interpretation of boycott
that presumed that any boycott entails a threat of violence. In his
dissent, Holmes argued that peaceful picketing and boycotting could
be justified by characterizing labor picketing as a means of competi-
tion. As Holmes argued, a combination of workers was "a necessary
and desirable counterpart [to combination by employers], if the bat-
tle is to be carried out in a fair and equal way." 4' For Holmes, the
majority in Vegelahn had adopted a debatable construction of labor
picketing and boycotting, one which interpreted peaceful concerted
activity as violence. Concealed within Holmes' dissent was a new
metaphoric argument for understanding the legal meaning of boy-
cotts.
In Vegelahn, the majority employed the image schema of com-
pulsory force projected in cases like Glidden and Gompers in at-
tributing meaning to the workers' concerted activity and body meta-
phors for treating CORPORATION AS A PERSON. Holmes argued
the case for conceptual and metaphoric symmetry. Business and la-
bor boycotts should, in his view, be governed by the same legal stan-
dards of competition. For Holmes, the proper conception of competi-
tion was structured by a concealed metaphor that understood labor
disputes as a natural systematic response to competition between
labor and capital. Holmes' idea of labor disputes as a free struggle
for life had the rhetorical effect of characterizing picketing and boy-
cotting as natural symptoms of the functional process of competition.
Holmes' idea of competition could be understood in light of the basic
conceptual HOMEOSTASIS metaphor3 4'
fort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of society, dis-
guised under the name of capital, to get his services for the least possible re-
turn. Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the
other is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on
in a fair and equal way ....
108 N.E. at 1081.
339. Mark Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes On The Su-
preme Judicial Court, 63 VA. L. REv. 975, 1036 (1977). This was not because Holmes
sided with the cause of labor. As Tushnet has explained: "Holmes saw his opinions as
erecting a structure of legal thought; that he came out on the labor side in Vegelahn was
as irrelevant as the fact that he came out on the employer's side in most cases involving
industrial accidents." Id. at 1040.
340. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081.
341. JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 129-37. Johnson illustrates how
the scientist Hans Selye's life-long research into the nature of stress reactions, which led
885
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The HOMEOSTASIS metaphor helps to explain why Holmes in
Vegelahn might have come to understand the process of competition
between labor and capital as a system which seeks to maintain in-
ternal stability in reaction to external stimuli. The HOMEOSTASIS
metaphor made it possible for Holmes to understand how economic
relations involving labor and capital could be like a biological proc-
ess regulated by natural laws. For Holmes, the process of competi-
tion between labor and capital was a necessary and desirable proc-
ess of evolutionary development. As Holmes explained: "[Ilt is plain
from the slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most su-
perficial reading of industrial history, that free competition means
combination, and that the organization of the world, now going on so
fast, means an ever-increasing might and scope of combination."342
For Holmes, combination by workers was "a necessary and desirable
counterpart [to combination by capital], if the battle is to be carried
on in a fair and equal way."1 3 The point advanced by Holmes was
that competition involved a general adaptive process that, if left free
of regulation, would serve to ensure that the general problems of
injury and justification were resolved in a fair manner.
3 44
The HOMEOSTASIS metaphor reveals the hidden meaning of
Holmes' view of competition by highlighting how embedded knowl-
edge of bodily experience is used causally to explain complex phe-
nomena. Holmes wanted to explain how labor and capital competi-
tion were parts of a natural process of a larger whole involving the
process of market competition. The parts-whole schema and a bio-
logically derived understanding of the BODY AS HOMEOSTATIC
ORGANISM enabled Justice Holmes to understand business and la-
bor boycotts as substantially analogous to the internal biological
systems of the body.345 Thus, in his dissent in Vegelahn, Holmes re-
lied upon a biological understanding of the competitive process in
concluding that combination of workers was as natural as combina-
tion of capital, and that free competition necessarily entails that
both labor and capital be free to combine and engage in a competi-
tive struggle. 46
to a new model of disease and new strategies for medical treatment of disease, could be
seen as a metaphoric shift from a model of disease structured by the metaphor BODY AS
MACHINE to the metaphor HOMEOSTASIS. Id. at 129. Steven L. Winter has recently
relied upon the metaphor of HOMEOSTASIS to develop a theory of constitutional law as
"the dynamic product of the relentlessly jurisgenerative processes of social and cultural
construction." Winter, Indeterminacy, supra note 33, at 1506.
342. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081.
343. Id.
344. "Workers and employers, then, were competitors, and the law ought to be neu-
tral in their struggle." Tushnet, supra note 339, at 1038.
345. See generally JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 131.
346. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Holmes' HOMEOSTASIS metaphor was likely influenced by
the biological ideas of Darwinian theory popular in his day-the no-
tion of a biological process of selection where struggle within each
biological species and between species leads to the natural selection
of the fittest with the best adapted physical characteristics. Dar-
win's theory was itself based on knowledge derived from evolution-
ary studies of the bodies of animals. The biological laws of evolution
were understood as a homeostatic system in which the survival of
the fittest ensures the necessary and desirable process of develop-
ment. Holmes seems to make a similar point about labor and busi-
ness boycotts as forms of competition. In this important sense, Hol-
mes sought to bring about a paradigmatic shift in the legal meaning
of boycotts through metaphoric reasoning.
C. The Metaphoric Structures of Modern Boycott Doctrine.
Today, judges and commentators understand the meaning of
boycotts in terms of a set of legal distinctions animated by different
bodily experiences based on the HOMEOSTASIS metaphor. Regard-
less of the doctrinal field in which the courts resolve boycott issues-
labor, antitrust or constitutional law-the metaphor HOMEOSTA-
SIS lies at the heart of boycott doctrine. The legal distinctions gov-
erning the law of boycotts have thus generated different legal
meanings of boycotts that are based on notions about how boycott
activity serves or interferes with metaphorically based body func-
tions.
In labor boycott cases, boycotts are typically analyzed as toxic
syndromes affecting a system function; the law is understood as a
general adaptive response to the toxicity. In business boycott cases,
boycotts are understood to be naked restraints trade when the ac-
tivity in question is viewed as infecting the central nervous system
of market economy. In other cases, what may look like boycott activ-
ity is justified on the ground that the business practice serves the
ancillary function of promoting the internal mechanism of market
competition. In civil rights cases, boycotts are analyzed not as a dis-
ease or toxicity, but rather as a natural or healthy bodily response
necessary to correct a malfunctioning bodily system. In boycott cases
following the more usual Trial Lawyers pattern, however, boycotts
are likely to be analyzed in terms of metaphors applicable to labor or
business restraints, leading judges to findings of illegality. Thus, in
the case law, boycotts have been understood as a response affecting
an internal body system, and boycott regulation has been thought to
be warranted to maintain the systems' steady state in the face of
887
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stress.34 The four legal distinctions in the law of boycotts can be un-
derstood as the entailments of the basic HOMEOSTASIS metaphor.
1. The Metaphoric Structure of the Speech/Conduct Distinction.
The CONTAINMENT metaphor is a dominant metaphor that has
structured much of the law's understanding of communication and
speech. The metaphor is based on bodily experiences of contain-
ment.34 We experience our bodies as containers having a bounded
surface and an in-out orientation.349 This understanding enables us
to make sense of complex conceptual phenomena. For example, the
metaphor CONTAINER is used to organize our thoughts about the
idea of argument. Thus, the metaphor ARGUMENT IS A CON-
TAINER is used to highlight a number of different meanings about
legal arguments: We assert that our opponent's "argument lacks
content," or that it "has holes in it," or "lacks substance," or that his
argument "won't hold water."350 We intuitively understand the
meaning of such statements because we have common experiential
orientations that permits each of us to have a shared understanding
of our bodies as a container.
351
The bodily experiences of containment structures the CON-
DUIT or CONTAINER metaphor, which is a dominant conceptual
metaphor that cognitive theorists have identified for understanding
the way we talk and the way we comprehend the nature of human
communication. 352 Human communication is imagined to be a proc-
ess through which objects (ideas or thoughts) are placed in contain-
347. See JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 131 (citing WALTER B.
CANNON, THE WISDOM OF THE BODY (1932) and discussing Walter B. Cannon's notion of
homeostasis).
348. "Each of us is a container, with a bounded surface and an in-out orientation,"
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 248, at 29. Thus, the body is a CONTAINER for our
emotions: "He was filled with anger. She couldn't contain her joy. She was brimming with
rage. Try to get your anger out of your system." LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, supra note 45, at
383.
349. See JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 21-22; see also LAKOFF &
JOHNSON, supra note 248, at 28-30.
350. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 248, at 92.
351. For example, metaphors such as ARGUMENTS ARE JOURNEYS ("where is the
argument going?") or KNOWING IS SEEING ("which view do you espouse?") are different
manifestations of the basic conceptual MIND-AS-BODY or CONTAINER metaphors.
Familiar linguistic expressions like "where is the argument going" make sense to us be-
cause they are based on basic conceptual metaphors derived from the MIND-IN-BODY
metaphor. See generally Winter, Under Color of Law, supra note 35, at 389, 391
(illustrating how a conceptual metaphor like "CONTROL IS UP will motivate many dif-
ferent metaphorical expressions such as 'he's under my thumb' or 'she's on top of the situ-
ation").
352. JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 58-59 (citing Michael Reddy,
The Conduit Metaphor in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT (Andrew Ortony ed., 1979)).
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ers (words and sentences) and sent along a conduit to a hearer. The
receiver of the message takes the idea-object out of the word-con-
tainer and comprehends what was communicated by the sender.
35 3
Thus, in the law, as in everyday conversations, communication is
thought to "consist1 of finding the right word-container for [the]
right idea-object, sending this filled container along a conduit or
through space to the hearer, who must then take the idea-object out
of the word-container."354
Action can also be metaphorically understood on the level of
pure expression. The act of communicating a message motivates us
to conjure up ideas about force and action. There is force at work as
a result of the conduit metaphor of speech itself.355 For example, the
communication of boycott appeals is understood in labor law to have
a signal effect that causes action. The force of the signal on the in-
tended audience of the communication is sent through space to the
hearer, who understands the message of the signal as an idea-object
contained the word-container. The force structure of the signal effect
of boycotts has been interpreted by judges as an act of compulsion.5
The propositional content of boycott expression is linked to bodily
experiences of what happens when a crowd starts pushing. The force
of the expression moves the hearer along a path she may not other-
wise have chosen.
As Justice Stevens concluded in Safeco, boycotts and picketing
"[i]n the labor context ... call[] for an automatic response to a signal
rather than a reasoned response to an idea."357 The idea-objects of
boycott publicity involve an automatic response because the force of
expression causes action once the idea-objects are received and
taken out of their word-container. An automatic response follows be-
cause a compulsion schema structures the meaning of the signal as
having a causal effect on the hearer. In other words, it is the image
schema of compulsion and the conceptual metaphor of BODY AS
CONTAINER that best explains why otherwise peaceful boycott
353. Id. at 58.
354. Id. at 59.
355. There is force at work in "the sentence-container with its idea-object to change
the form of the expression." ("John is home" has a different force than "Is John home?").
Id. at 59. There is also the force "that acts on the hearer to determine how the hearer un-
derstands the utterance." Id. There is also "the force with which the word-or utterance-
container is sent through the conduit or through the space between speaker and hearer
[having] a certain magnitude." Id. Finally, there is the "perlocutionary effects" of the force
of the utterance itself. Id. at 59-60. "Your commanding me to spit-shine my shoes might
(in addition to my grasping the meaning of your utterance as a command) force me to
shine my shoes, or it might cause me to laugh in your face.. . "Id. at 60.
356. Id. at 45, 58.




publicity has been treated in labor law as coerced action.
This may also help to explain why the Tree Fruits exception of
labor law, which has accorded First Amendment protection to so-
called consumer picketing, failed to develop. In Tree Fruits, Justice
Brennan concluded that picketing that merely requests customers of
struck employers not to buy the struck product falls within a special
statutory proviso to the secondary boycott provision of federal labor
law that protects consumer picketing otherwise having secondary ef-
fects 58 In Safeco, 59 however, the Court concluded that consumer
picketing is not protected when it "is reasonably calculated to induce
customers not to patronize the neutral parties at all."36 In other
words, when consumer picketing has the effects of a secondary boy-
cott, the picketing loses its First Amendment protection because the
picketing is likely to compel the same action that would arise from
an otherwise unlawful secondary boycott. The inconsistency posed
between Tree Fruits and Safeco can be explained by the HOMEO-
STASIS metaphor: the law's purpose is directed at facilitating and
maintaining a dynamic, healthy body (i.e., economic system) by
regulating the compulsion of secondary effects of picketing and boy-
cotting.
In the labor context, the force schema attributed to boycotts in-
fluences the meaning of labor union picketing. As Justice Stevens
noted in his concurrence in Safeco, "[in the labor context, it is the
conduct element rather than the particular idea being expressed
that often provides the most persuasive deterrent to third persons
about to enter a business establishment."36' Consequently, in mod-
ern labor law discourse, the dominant presumption has been that
picketing and boycotts are signals which inherently call for force,
action, and conduct.
Handbilling and leafletting, however, have been accorded dif-
ferent legal treatment because judges do not perceive such activity
to pose the potential toxic or coercive force attributed to economic
boycotts or picketing. Judges do not view handbilling as coercive as
picketing and boycotting.
3 62
358. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits),
377 U.S. 58, 69-70 (1964).
359. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
360. Id. at 614.
361. Id. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, in Safeco, Justice Stevens concluded
that boycotts and product picketing were not protected by the Tree Fruits exception to
federal labor regulation if such activity "can be expected to threaten neutral parties with
ruin or substantial loss." Id. at 612-13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
362. As Justice Stevens has expressed this point: "Indeed, no doubt the principal
reason why handbills containing the same message are so much less effective than labor
picketing is that the former depend entirely on the persuasive force of the idea." Id. at
619.
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In DeBartolo II, for example, the Court assumed that the sec-
ondary effects of leafletting are not coercive in effect because con-
sumers can turn away after they read a handbill; they are not
"intimidated by a line of picketers."3 3 Of course, handbilling can in-
volve more than one person; it can be the result of concerted activity.
Handbilling by an organized group can look a lot like a picket line.
The Court nonetheless assumed that handbilling, unlike peaceful
picketing and boycotting, involves only the persuasive force of an
idea.
The persuasive force of handbilling is thus thought to be less
than the force involved in picketing or boycotting because it is a
force that comes from within the receiver, rather than a force con-
veyed from the outside. Consumers who choose to go along with the
demands of those handbilling are considered to do so freely, because
the Court has assumed that there is no outside force intimidating
them to take action, as in the case of picketing or calls for a boycott.
The legal meaning of boycotts and picketing, structured by the con-
tainer metaphor, conjures up an image of idea-objects moving from a
group of workers to an intended audience of receivers. The receivers
are then induced; i.e., compelled, to take action by the force of the
message sent through space to them. The force originates outside
the hearer and is thus thought to be different in kind from the in-
ternal force of the persuasion of idea.
Again, handbilling is accorded greater legal protection because
handbilling is thought to be less threatening or coercive than picket-
ing or boycotting. Following the HOMEOSTASIS metaphor, the no-
tion of internal self-regulation is a matter of degree.3 In under-
standing the body as a purposeful organism, the HOMEOSTASIS
metaphor also accepts the idea that the body can at times maintain
its own adaptive response to toxic substances.3 Thus the force of
persuasion internal to the hearer is something the individual may or
may not act upon because the individual is thought to have auton-
omy of will.
It is also likely that judges analyze handbilling from the per-
spective of the individual rather than the group. The reason for this
may be that as the number of participants increases, as it does with
boycotts, the effects of verbal acts are more likely to be seen as pos-
ing a threat that the body cannot maintain an adaptive response
such that legal intervention is warranted. Thus, judges are moti-
363. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trade Council
(DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 580 (1988).
-364. See generally JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 134 (discussing
the HOMEOSTASIS metaphor of disease).
365. Id. at 135.
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vated to justify decisions that accord handbilling greater First
Amendment protection than picketing or boycotting.
Indeed, the words "handbill" and "leaflet" encourage us to think
in terms of individual activity. According to the Oxford English Dic-
tionary, a handbill is "[a] printed notice or advertisement on a single
page, intended to be delivered or circulated by hand." 6 A leaflet is
defined as a "small or young foliage leaf' or a "folded printed sheet
intended for free distribution."367 The words are thus defined in
terms of parts that belong to a larger whole-printed paper is dis-
tributed by hand or like leaves connected to a tree. The legal anom-
aly created by DeBartolo II can be understood in terms of an imagi-
nary distinction used in cognitive thought for organizing information
on the basis of the parts-whole schema.
Picketing and boycotting have been understood as collective
activity since a group or whole is involved, whereas handbilling and
leafletting has given rise to an understanding that focuses on the
individual or part of the activity. Viewed through the parts-whole
schema, picketing and boycotting involve group action, whereas
handbilling involves individual action. In focusing on the individual
activity of handbilling (the hand or the leaflet), judges are less prone
to find that even group handbilling presents the same coercive dan-
gers as picketing or boycotting. In DeBartolo II, the Court drew an
all-or-nothing distinction between picketing and leafletting because
the language judges use to describe the meaning of handbilling en-
courages such a distinction.
What judges have failed to consider is that expressive activity
may not be a container or receptacle for conveying meaning, but
rather a form of conduct or activity that is aimed at constructing
new meaning for communication itself. Picketing, boycotting, and
handbilling, are activities that generate through group action con-
structed meanings of political action as well as to convey informa-
tion about a particular labor dispute. The experiential nature of
group protest can create information that can be gleaned only by
participating in the activity. Anyone who has experienced walking
on a picket line, or demonstrating in a parade understands that the
experience of doing creates lasting information about political pro-
test and cultural identity.36
The communicative action of such activities is ignored by the
366. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, vol. VI at 1070 (2d ed. 1989).
367. Id. at 680.
368. See, e.g., BARBARA EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PROTEST & CULTURAL REVOLUTION:
NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION IN THE 1970S AND 1980S (1991); see also Winter, Indetermi-
nacy, supra note 33, at 1500 n.305 (describing the experience of a commentator who ex-
plained how she came to understand why her parents brought her to antiwar demonstra-
tions during the sixties when she was but a small child).
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courts, because in adopting the CONTAINER and HOMEOSTASIS
metaphors judges have come to understand speech and communica-
tion as a container or receptacle for conveying information for func-
tional purposes, rather than as a form of conduct or activity which is
itself aimed at constructing meaning.
2. The Metaphoric Structure of the Primary/Secondary Dis-
tinction. The idea of labor boycott inducements as a force having the
potential to spread labor discord is reflected within the statutory
scheme which recognizes a distinction between primary and secon-
dary boycotts. As noted,369 the primary/secondary distinction of labor
boycotts has led to the curious result that unions can picket and
boycott an employer with whom they have a controversy, but they
cannot bring to bear the same pressure on so-called secondary em-
ployers, who have a business relationship with the primary em-
ployer, even though a successful primary boycott can have the same
effect as that of a secondary boycott.370 Thus, in Allied International,
a secondary boycott brought for purely political purposes was found
to be illegal because the union's boycott fell within the literal provi-
sions of the secondary boycott proscription of federal labor law.Y
The primary/secondary distinction underlying the Court's decision
in Allied International can be interpreted metaphorically in terms of
the metaphor HOMEOSTASIS and the image schema offorce.
As Howard Lesnick's pathbreaking study of labor law's secon-
dary boycott legislation indicates, body metaphors and the images of
disease or cancer have animated judicial thinking of secondary boy-
cott problems generally.372 Hence, the regulation of secondary boy-
cotts has been justified on the basis of metaphors that treat the sec-
ondary effects of boycotts as cancer cells spreading throughout
healthy parts of the body, or what Professor Lesnick, describing the
understanding of secondary boycotts in the Congressional materials
leading up to the Taft-Hartley Amendments, called the "metastasis
369. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
370. As Julius Getman has explained, "[tihe core concept was that it was unfair for a
union that had a dispute with employer A to attempt to cause a strike at the premises of
employer B in order to cause B to stop doing business with A." The legislative history un-
derlying the Taft-Hartley Act, as well as express language in the statute, indicated that
Congress desired to distinguish between primary and secondary boycotts.
371. 456 U.S. 212 (1982); see also supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
372. See Lesnick, supra note 182, at 1415 ("A major asserted basis for restricting
secondary activity was the legislative desire to discourage what may be called the metas-
tasis of labor disputes: the fanning out of unrest from the struck plant to those doing
business with it.") (citing 93 CONG. REC. 4323 (daily ed. April 29, 1947), reprinted in 2
LEGIsLATIVmE HISTORY OF LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1107 (1985)
(remarks of Senator Taft)); see also supra notes 78-88, 152-54 and accompanying text.
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of labor disputes."3 73 The image schema of physical force, i.e., a dis-
orderly mob, is united with the image of invisible organisms attack-
ing the body to create a powerful appeal for legal regulation of boy-
cotts. The drafters of the federal labor laws thus assumed that sec-
ondary boycotts should be prohibited in order to protect innocent
parties and to limit the effects of otherwise lawful disputes. 4
The image of secondary boycotts as a metastasis, however,
projects a vision that sees labor disputes, even otherwise peaceful
disputes as a nonspecific disease to be contained or quarantined. On
the other hand, if primary picketing is to be deemed lawful in order
to preserve the institution of collective bargaining, as it is now un-
der federal labor legislation, 75 then even peaceful secondary boy-
cotts aimed at coercing non-complying employers to bargain collec-
tively may be a necessary and beneficial practice of federal labor
policy that favors collective bargaining as the most effective means
of resolving labor strife. Rather than perceiving secondary boycotts
as a disease, one might perceive secondary boycotts as a "remedial
practice," a "cure" or "preventive therapy" for upholding federal coll-
ective bargaining policy.
37 6
The point is that secondary boycotts are neither a disease nor a
metastasis. Secondary boycotts can be understood as a legitimate
tactic that labor organizations rely upon to counter the superior bar-
gaining power of their employers. If we invoke different MIND-AS-
BODY metaphors, say for example, BODY-AS-MACHINE,377 we
373. Lesnick, supra note 182, at 1415.
374. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act prohibits labor unions
from coercing one business to cease dealing with another business, where coercion is de-
fined to include means other than non-picketing publicity. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4)(ii)(B)
(1988).
Professor Lesnick's cancer metaphor is highly misleading as an explanation for justi-
fying the federal proscription against secondary boycotts because nearly every national
primary strike has consequences that spread the effects of the dispute to innocent suppli-
ers and customers of the primary employer. The METASTASIS metaphor is also mislead-
ing because it fails to consider the nature of the appeal that a labor union actually makes
in publicizing an otherwise lawful primary dispute.
375. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (a)(i); see NLRB v. Local 307, Plumbers, United Ass'n of
Journeymen and Apprentices of Plumbing and Pipefitting Indus. of United States and
Canada, 469 F.2d 403, 406 (7th Cir. 1972).
376. The metaphoric concept of boycott as a METASTASIS provides us with a useful
way for understanding some aspects of secondary boycotts, but in the process of
"mapping" meaning with the image of disease (associating the meaning of the source do-
main, metastasis, with its target concept, boycott), the metaphor provides us with useful
information, but also hides other aspects of boycott activity.
377. Mark Johnson, for example, has shown how the metaphor BODY AS MACHINE
was the underlying imaginative device structuring early medical theories of disease. See
JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 130. Thus, medical metaphors "such as
those of isolated parts, functional assemblies, and repair and replacement of malfunction-
ing units" structured medical evidence in the nineteenth century. Id. As Johnson claims,
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might imagine a system of labor law doctrine that provides affirma-
tive protection for secondary labor boycotts. For example, the
prevalent legislative goal of advancing industrial peace might be to
conceive boycotts as a means of repairing injuries and resolving la-
bor-management disputes, as a way of restoring the machine-like
functions of the body. Boycotts might be understood as a steering
mechanism for social and economic decisionmaking. Rather than
viewing boycotts as a threat to the body's functional balance, judges
might come to understand boycott phenomena as an important part
of the democratic process. Alternatively, we might then imagine a
system of labor law doctrine that provides affirmative protection for
secondary boycott activity as an essential "lubricant" for bringing
peace and resolution to labor disputes.
3 11
3. The Metaphoric Structure of the Naked/Ancillary Distinc-
tion. In antitrust law, a somewhat similar imaginative process has
come to influence judicial thinking about business boycotts. The im-
age of "nakedness" has come to be used in this area to describe ille-
gal boycotts that restrain trade, and the idea of "ancillary" has come
to signify the deployment of collective effort for social progress and
development.3 9 Restraints of trade that are deemed to be naked rep-
resent activity that is seen to be predatory or pernicious or socially
unredeeming. Just as the image of the boycott serves to evoke ideas
about mob violence in labor law discourse, the image of nakedness in
antitrust boycott doctrine projects ideas about primitive, animal-like
passion, conduct understood to be uncivilized and socially undesir-
able. The concept of ancillary restraint, however, serves to justify
boycotts that have been civilized by a scheme of reason that seeks
instrumentally to promote the maximization of private wealth. In
other words, ancillary restraints may be necessary in order for vital
economic functions to work efficiently. Moreover, the effects of ancil-
"IrMhe BODY AS MACHINE metaphor was not merely an isolated belief; rather, it was a
massive experiential structuring that involved values, interests, goals, practices, and
theorizing." Id.
378. Such a result would not unduly increase the power of the labor movement. No-
strike clauses in collective bargaining agreements would limit the vast majority of incum-
bent unions from engaging in secondary strikes and boycotts. Moreover, secondary boy-
cott regulation is now so technical and irrational that it is rarely utilized to regulate boy-
cotts and strikes of significant economic consequences. See Getman, supra note 28, at 20-
21 ("Because of its technicality, ambiguous drafting, and confused interpretation, secon-
dary boycott law more resembles an intellectual rubble heap piled haphazardly with
conflicting rules riddled with exceptions, doctrines randomly applied, and terms given dif-
ferent meaning in similar cases than it does a delicate balance; anything a union might
do can be justified by one doctrine and prohibited by another.").




lary restraints can be overcome by the general adaptive response of
market competition.
In the image of a nakedness we can begin to understand how
cultural and physical experiences might fuel understandings about
group action that regard boycotts as inherently dangerous practices
to be closely regulated, and why boycotts seen to be ancillary to le-
gitimate objectives are deemed lawful. Ancillary boycotts are merely
conduits for achieving legitimate objectives, while boycotts as naked
restraints of trade cannot be redeemed by any legitimate instrumen-
tal function. The CONTAINER metaphor unites with the idea of
ancillariness to structure a legal meaning of boycotts. Naked re-
straints of trade lack a proper container or conduit of legitimacy,
and are thus condemned on a per se basis. Under the HOMEOSTA-
SIS metaphor the naked/ancillary restraint analysis makes perfectly
good sense as a law-generated means of maintaining balance within
the economic system.
The CONTAINER metaphor also helps to explain the argumen-
tative structure that judges have advanced in arguing various un-
derstandings about the market consequences of boycotts. In the
Pinhas case, the two different jurisdictional tests advanced by Jus-
tice Stevens and Justice Scalia, for the majority and dissent respec-
tively, can be seen to rest on different imaginative ideas about con-
tainers and the parts-whole schema. In finding that a price-fixing
conspiracy which excluded a single ophthalmological surgeon from
the Los Angles market affected interstate commerce, Justice Stevens
and the majority advanced an argument that the boycott was to be
judged "not by a particularized evaluation" of a single exclusion, but
rather by "a general evaluation of the restraint's impact on other
participants and potential participants in the market."3 80 In other
words, the boycott was a conduit that had to be judged in light of its
potential impact on the whole of the market economy. Justice Scalia,
however, dissented because he believed that the boycott was a con-
duit for putting into effect a particularized market restraint that,
when judged as a part of the market economy, failed to substantially
affect interstate commerce.
4. The Metaphoric Structure of the Public/Private distinction.
The public/private distinction that underlies the Court's rationale in
cases like Noerr and Trial Lawyers can be understood in terms of
the parts-whole schema of the basic HOMEOSTASIS metaphor. The
parts-whole schema helps us to comprehend how politics involves
interests which are broader than the immediate pecuniary interests
of economics. Expressive conduct depicted as pure politics involves
380. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, Ill S. Ct. 1842, 1842 (1991).
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matters which affect the collective whole of the body politic and are
therefore accorded greater legal protection. Political expression
seeking economic objectives, involving only commercial relations and
activity, is seen to be a lesser part of the political process, and is ac-
corded lesser legal protection. When pure speech is found to be un-
contaminated by conduct, even expression of economic matters is
protected. Moreover, when economic objectives are sought in the
political channels of government, near absolute protection is ac-
corded such activity because the whole of the political- process is
seen to be involved. Thus, the Court established its Noerr doctrine to
insulate from all legitimate regulation interest group lobbying in the
legislative halls of government, while allowing government to regu-
late direct action efforts by citizen groups seeking economic and po-
litical objectives through boycotts and picketing. The parts-whole
schema helps to explain the doctrinal distinctions drawn by the
Court in cases like Noerr and Trial Lawyers.
If the image schema of force dominates judicial thinking about
labor group activities, and if speech is understood as a container,
then a prototypical effect follows: the parts-whole schema operates to
accord labor groups little, if any, freedom to engage in politically ex-
pressive activity. The physical, social, and ethical force schemas
utilized for understanding the legal meaning of labor boycotts are
not seen as a legitimate part of the democratic or political whole of
the legislative system. Hence, when unions resort to picketing and
economic boycotts to secure their interests, the judicial focus is
shaped by images of force that direct attention to the path of the
force represented by a potentially unruly crowd. What is missed and
marginalized is the communicative action associated with the peace-
ful exercise of labor's collective liberties. The ideological effect is to
deny labor a role to play in advancing its part in the whole of the
political process.
D. The Chameleon-like Quality of Modern Boycott Doctrine.
The term boycott has thus meant different things to judges be-
cause different understandings of a common metaphoric structure
have been applied to boycotts in labor, antitrust, and constitutional
law. In labor boycott cases, image schemas of force, signal, and co-
ercion have dominated legal discourse and analysis because judges
have adopted a view of labor boycotts structured by a basic HO-
MEOSTASIS metaphor that analogizes boycott activity to a disease
or toxic substance, much in the same way that early common law
judges analogized early labor boycotts to wild tigers.
While judges now acknowledge that labor boycotts involve ele-
ments of expression, they have been much more concerned about
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regulating the effects of such activity. Secondary boycotts are thus
absolutely forbidden because they are seen as having the potential
of spreading the toxic effects of labor disputes. Primary boycotts are
generally protected, but even these boycotts are nearly always seen
as an inherently coercive force that can justify state regulation. La-
bor has thus been denied a First Amendment right to engage in sec-
ondary boycotts for purely political purposes, and the First Amend-
ment rights of primary boycotts are subject to regulation necessary
to maintain equilibrium in economic affairs. The system of regula-
tion applicable to labor boycotts is thus understood to be a necessary
adaptive measure for maintaining an effective economic system.
In antitrust law, judges have come to understand that boycotts
may sometimes represent legitimate and normal forms of business
competition, although at other times they have acknowledged that
boycotts should be condemned per se as an antitrust restraint. This
has led to contradictory statements in legal opinions which both as-
sert and resist the prevailing antitrust wisdom that business re-
straints classified as "boycotts are unlawful per se."3 81 When courts
find that a group boycott has been utilized for the purposes of re-
straining trade, the word boycott is used to describe the conduct of
the defendants, and the per se rule of illegality is usually applied.
When a concerted refusal to deal, or boycott, is found to be premised
upon good (i.e., procompetitive) purposes, however, the word boycott
is not used, and the activity of the defendants is typically upheld as
justifiable and reasonable. In antitrust law, terms such as instru-
ment, tool, naked boycott, or ancillary restraint have become the la-
bels that judges use to justify their decisions. These labels can be
shown to make perfect sense in terms of the BALANCE and HO-
MEOSTASIS metaphors that judges have utilized in antitrust law.
In viewing competitive pricing as the central nervous system of the
economy,32 and boycott as a naked restraint, antitrust judges have
reasoned on the basis of medical-biological metaphors structured by
the basic idea of HOMEOSTASIS.
In cases involving consumer boycotts, judges have come to see
boycotts as manifesting First Amendment freedoms when non-labor
groups are boycotting for purely political purposes. Political boycotts
by civil rights and women's rights groups have been understood as
embodying First Amendment freedoms at least when they are per-
ceived to be in pursuit of altruistic objectives. In finding that group
381. As Justice White has recently observed in FTC v. Indiana Federation of
Dentists, a "boycott pigeonhole" should not be invoked in antitrust law to condemn every
business restraint categorized as "unlawfulper se." 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986).
382. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940)
(Douglas, J.); see also Boudin, supra note 35, at 408.
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boycotts are to be protected as First Amendment freedoms, the Su-
preme Court has used terms such as majesty, dissatisfaction with a
social structure, speech, assembly, association, and petition to char-
acterize the nature of these boycotts. These words can be understood
as the entailments of the parts-whole schema and the HOMEOSTA-
SIS metaphor underlying the public/private distinction.
Every so often, however, the dissonance posed by these differ-
ent metaphoric understandings of boycotts appears within a tedhni-
cal legal definition about a seemingly unrelated question, as it did in
the Pinhas case. While Pinhas appears to present a technical ques-
tion concerning the jurisdictional requirement of interstate com-
merce in the antitrust context, what animates the difference in
opinion over that issue are two different perspectives, or conceptual
understandings, about group boycotts. Justice Stevens' majority
opinion, upholding interstate commerce jurisdiction, can be seen as
advancing the market metaphors of cases like Noerr, Allied, and
Trial Lawyers for the proposition that even the boycott of a single
surgeon in Los Angles can affect interstate commerce, because price-
fixing is commonly understood to be a crime that affects the central
nervous system of the market economy. Justice Scalia, dissenting in
Pinhas, can be seen on the other hand to have relied upon the idea
of a container or conduit for understanding the Commerce Clause
consequences of a boycott. For Justice Scalia, cases such as Clai-
borne Hardware and NOW become the metaphoric sources for an
understanding of the way he interpreted the meaning of the juris-
dictional issue in Pinhas.
Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas is thus an interesting decision
because it illustrates how justices of the Supreme Court are cur-
rently embroiled in a battle over control of the metaphors for defin-
ing the meaning of the term boycott for jurisdictional purposes. Jus-
tice Stevens, and the majority of commentators who defend the
"infected activities" metaphor of the McLain decision, have read the
interstate commerce clause in antitrust decisions as justifying court
jurisdiction whenever a challenged trade restraint involves activities
which infect activity having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce. Trade restraints involving a group boycott of a single
competitor will satisfy the commerce requirement because even the
exclusion of a single eye surgeon from the market is activity infected
by a conspiracy having a not insubstantial effect on interstate com-
merce. The metaphor of "infected activity" in this context has
meaning in terms of the way disease infects a human body. A con-
certed refusal to deal, or a group boycott, is thus like a disease in-
fecting the body of interstate commerce. The disease of boycott is one




Justice Scalia's dissent in Pinhas, however, set forth different
metaphors in criticizing the majority and their reliance on McLain.
In Justice Scalia's understanding, the commerce clause requirement
for federal court jurisdiction in Pinhas called into question Justice
Stevens' metaphor of a gateway. In his view, the alleged boycott
against Dr. Pinhas was a dispute between a single hospital and one
doctor. The challenged restraint was thus seen to be of "local nature.
In Justice Scalia's view, the commerce requirement for jurisdiction
requires proof that the defendant's activities substantially affect
commerce by restricting competition.3 s Instead of relying upon the
"infected activities" or "gateway" metaphors of the majority, Justice
Scalia argued in favor of a competition analysis for Commerce
Clause purpose. Thus, in the dissent's view, a group boycott does not
substantially affect interstate commerce unless the boycott sub-
stantially restrains competition. Boycotts are thus mere instruments
or tools, and will affect interstate commerce only if they are utilized
by those having market power.
IV. THE CONCEPTUAL MODELS OF BOYCOTT DOCTRINE AND
THE RIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Metaphors in the law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to




Boycotts and concerted refusals to deal that restrain trade or
spread the effects of labor disputes to innocent third parties have
been declared unlawful under federal labor and antitrust law. Yet it
is also true that many economic boycotts in labor and antitrust law
have been found to be perfectly lawful because they are sometimes
seen to involve conduct protected by the First Amendment.85 Since
383. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. 1842, 1851 (1991) (Scalia, J.
dissenting).
384. Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardoio, J.).
385. In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the Supreme Court held that
primary boycotts and picketing by labor groups involve protected forms of expression that
cannot be prohibited in the absence of an overriding governmental interest. Moreover,
while federal labor law proscribes secondary boycotts, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B)
(1988), the Court has held that not every boycott with a secondary effect is proscribed by
federal labor legislation; boycotts involving certain forms of consumer picketing and
handbilling have been judged lawful even though they involve secondary effects. See, e.g.,
NLRB v Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S.
58 (1964) (secondary boycott provision of federal labor law held not to apply to picketing
of retail grocery stores in an effort to persuade customers not to purchase apples packed
by non-union firms); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr.
Trades Council (DeBartolo 11), 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (secondary boycott provision of federal
labor law held not to prohibit peaceful distribution of handbills at a secondary boycott
site). The Supreme Court, however, has not been consistent in this area for it has also
recognized limitations to otherwise lawful consumer picketing in order to prohibit the
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an effort to persuade individuals to join a group seeking to influence
governmental policy involves political activity and expression, it has
been recognized that boycotts may be constitutionally protected un-
der the speech and petition clauses of the First Amendment.3 86
The Supreme Court, however, has had considerable difficulty in
finding a "right to boycott" in "any of the lines of First Amendment
precedent the Court has developed in this century."387 The problem
is that the Court has never made up its mind about economic boy-
cotts for political purposes. While conventional wisdom supports the
view that government should refrain from regulating constitution-
ally protected liberties, including the rights of petition3s8 and as-
spread of strikes and boycotts to secondary employers. See NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union, Local 100 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 614 (1980) (modifying Tree Fruits,
holding that consumer picketing violates the secondary boycott provision of federal labor
law if it "reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial
loss."). See generally Brian K. Beard, Comment, Secondary Boycotts After DeBartolo: Has
the Supreme Court Handed Unions a Powerful New Weapon?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 217 (1989);
Barbara J. Anderson, Comment, Secondary Boycotts and the First Amendment, 51 U. CHI.
L. REV. 811 (1984).
In antitrust law, the lower federal courts have concluded that the drafters of the
Sherman Antitrust Act never intended the legislation to be interpreted so as to conflict
with constitutionally protected activity. See Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620
F.2d 1301, 1317 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); Protor v. General Conf. of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 651 F. Supp. 1505 (N.D. IM. 1986); see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 3-9 (1989 Supplement) (discussing various anti-
trust decisions which found that the First Amendment provides an affirmative defense to
economic boycotts for political purposes). While the Supreme Court has suggested that
the First Amendment might provide a complete defense for constitutionally protected po-
litical activity, see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), it has never
recognized such a defense in a case involving an economic boycott by competitors chal-
lenged under the antitrust laws. One can, however, find language in recent Supreme
Court decisions suggesting that the First Amendment would protect political activity de-
signed to publicize a group boycott for purposes of influencing governmental action. See,
e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 426 (1990) ("It is, of course,
clear that the association's efforts to publicize the boycott, to explain the merits of its
cause, and to lobby District officials to enact favorable legislation ... were activities that
were fully protected by the First Amendment.").
386. See, e.g., Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 659 (1978) (discussing labor boycotts in connection with the First Amendment pro-
tection for social and political boycotts).
387. Harper, supra note 30, at 413. Michael C. Harper's study of the consumers'
emerging right to boycott evaluates the various arguments for deriving a constitutional
right to boycott and demonstrates in each case why such arguments have failed to ad-
vance a strong theory in support of a right to boycott. Id. at 413-17 (analyzing the argu-
ments based on the right to engage in expressive conduct, right of autonomy, and right of
association). As Harper has also illustrated, neither the Court's decision in Claiborne
Hardware, nor the decisions it relied upon, "offers adequate support for the right." Id. at
418.
388. Supreme Court pronouncements suggests that the "right to petition" derives its
meaning from the nature of a republican form of government. See, e.g., United States v.
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sembly,3s the Supreme Court has been unable to devise a principled
rationale for distinguishing commercial activity, condemned by labor
or antitrust law, from so-called political activity entitled to immu-
nity under the petitioning clause of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has avoided ruling directly on the petition
clause," and has instead developed idealized cognitive models
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (finding that the right to petition is implicit in the
"[the very idea of a government, republican in form"). The Court has also recognized that
the rights of petition and assembly are cognate rights which derive meaning from the free
speech clause of the First Amendment. See, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364
(1937) ('The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free
press and is equally fundamental .... "); see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS-A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 198 (1971); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. III, vol. II at 780-81 (1968) [hereinafter
SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTION]. There is, however, considerable confusion about the scope of
the rights. Are the rights merely preventative rights which grant citizens the freedom to
voice grievances, or do the rights extend further by establishing a governmental duty to
consider the petitioners' grievances? See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (holding
that the petition right is subsumed in guarantee of freedom of speech thus suggesting
that the right is merely preventative in character). But see California Motor Transport v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (suggesting that the right to petition extends to
establish a governmental duty to consider and decide petitioners' claims); Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983) (holding that the National Labor Rela-
tions Board lacked the authority to issue a cease-and-desist order to enjoin an employer's
tort action brought in state court because it is otherwise protected as a form of govern-
mental petitioning); Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right To Petition Gov-
ernment for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 143 (1986) (arguing that such in-
terpretations of the right to petition clause ignore the original design of the right which
"included a governmental duty to consider petitioners' grievances"). The Court has also
held, not surprisingly, that the assembly and petition clauses of the First Amendment are
not absolute. For example, the right to petition is subject to the limitation of overriding
governmental interests. See, e.g., United States v. Hariss, 347 U.S. 612, 624-26 (1954)
(rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, which
regulates federal lobbying expenditures, on the ground that the right to petition is subject
to the limitations of overriding governmental interests).
389. The right to engage in peaceful assemblies is commonly regarded as a right that
is subordinate to the right to petition, but the courts have been more willing to recognize
that the right of assembly, distinguished from the political right to assemble to petition
government, is a much broader right that derives its meaning from the free speech guar-
antee of the First Amendment. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTION, supra note 388, pt.
III, vol. II at 781.
390. In Claiborne Hardware, Justice Stevens suggested that an economic boycott
called by a civil rights group for purposes of securing racial equality was constitutionally
protected as First Amendment activity pursuant to the right to petition government for
redress of grievances. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982). Jus-
tice Stevens placed emphasis on the fact that the Court in Eastern R.R. Presidents Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) had concluded that the freedom to
petition, guaranteed by the First Amendment, required a construction of the Sherman
Act that shielded from liability a deceptive and anticompetitive lobbying campaign con-
ducted by a railroad association seeking antitrust legislation. Claiborne Hardware, 458
U.S. at 913-14. Justice Stevens noted that the civil rights boycott at issue in Claiborne
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(ICMs) for guiding judicial interpretations of federal regulation.
These models seek to explain and justify different judicial under-
standings about concerted efforts of groups to petition government.
By exploring the difference between these models we can come to
understand why seemingly like cases are decided differently by the
Supreme Court. 9'
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has been unable to articu-
late a consistent rationale or theory for distinguishing between
forms of protected and unprotected political expression. The problem
is not that the Court has failed to recognize constitutional issues, for
the Court has struggled hard to resolve conflicts between the First
Amendment and federal regulation under labor and antitrust legis-
lation in various contexts. Rather the problem is that the Court has
failed to recognize that its own case law has embraced vastly differ-
ent cognitive conceptions about the right of groups to petition gov-
ernment for political and economic objectives.
A. The Idealized Cognitive Model of Interest Group Pluralism.
That governmental regulation might have to yield to the First
Amendment was first recognized by the Warren Court in its 1961
landmark decision in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight.92 As a result of Noerr, the courts have inter-
Hardware, like the railroad's boycott in Noerr, represented concerted activity aimed at
influencing governmental action. Id. at 914. But see FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 468 U.S. 411, 776 (1990) (distinguishing Noerr on the grounds that in Noerr, the
"alleged restraint of trade was the intended consequence of public action. . . ."); Harper,
supra note 30, at 418-19 (arguing that Noerr "affords protection only to boycotts with a
particular purpose: the coercion of third parties to use their influence to secure the gov-
ernmental action desired by the boycotters.").
391. See, e.g., Stanley D. Robinson, Reconciling Antitrust and the First Amendment,
48 ANTrrRUST L.J. 1335, 1335 (1979) (arguing that "[flor many years the subtleties of
First Amendment jurisprudence had little relevance to the practice of antitrust law");
Getman, supra note 28, at 41 (arguing that "[1]abor relations is the one area of law in
which the policies of the First Amendment have been consistently ignored, reduced, and
held to be outweighed by other interests"). Indeed, more than a half century ago, Justice
Holmes remarked that the absence of First Amendment issues in response to antitrust
decrees prohibiting competitors from exchanging pricing and production information was
"surprising in a country of free speech." American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377,413 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
392. 365 U.S. 127 (1961); see also Minda, Interest Groups, supra note 89, at 914-24,
931-63. While Noerr is commonly understood as furthering important First Amendment
freedoms, the decision had in practice the dubious result of upholding the right of special
interest groups to ply governmental processes with enormous economic resources in an
effort to influence governmental action to the detriment of rivals and the public interest.
In Noerr, for example, Justice Black, writing for a unanimous Court, concluded that the
Sherman Act had to be construed to permit an association of railroads to engage in a
highly deceptive and unethical lobbying campaign aimed at destroying a competitive rival
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preted the right to petition as establishing both a First Amendment
defense and a principle of statutory construction that restrains the
reach of governmental regulation and prevents the imposition of
civil liability for petitioning activity as long as the petitioning is not
a sham.
393
While Justice Black offered several rationales for the Court's
decision in Noerr, he noted that "[the right of petition is one of the
freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course,
lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms."394 In
Justice Black's view, the effort to apply the antitrust laws to the lob-
bying activities of special interest groups "would impute to the
Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but politi-
cal activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever in the
legislative history of the Act."3 95 What Justice Black was affirming in
Noerr were the central tenets of pluralist ideology,396 a political con-
by influencing state governments to enact antitrucking legislation. Noerr, 365 U.S. at
139-40.
393. See Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 842 (1980) (holding that Noerr and the First Amendment require a construction
of the antitrust laws that avoids the imposition of antitrust liability for economic boycotts
for political purposes); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (holding
that the First Amendment establishes an affirmative defense to civil liability for conse-
quences of an economic boycott for political purposes). See generally AREEDA &
HOVENKAMIP, supra note 385, at 3-9. For a discussion of the confusion spawned by such
decisions, see Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Governmen-
tal Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80
(1977); Robert A. Zauzmer, Note, The Misapplication of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in
Non-Antitrust Right to Petition Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1243, 1249-72 (1984).
394. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138.
395. Id. at 137.
396. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES:
CONFLICT AND CONSENT (1967); see also Minda, Interest Groups, supra note 89, at 93742
(describing how pluralist ideology provided the Warren Court with "a conception of politi-
cs that optimistically accepted the legitimacy of interest group influence in the political
process"). The underlying pluralistic perspective that explains Justice Black's view of the
role of interest group petitioning can be found in the concluding paragraph of Justice
Black's opinion:
In rejecting each of the grounds relied upon by the courts below to justify
application of the Sherman Act to the campaign of the railroads... we have re-
stored what appears to be the true nature of the case-a "no-holds-barred fight"
between two industries both of which are seeking control of a profitable source
of income. Inherent in such fights, which are commonplace in the halls of legis-
lative bodies, is the possibility, and in many instances even the probability, that
one group or the other will get hurt by the arguments that are made. In this
particular instance, each group appears to have utilized all the political powers
it could muster in an attempt to bring about the passage of laws that would help
it or injure the other. But the contest itself appears to have been conducted
along lines normally accepted in our political system, except to the extent that
each group has deliberately deceived the public and public officials. And that
deception, reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman
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ception of democratic society "that denie[s] absolute truths, re-
main[s] intellectually flexible and critical, value[s] diversity, and
[draws] strength from innumerable competing subgroups." 97 When
applied to judicial review of interest group petitioning, pluralist
ideology required tolerance for group conflicts because interest
group competition for political favor was assumed to advance the
public interest. Interest group pluralism thus advanced reasons for
believing that legal neutrality or non-intervention in the political
spheres of government advanced the public good, a guarantee of de-
mocracy, and the public interest.
What motivates the theory of interest group pluralism is a set
of underlying images of the political process that are aimed at es-
tablishing the truth of a number of highly contestable observations
about the nature of political activity. Interest group competition is
seen by contemporary legal scholars as political activity even when
the participants of such activity understand that their activity is
designed to achieve economic or commercial objectives through po-
litical subversion or domination. 9 s Interest group competition, even
when driven by profit-motivated objectives, is thus understood by
Professor Elhauge as public rather than private activity, because
interest group struggle is thought to be essential to the political
process of government.399 Deregulation of interest group competition
is encouraged because it is thought that the pursuit of private inter-
ests would, like the invisible hand of the market, lead to the greatest
aggregate social welfare. Interest groups are presumed to have pre-
determined desires and to be able to engage in rational decisions
that depend upon objectivist assumptions about reasoning and hu-
man motivation.4 0
A number of richly textured metaphors combine to provide
meaning to the legal theory of interest group pluralism. The HO-
MEOSTASIS metaphor can help explain the particular meaning of
interest group competition that Justice Black adopted in Noerr-a
Act is concerned.
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144-45.
397. EDWARD M. PURCELL JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOcRATic THEORY 211 (1973); see
also Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reason.
ableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1188 (1990).
398. See Minda, Interest Groups, supra note 89, at 924, 934-37.
399. See supra notes 205-16 and accompanying text.
400. Interest groups are understood by political pluralists as having unified interests
which permit the group to "engage in rational decisions similar to those of rational people
buying and selling products in the market." Minda, Interest Groups, supra note 89, at 938.
In this sense, pluralist and public choice theorists believe that political ordering is assimi-
lated by market ordering. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1539, 1542 (1988); see also ROBERT DAHL, DILEMAS OF A PLURALIST DE-
MOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL 32 (1992).
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no-holds-barred fight between groups seeking to influence and con-
trol governmental action.40' The HOMEOSTASIS metaphor and the
related idea of a PURPOSEFUL ORGANISM, structured the
meaning underlying Justice Black's view that interest group com-
petition leads to the public good. These metaphors also justified
Justice Black's view that deception, fraud, misrepresentation, and
competitive injury resulting from predatory conduct in the legisla-
tive sphere of government were to be insulated from judicial scru-
tiny unless such petitioning was found to be a mere sham. Judicial
meddling into the political process would only undermine the natu-
ral process of selection in the search for truth. For this reason Jus-
tice Black concluded that it was apparent that "[tihe proscriptions of
the [Sherman Act], tailored as they are for the business world, are
not at all appropriate for application in the political arena."0
The idealized cognitive model of interest group pluralism is
structured by another related Holmesian metaphor-the MARKET-
PLACE OF IDEAS. 0 Dissenting in Abrams v. United States,04 Jus-
tice Holmes asserted that "the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market."40 5 As Constitutional scholars have noted, Holmes' idea of
the marketplace as a truth discovering process has influenced mod-
em constitutional principles defining the nature of free speech
guaranteed by the First Amendment.46 The metaphor of a market-
place joins with cultural metaphors such as MIND IS A MACHINE,
IDEAS ARE PRODUCTS and IDEAS ARE COMMODITIES to cre-
ate an idealized model for understanding how interest groups' per-
suasion is like selling, how legislation is like acceptance, and how
truth is the test of competition, what Steven L. Winter has aptly
401. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 140
(1961); see also, Minda, Interest Groups, supra note 89, at 922.
402. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 141.
403. This metaphor has dominated much of Supreme Court doctrine under the First
Amendment. See BAKER, supra note 133, at 223. Professor Baker has shown how the
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS metaphor in free speech doctrine has prevented the Su-
preme Court from fully considering the individual liberties and political freedoms affected
by profit-oriented expression. "[E]nterprise speech rooted in the profit-oriented require-
ments of the market or in instrumental attempts to use property to exercise power over
others fails in principle to exhibit individually chosen allegiance to personal values and,
therefore, should be subject to regulation." Id.
404. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
405. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Winter, Transcendental Nonsense,
supra note 35, at 1188-89.
406. Steven L. Winter, for example, has shown how the metaphor MARKETPLACE
OF IDEAS came to support an important understanding of freedom of speech that came
to be associated with several conventional metaphors of the mind and ideas. Winter,
Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 35, at 1189.
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called "a 'folk' version of the relativist view of meaning."407
As Winter has argued, the MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS meta-
phor is structured by the cultural metaphors of mind and ideas in
establishing a relativist meaning for organizing the legal categories
of free speech doctrine in constitutional law.4°8 Within the imagina-
tive framework of the ICM, of free speech as a marketplace of ideas,
it becomes possible to understand how at least one view of free
speech could support the idea that powerful interest groups, like
corporations, should be entitled to equal access to the legislative
arena for making their ideas and expression known to decisionmak-
ers.409 We can also come to see how modern First Amendment juris-
prudence has developed under the MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
metaphor.
In combining images about free political arenas and notions
about marketplace behavior, the theory of interest group pluralism
adopted by Justice Black in Noerr connects conflicting ideas and
meanings to justify interest group competition. In Noerr, the picture
of unethical conduct, normally associated with collective action of
groups in labor law, is replaced with a picture that associates group
activity with an orderly political process essential to a republican
form of government. The image schema of force utilized to support
findings of coercion connects with the ICM of the marketplace of
ideas to support truth. Images of naked and ancillary restraints of
trade, normally utilized in antitrust law to judge the collective ac-
tions of competitors are in turn replaced with images that justify
collective efforts by competitors to restrain trade by appealing to the
invisible hand rhetoric of the market. The distinction between the
mob or naked restraints and interest group struggle is thus ani-
mated by an imaginative structure of meaning that connects group
activity with different images or social visions about acceptable
forms of group political activity.
B. The Idealized Cognitive Model of Civic Republican Activism.
Justice Black apparently understood the collective action of
special interest group petitioning as a necessary and desirable com-
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 133, at 14. Edwin Baker argues that the confidence
legal decisionmakers have in the power of rationality is misplaced:
People cannot use reason to comprehend a set reality because no set reality ex-
ists for people to discover .... Our conceptions reflect forms of life rather than
reason applied in a metaphorical marketplace of ideas-although speech within
this marketplace may be an important, but not necessarily an especially privi-
leged, practice that affects our conceptions.
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ponent of democratic government. A highly problematic aspect of
Justice Black's opinion in Noerr was that while the opinion justified
the railroads' freedom to petition government, from the perspective
of the right to petition government, he failed to explain the contours
or scope of the right to petition which he sought to affirm. For ex-
ample, it was far from clear whether Justice Black was prepared to
find that the principle of antitrust immunity would apply to other
non-traditional forms of petitioning, especially to attempts to influ-
ence governmental action by boycotts or concerted refusals to deal.410
What was missing in Noerr was an explanation that connected the
ideology of interest group pluralism with a coherent legal theory of
political participation.
While Noerr appears to have established near absolute im-
munity for special interest group lobbying,41' the Supreme Court has
been less willing to extend statutory immunity or First Amendment
protection to economic boycotts by groups which attempt to petition
government indirectly by making marketplace appeals to the elec-
torate. Economic boycotts and concerted refusals to deal have thus
been subject to legal standards that differ substantively from those
that are applied to lobbying and other traditional forms of direct
governmental petitioning. These cases have served to raise sharp
conflicts with the right to petition government that Justice Black
saw to be central to the Noerr immunity principle.
By far the most perplexing cases involving the tension between
the right to petition and federal regulation of such activity have in-
volved group boycotts and direct consumer actions undertaken to
allegedly influence governmental action. Beginning with the civil
410. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127,
136 (1961) (noting that the railroads' actions "bear very little if any resemblance to the
combinations normally held violative of the Sherman Act, combinations ordinarily char-
acterized by [activities including] price-fixing agreements, boycotts, market-division
agreements, and other similar arrangements"); see also id. at 140-44 (discussing the dis-
tinction between permitted "political activity" and forbidden "trade restraints").
411. For nearly three decades, Noerr has served to immunize otherwise unlawful
conduct in the sphere of government when the immediate purpose is to influence legisla-
tion. However, a higher standard has been imposed with regard to activity in the judicial
sphere. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); see also Minda, Interest
Groups, supra note 89, at 913-31.
Noerr's interpretation of the right to petition has thus required judges to exhibit tol-
erance for collective activity of groups seeking to compete in the governmental spheres,
While the more recent decisions of the Supreme Court can be seen to retreat from new
applications of Noerr in other contexts, see, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988), the Court has remained steadfast in its commitment to
the Noerr immunity doctrine in cases where traditional forms of petitioning activity are
utilized by special interest groups "genuinely intended to influence governmental action."
See Minda, Interest Groups, supra note 89, at 981-82, 1011-13.
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rights movement of the 1950's, boycotts and concerted refusals to
deal have become an increasingly important and powerful tactic for
advocates of social change.412 The proliferation of consumer boycotts
undertaken by various consumer organizations protesting the prac-
tices of corporate enterprises and governmental entities are now re-
garded as part of an increasing effort by "the unorganized and the
powerless to dramatize their problems and apply pocketbook pres-
sure in an effort to alleviate them."413
In Claiborne Hardware, the Court had a choice to characterize
the civil rights boycott in that case either in favor of the meaning
attributed to it by either the boycotters or the targets. In finding
that the meaning attributed to the boycott by the boycotters exhib-
ited elements of majesty, Justice Stevens and the Court downplayed
an alternative characterization that would have placed greater im-
portance on protecting the freedom of those who were the target of
that boycott, as well as the freedom of other .individuals who may
have been coerced by the civil rights boycott. In Claiborne Hard-
ware, Justice Stevens employed the CONTAINER metaphor to un-
derstand the social reality of the events he characterized. The force
schema was also at work in Claiborne, since the boycott was under-
stood as a means of political leverage designed to move the legisla-
ture to act. Thus, the conceptual metaphors BOYCOTT IS A CON-
DUIT or CONTAINER and the schema of force can be seen to com-
bine with the MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS metaphor to prefigure a
new idealized cognitive model about political activity.
This model can be seen to be influenced by the HOMEOSTASIS
metaphor that helps to explain why the political expression of boy-
cotts is a necessary and essential function for maintaining civic re-
publican values. In making a distinction between interest group
politics and social movements, the HOMEOSTASIS metaphor of re-
publican thought affirms the importance of extra-institutional direct
action tactics.414 As Professor Pope has explained: "The resulting
picture shows the American political order not as a delicately bal-
anced machine or a harmonious politic, but as a competition be-
tween rival modes of politics, with republican moments punctuating
the operation of politics-as-normal at all levels."45 As an ideal, the
construct of republican moments in American politics is thus prem-
ised upon the idea that citizen revolts periodically occur in a healthy
412. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 10, at 112-14 ("While some may be inclined to
view consumer boycotts... in the context of the various social protests of the 1950s and
1960s... it is believed that a more useful historical perspective.., is gained by tracing
the origins of boycotts in America further back in time.").
413. Id. at 113.
414. See Pope, Republican Moments, supra note 20, at 311 n.107.
415. Id. at 313.
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political system to destabilize the operations of day-to-day politics
that no longer serve the needs of society. These eruptions serve to
establish a new balance in the dynamic development of a democratic
society. Republican moments are thus visualized as a "sort of
'surrogate for revolution' that reconnects the state to civil society."416
In viewing the deployment of economic power in the market as
a surrogate for revolution, political action boycotts serve important
constitutional purposes by creating an outlet for political dissent
and protest. This understanding of boycott is what James Pope
characterized as a republican moment justifying First Amendment
protection of the Claiborne Hardware boycott.41 That boycott was
found to be justified under the theory of civil republicanism because
"the boycotters were pursuing a broad goal rather than narrow self-
interests."41' Here then, in a nutshell, is the chameleon-like mecha-
nism of boycott doctrine in operation. By focusing on the aspects of
boycotts that involve altruistic purposes that transcend the imme-
diate economic interests of those boycotting a constitutional right to
boycott can be discovered. This model of boycott thus serves to evoke
images of civic responsibility and self-sacrifice. By sacrificing their
own interests, boycotters manifest their political commitment to ad-
vancing the interests of others. The right to boycott is thus made to
depend on whether the boycotters seek to advance popular republi-
can values of the common good.
The Supreme Court, however, has not been constrained by the
republican ideology of Claiborne Hardware in denying First
Amendment protection to purely political boycotts by labor and
other groups. In the same term that Claiborne Hardware was de-
cided the Court decided in Allied International that a boycott called
by the longshoremen's union to protest the Russian invasion of Af-
ghanistan could be proscribed as an illegal secondary boycott.4 19 In
Allied International, the labor boycott was aimed at influencing the
policies of a foreign government, and the boycott could thus only be
described as political; the Court refused to recognize that the boycott
involved constitutionally protected expression because a different
set of moral, legal, and political contexts were involved. Because the
boycott in Allied International was secondary in nature and hence
416. Id. at 319.
417. See id. at 349-52. According to Professor Pope, the Supreme Court has adopted
the principle that boycotts should be constitutionally protected when they advance re-
publican-values, i.e., when they "transcend the day-to-day conduct of business as usual."
Id. at 349.
418.Id. at 352.
419. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Intl, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982); see
also Florian Bartosic & Gary Minda, Labor Law Myth In The Supreme Court, 1981 Term:
A Plea For Realistic And Coherent Theory, 30 UCLA L. REV. 271, 306-10 (1982).
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arguably proscribed by federal labor law, the Court was influenced
by the metastasis metaphor of labor cases, the boycott was under-
stood to be a disease spreading throughout an otherwise healthy
economic system. The cure was federal proscription of the boycott.
In Claiborne Hardware, the Court recognized a First Amend-
ment defense by envisioning the civil rights boycott as a conduit for
bringing a message of the protest. Even though the boycott had sec-
ondary effects, 420 the Court concluded that the boycott was not a dis-
ease, but rather a cure for curtailing discriminatory patterns in so-
ciety that had been sanctioned at one time by official state actions.
The problem the Court saw -was that civil society, not the boycott,
represented the threat to law and order.42'
Hence, in Claiborne Hardware it was the social context of
Southern culture, rather than the boycott, that represented to the
Court the forces of illegality, disorder, and insurgency. The Clai-
borne Hardware boycott was aligned with images of "law and order,"
"stability," and "justice;" in contrast, it was the target of the boycott,
local government, that represented the image of the "unruly mob." It
was the cultural images of Southern lynch mobs and labor protests,
ruled by irrational passion, bypassing the judicial process in favor of
the "pragmatic and the expedient,"422 that explains why the eco-
nomic boycott against this mob in Claiborne Mississippi was pro-
tected, and why the Court's decision was distinguished from the
boycotts in labor cases such as Allied International.23
420. During the Claiborne Hardware boycott, third parties were asked not to do
business with the targets of the boycott.
421. The civil rights boycott of Claiborne Hardware arose out of the historical strug-
gles of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s which actively challenged the
regime of Jim Crow discrimination in the South, discrimination that had been firmly en-
trenched by state law. From the cultural experience of the civil rights movement, one can
come to see why the economic boycott in Claiborne Hardware could be perceived as a lib-
eratory or republican moment that represented the virtues of popular republican politics.
See Minda, Progressive Labor Politics, supra note 20, at 105.
422. See Peller, Reason And The Mob, supra note 328, at 31.
423. While it is true that ideas of federalism and federal supremacy also help to ex-
plain the Court's Claiborne Hardware decision, constitutional law and policy cannot fully
account for why the Court has defined the meaning of boycotts differently in other boycott
cases. Federalism or practical considerations of remedy fail to explain why the legal
meaning of boycott changes like the color of a chameleon as legal analysis moves to dif-
ferent social and economic contexts. What is not explained is why Claiborne Hardware is
the exceptional case. It may be that the metaphors of the Southern lynch mob that signi-
fied the need for federal intervention in Claiborne Hardware have become culturally ir-
relevant today in view of narratives that have come to characterize the "New South." See,
e.g., VIDIADHAR S. NAIPUL, A TURN IN THE SoUTH (1989).
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C. Trial Lawyers And The Politics of Metaphoric Representation.
In Trial Lawyers,' 4 the Supreme Court attempted to reconcile
the doctrinal conflict created ' by cases like Noerr and Claiborne
Hardware. by distinguishing between financially interested and fi-
nancially disinterested boycotts aimed at influencing governmental
action.4 5 Justice Stevens' emphasis 'on whether boycotters have a fi-
nancial interest at stake in governmental decisionmaking can be
explained in terms of a concealed argument favoring a competitive
or market process, rather than a political or governmental process,
for determining economic entitlements.
Where those boycotting have a financial interest in restraining
trade, Trial Lawyers favors private markets for implementing and
harnessing private financial interests. As Professor Elhauge has ar-
gued, the Court has apparently accepted the notion "that competi-
tive markets provide a mechanism for harnessing that financial in-
terest in the public interest because the process of competition
causes producers to provide goods at the lowest cost to those who
value them the most."42
In rejecting the lawyers' claim that their boycott was protected
by Claiborne Hardware, Justice Stevens also concluded that the
crucial element in Claiborne Hardware was that the civil rights boy-
cotters "sought no special advantage for themselves... [but instead]
sought only the equal respect and equal treatment to which they
were constitutionally entitled."427 While the Court acknowledged
that the lawyers' boycott may have been the result of altruistic mo-
tives, "it [was] undisputed that their immediate objective was to in-
crease the price that they would be paid for their services."428 Clai-
borne Hardware was, distinguished on the ground that First
Amendment protection for political boycotts was "not applicable to a
boycott conducted by business competitors who 'stand to profit fina-
424. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n (Trial Lawyers), 493 U.S. 411
(1990).
425. Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 427 (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 508 (1988)). While Justice Stevens also noted that the Claiborne
Hardware boycotters advanced a constitutional right, see id. at 776-77, it is difficult to see
that fact as a key factor in Justice Stevens' decision since the Trial Lawyers boycotters
also purported to advance the Sixth Amendment rights of their indigent clients. More-
over, as Professor Elhauge has also noted, "while such a constitutional objective may be
necessary to confer immunity on a disinterested restraint, it is plain after Trial Lawyers
that benign subjective motivations, whether or not they involve the vindication of consti-
tutional rights, are not sufficient to confer immunity on a financially interested restraint
used to seek governmental action." Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note
30, at 1209-10.
426. Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 1197-98.
427. Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 777.
428. Id. at 777; see also Minda, Interest Groups, supra note 89, at 991.
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ncially from a lessening of competition in the boycotted market." 429
Since at least one objective of the trial lawyers' boycott was to secure
an economic advantage for the boycotters, the Court found that the
boycott fell outside the First Amendment defense recognized in
Claiborne Hardware for politically motivated boycotts.
430
Judicial notions about antitrust process structured the Court's
Trial Lawyers opinion, but the rhetorical support for those notions
was bolstered by a concealed argument that was metaphoric in na-
ture. The distinctions that the Court drew between economically-
motivated and politically motivated boycotts made sense because the
distinctions relied upon a familiar imaginative schema and a basic-
body metaphor. The Court's public/private distinction relied upon a
parts-whole image schema: financially interested and financially
disinterested boycotts represent different parts of a larger whole
made up of public and private spheres of civil society. The basic
structure ordering the relation of each part to the whole is deter-
mined by the concept of containment.
Financial motivation thus- becomes the key factor for determin-
ing which container or sphere is appropriate. Antitrust review is fa-
vored when private decisionmaking, ie., self-interested decisionmak-
ing, is involved because antitrust legislation is aimed at promoting
the public interest through the private competitive process. 431 First
Amendment protection thus extends only to protect public decision-
429. 493 U.S. at 776 (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486
U.S. 492, 508 (1988)).
430. In rejecting the trial lawyers' antitrust immunity claim, Justice Stevens distin-
guished Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961),
on the ground that the scope of antitrust immunity afforded by Noerr was limited to peti-
tioning campaigns where the alleged restraint would flow from public action. Trial Law-
yers, 493 U.S. at 776. As Justice Stevens explained in Trial Lawyers:
[I]n the Noerr case the alleged restraint of trade was the intended consequence
of public action; in this case the boycott is the means by which [the trial law-
yers] sought to obtain favorable legislation. The restraint of trade that was im-
plemented while the boycott lasted would have had precisely the same anticom-
petitive consequences during that period even if no legislation had been en-
acted. In Noerr, the desired legislation would have created the restraint on the
truckers' competition; in this case the emergency legislative response to the
boycott put an end to the restraint.
Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 776. Justice Stevens reasoned that Noerr was inapplicable to
the Trial Lawyers' boycott because the restraint of trade sought by the boycotters, a clas-
sic price-fixing conspiracy, was itself responsible for restraining trade. Restraints of trade
created by private action for financially interested reasons lose the immunity Noerr cre-
ated for boycotts seeking to directly influence governmental decision-making. As Profes-
sor Elhauge recently explained, "Noerr provides immunity to input, financially interested
or disinterested, into a disinterested accountable decisionmaking process because it is the
decision of the latter that provides the assurance that any resulting restraint is in the
public interest." Elhauge;Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 1210.
431. See Elhauge, Antitrust PetitioningImmunity, supra note 30, at 1196-97.
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making, ie., financially disinterested and publicly accountable deci-
sionmaking.4"2 Economic boycotts for political purposes lose the
protection under the Noerr immunity principle because they are
presumed to -be the result of private action, and the First Amend-
ment defense of Claiborne applies only when those participating in
the boycott are acting out of purely altruistic motives.
The parts-whole schema provides rhetorical images that rein-
force the public/private distinction of Trial Lawyers because there
exists a dominant metaphor that structures the bulk of legal under-
standing about law and politics, the BODY AS CONTAINER meta-
phor, which structures legal concepts in terms of bounded entities
like arms, legs, and bodies. Our bodies are understood as containers
with forces internal to it that are limited and constrained by the
physical space of our exterior.
The experiential understanding of BODY AS CONTAINER has
motivated lawyers and judges to comprehend legal notions about ar-
guments, contracts, or obligations as bounded entities. 433 For exam-
ple, Justice Stevens' notion that boycotts can be distinguished on the
basis of the motives of the boycotters assumes that there are unique
forces motivating boycotts. Once a boycott is classified in terms of
motive, the boycott is presumed to be influenced by particular forces.
Economically motivated boycotts are influenced by private market
forces; and politically motivated boycotts are influenced by political
forces. The law seeks to restrain market forces through antitrust
regulation, but political forces are intended to go unregulated. Trial
Lawyers is thus an important decision for identifying the boundaries
between the two idealized cognitive models of interest group plural-
ism and civic republicanism.
It is an imaginary process of representation which defines
boundaries between the idealized cognitive models. In Trial Law-
yers, the image of the boycott as a business restraint enabled the
Court to treat the lawyers' boycott as if it were merely the concerted
activity of a business cartel. The lawyer's constitutional freedoms
432. Id.
433. Agreements are understood as containers that convey ideas and positions; con-
tracts establish boundaries of obligations, and obligations are understood in terms of
bounded promises. As Mark Johnson has explained:
If you enter into an agreement, you become subject to a (moral or legal) force
that acts within the abstract space contained by the agreement. So, to get out of
such a contract or agreement is to be no longer subject to its force, since you are
no longer within the "space" where that force acts upon you. This fact is a con-
sequence of the schema for containment .... Where there is a container, there
can be forces internal to it that are limited and constrained by the boundaries of
the container. Once an object is removed from (taken out of) the container, it is
no longer influenced by those forces.
JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND, supra note 45, at 35.
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were consequently seen to have the lesser constitutional status at-
tributed to profit-maximizing activity.3 4 Because profit-oriented
forms of commercial expression fail to implicate constitutional val-
ues,435 the lawyers' boycott was not accorded the First Amendment
protections made applicable to political boycotts. The denial of a
constitutional right to boycott in Trial Lawyers rested upon a char-
acterization of the boycott as a threatening and dangerous market
restraint. This characterization justified the application of the per se
rule of antitrust as a necessary corrective device to guard against
the perceived danger. The constitutional values associated with the
Claiborne Hardware boycott were found not to be relevant because
the Court's understanding of the boycott was aligned with images
that gave priority to the interests and values of the market.
Legal concepts defining the bounds of acceptable group activity
of different boycotts have therefore worked in practice to curtail the
ability of consumer groups to engage in economic boycotts for politi-
cal purposes. Special interest lobbies may engage in unethical and
deceptive publicity campaigns designed to influence the government
to take action that would destroy competitive market forces."' Rela-
tively powerless groups, who are either not represented or underrep-
resented in the governmental sphere, can deploy their economic
power outside of political arenas only if they lack an economic inter-
est in the subject matter of their activity.
434. Boycotts conducted by business competitors for profit-seeking objectives have
never been thought to be protected by the First Amendment, even though such boycotts
involve elements of expression. See generally Frederick Schauer, The Aim and the Target
in Free Speech Methodology, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 562, 563 (1989).
435. See BAKER, supra note 133.
436. The dilemma posed by the unregulated power of special interest groups might
have been avoided had the Court adopted a sham petitioning exception to the Noerr im-
munity principle, one that would deny antitrust immunity when lobbying or engaging in
other forms of deceptive petitioning activity which.intended to perfect an anticompetitive
conspiracy to mislead governmental decisionmakers. Truly powerful special interests do
not need the protection of Noerr immunity in order to dominate the legislative process
through deception and fraud. See Minda, Interest Groups, supra note 89, at 1011-13.
437. What is striking about the Court's decision in Trial Lawyers is that the decision
ignores the political realities facing the group of trial lawyers and their indigent clients.
While it is true that the lawyers had an economic interest in their fees, they also had an
interest in participating in the political process that determined their wages, hours, and
other working conditions. Justice Stevens, however, conceptualized the lawyers as mere
market participants motivated by profit-making objectives, when in fact they sought to
have a say in the decisionmaking process that determined their workplace interests, as
well as representing the interests of indigent clients. The lawyers' interest in higher fees
involved more than just profit-maximizing objectives; what was at stake was human self-
determination. See id. at 995. -
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D. Making Sense of Boycott Doctrine-Implications of the Models.
Judicial ambivalence about the right to boycott for political
purposes is thus fueled by radically different imaginative concepts
or idealized models about the nature of political participation in a
democratic government. One conception appears to be based on the
belief that interest group representation furthers the public good.
The other is based on the belief that the public good is best advanced
by collective self-determination and discursive citizen participation
in public debate. One view defines the right of political participation
as a preventative right that grants citizens the freedom to present
grievances through certain orderly procedures. The other defines the
right as a discursive right that grants citizens the freedom to engage
in forms of expressive conduct essential for participating in the de-
liberative process of government.38
One model of group political participation, favored in labor and
antitrust litigation, has defined the right of political participation in
terms of what can be described as the theory of interest group plu-
ralism, a theory that assumes that political participation is reserved
exclusively to special interest group competition within political
arenas. The other theory, reflected in civil rights litigation involving
economic boycotts to protest racial discrimination, has defined the
right of political participation in terms of a theoretical perspective
that assumes that citizen involvement in the deliberative discourses
of government is essential to a republican form of government.
These different conceptions of political participation have been ap-
plied by the Court in a very context-specific manner because the
cognitive models upon which the Court has relied for categorizing
boycott doctrine have been shaped by deeply ingrained bodily expe-
438. Claiborne Hardware and Noerr can thus be seen as representing two different
conceptions about political practice. One understanding, reflected in Justice Black's deci-
sion in Noerr, has defined the right of political participation in terms of what can be de-
scribed as the theory of interest group pluralism, a theory that assumes that political
participation is reserved exclusively to special interest groups. See id. at 931-35, 937-42.
The other, reflected in Justice Stevens' decision in Claiborne Hardware, has defined the
right of political participation in terms of a theory of popular sovereignty or civic republi-
canism, a theory that assumes that citizen involvement in the deliberative process of gov-
ernment is essential to a republican form of government. The view reflected in Noerr de-
fines the right of political participation as a "preventative right" that grants citizens the
freedom to present grievances through certain orderly procedures and channels of repre-
sentation. The view reflected in Claiborne Hardware defines the right as a discursive
right that grants citizens the freedom to engage in forms of expressive conduct essential
for participating in the deliberative process of government. There is evidence to support
the position that the drafters of the First Amendment Petitioning Clause understood the
right to petition as a discursive right, even though modern Supreme Court theory has fa-
vored interpretations that construe the right to petition as merely a preventative right.
See Higginson, supra note 388.
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riences that influence the Courts' understanding about the reality of
group activity in different social and historical settings.
In labor law, that reality seems to reflect an understanding of
boycotts drawn from bodily experiences of physical force. From the
embodied experience, boycotts have been understood to be compul-
sory forces that coerce and exclude the liberty of other individuals,
or as diseases that spread the effects of labor disputes to neutral
parties. In antitrust law, boycotts have been understood from some-
what different embodied experiences that allow judges to see boy-
cotts as instruments for advancing legitimate competitive interests.
What makes civil rights boycotts appear political and familiar to
judges, and what makes labor boycotts appear threatening and dan-
gerous as "other," is an imaginative process of reasoning that places
the status of certain images or experiences drawn from basic bodily
experiences about the world in specific factual contexts.
The right of political participation, crucial to democratic proc-
ess, has thus been defined in ways that can prevent marginalized
and relatively powerless groups from utilizing an effective means of
influencing governmental action. The right to boycott upheld in
Claiborne Hardware has thus been limited to those rare instances
where groups engage in pure political expression to pursue purely
altruistic objectives.439 The metaphors of white Southern culture
that signified the need for federal intervention and legal order in
Claiborne Hardware are now perceived to be culturally irrelevant in
today's corporate-driven mass culture."0
What animates the judicial understanding of boycotts are the
metaphors of the marketplace, the idea that knowledge about mar-
kets offers an objective medium for structuring and ordering politi-
cal and commercial activity. In Noerr, it was the logic of the invisible
hand mechanism that animated the view that interest group com-
petition furthers the public good. In Trial Lawyers, it was the notion
that private economic interests can be contained by a competitive
market process which often leads to the subversion of the public
good. In Allied International, it was the notion that secondary labor
boycotts spread the effects of labor disputes throughout the eco-
nomic system. In Claiborne Hardware, it was the notion that politi-
cal boycotts are a special form of political expression regulating the
competitive forces of different political interests. What unites these
439. Even the protqction granted to the boycott in Claiborne Hardware would per-
haps now be called into question, since the participants of that boycott had an economic
interest at stake in eliminating various discriminatory practices that limited their em-
ployment opportunities. Indeed, this is what the boycott against the Claiborne Hardware
Company was apparently all about. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 899-900, 914-15.
440. See generally Cornel West, The Role of Law in Progressive Politics, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 1797 (1990); Minda, Progressive Labor Politics, supra note 20, at 106-07.
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different legal understandings of boycotts is an implicit metaphor
that equates boycott activity to the homeostatic functions of the
body.
First Amendment defenses for political boycotts and antitrustimmunity for governmental petitioning by boycott are consequently
viewed as conduits to channel collective resource allocation decisions
into either a competitive process, defined in large part by antitrust
and labor law, or a political process, defined by constitutional law.
The underlying assumption is that the each part will provide "some
realistic assurance that the decisions will be in the public inter-
est."' 1 In other words, political activity will serve the public interest
only if the individuals respect the bounded space separating mar-
kets and politics. The realms of markets and politics are understood
in terms of their own competitive forces, but each is assumed to
function like a homeostatic organism. In the realm of markets, the
invisible hand of competition ensures that the system reaches an
equilibrium state; in the realm of politics, it is the free flow of inter-
est groups competing for the favors of government that ensures a
healthy balance in government. The role of law is limited to main-
taining the competitive forces of each sphere. The basic structure of
labor and antitrust process and First Amendment law is thus
structured by a basic body metaphor that seeks to maintain balance
and equilibrium between the prevailing economic and political
power of dominant groups.
What is ignored is the possibility of alternative metaphors for
understanding the role of boycotts in American economic and politi-
cal life. Instead of understanding boycott activity as affecting some
system function, boycotts could be understood as the ongoing revi-
sion of the normative practices that make communities viable for
fostering human development and self-advancement. New meta-
phors drawn from cultural experience of direct citizen boycotts could
be employed to attribute new First Amendment meaning to boycotts
generally.
Boycotts could be seen as examples of collective political dia-
logue that create a particular form of political meaning through ac-
tion. Boycotting could be understood as a political act that is intrin-
sically important for extending political community to all groups in
society.' 2 The legal meaning of boycotts could be developed from an
understanding of boycott as a dialogic practice necessary for political
expression. Instead of analyzing boycott activity in terms of homeo-
static functions, the legal meaning of boycotts could be re-imagined
441. Elhauge, Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, supra note 30, at 1198; see also El-
hauge, Antitrust Process, supra note 30, at 697-708.
442. See generally Frank Michaelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
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in terms of a deliberative politics among persons overcoming,
through confrontation the moral stasis of official power and author-
ity. Thinking of boycotts as a dialogic process of deliberative politics
should encourage judges to adopt a new attitude toward boycotts: an
attitude traceable to a conception of democracy based on popular
will.4
3
The problem is that the legal understanding of boycotts devel-
6ped" in Claiborne Hardware is now in danger of extinction in face of
the dominant boycott images of cases like Trial Lawyers and Allied
International. Boycotts, like most other human activity, are the
product of multiple purposes and diverse interests. The boycott up-
held in Claiborne Hardware was brought because discrimination
denied African Americans economic opportunities in employment.'
The boycott in Trial Lawyers was brought because court appointed
lawyers could no longer effectively advance the Sixth Amendment
rights of their clients at the hourly fees fixed by local law."5 One
cannot say that these boycotts were purely financially interested or
disinterested boycotts; they were both. The only basis for making
these distinctions is the pull of a concealed metaphoric argumenta-
tive structure that encourages us to understand boycotts in terms of
body metaphors.
V. CHANGING SOCIAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE RIGHT To BoYcOTT:
LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL ORDER
Even boycotts aimed... at private decisionmaking should share the status
of other political acts such as electoral voting, contributing money and time
to an election or referendum campaign, and litigating for social purposes.
All of these political actions can be viewed broadly as means by which citi-
zens can influence important social decisionmaking.
4 6
The recent wave of consumer and political boycotts suggests
that boycotts are becoming an established part of the American po-
litical scene."7 Economic boycotts against Idaho potatoes,"8 Coors
443. See Frank Michaelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 293 (1989).
444. Minda, Progressive Labor Politics, supra note 20, at 99.
445. Id. at 77-78.
446. Harper, supra note 30, at 422 (footnote omitted).
447. See, e.g., Don Terry, Diplomacy Fails to End Store Boycott in Flatbush, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 16, 1990, §2, at B1; M.A. Farber, Black-Korean Who-Pushed-Whom Festers,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1990 §2, at Bi; Merle English & Ji-Yeon Yuh, Black-Korean Conflict
Simmers; Store Protests in Brooklyn Fan Old Flames, NEWSDAY, Feb. 13, 1990, at 6.
448. Pro-choice activists threatened Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus with a national
boycott of Idaho Potatoes if he did not veto what would have been the most restrictive
state abortion law in the nation. See, e.g., Idaho Abortion Bill Is Vetoed: Legislation Was
Far Too Restrictive, Governor Says, CHi. TRIB., Mar. 31, 1990, at 1.
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beer,4s Dominos Pizza,"' tuna fish,4"' and Salvadoran coffee,452 to
mention just a few, have all been called by special interest groups
seeking to influence commercial and governmental policy. These
boycotts pose a serious challenge to the way judges have come to un-
derstand the legal meaning of boycotts because the groups boycott-
ing today do so for both economic and political objectives. The actual
cultural practice of boycotts thus fails to respect the metaphoric rea-
soning upon which the Supreme Court has uncritically relied for
distinguishing between boycott activities of different groups.
Consider, for example, the Coors beer boycott, which was
brought by labor and consumer groups to change corporate policy of
the Coors beer company. The boycott was fueled by the opposition of
various groups to the political views of the founder of the Coors
company, who was instrumental in founding the Heritage Founda-
tion,45 3 a conservative think-tank which supported and helped to
shape Reagan Administration policies. The boycott was joined by
feminist organizations, as well as by black, hispanic, gay, and other
ethnic communities who found Coors to represent political causes
that were adverse to their interests.5 4 The boycott was initiated by
the AFL-CIO, which had been attempting unsuccessfully to unionize
449. See Tasini, supra note 7, at 19.
450. The National Organization for Women (NOW) has organized a boycott of Dom-
ino's Pizza alleging that Domino's owner, Thomas Monaghan, has contributed, in per-
sonal and corporate funds, over $50,000 to The Michigan Committee to End Tax Funded
Abortions. See, e.g., Dana Fulham, Local NOW Leader Urges Boycott of Two Firms,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 27, 1989, at 7. A national boycott was called by NOW but has had
little effect on Domino's sales. See Kara Swisher, Backing Away From Controversy: Abor-
tion Issue Causes AT&T to Pull Funds, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 1990, at El.
451. Environmentalists called a highly successful boycott against American tuna
canners to stop the canners from selling tuna fish caught in nets that also trap and kill
dolphins. Boycotting Corporate America, ECONOMIST, May 26, 1990, at 69; see also Sheets,
supra note 7, at 44.
452. A San Francisco-based peace group called for a national boycott of American cof-
fee manufacturers who import Salvadoran coffee beans, claiming that the manufacturers
were indirectly supporting El Salvador's violent right-wing government. John Greenwald,
Bitter Cup of Protest, TIME, May 28, 1990, at 52; see also Liberman, supra note 7, at 15.
453. In 1973, Joseph Coors, patriarch of the Coors family, donated $250,000 to help
start up the Heritage Foundation. Steven Greenhouse, The Coors Boys Stick to Business,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1986, § 3, at 1. Joseph Coors has, at times, provided more than half
of the Heritage Foundation's budget. See Paul Richter, Coors' New Brew: Taking Out the
Political Aftertaste, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1987, § 4, at 1.
454. See, e.g., Richter, supra note 453, at 1. Feminists boycotted Coors because of the
Coors's family's strident opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment. Id. at 6. African
Americans joined the boycott in response to statements by Bill Coors, Joseph Coors's
brother, that "blacks lack 'intellectual capacity' and that this was one reason Africa has
economic problems." Greenhouse, supra note 453, at 30. Women, African American, His-
panic, and homosexual groups have also boycotted Coors due to the firm's alleged dis-
criminatry employment practices. Id.
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Coors' breweries.455
The Coors boycott had both political and economic objectives.
Some groups boycotted Coors because they did not want to support
political causes that were perceived to be contrary to their political
interests. Other groups protested because they perceived Coors as
supporting governmental policies that worked to undermine their
economic interests. Finally, union groups boycotted to pressure Co-
ors to assume collective bargaining responsibilities under federal la-
bor law. The combined effect of the boycott over several years
worked substantially to diminish Coors' market share, a factor that
ultimately contributed to the success of the boycott.45
Justice Stevens' opinion in Trial Lawyers suggests that the Co-
ors boycott would not be immunized from antitrust litigation if the
participants had an economic stake in the outcome of the boycott. At
least some of the participants in the boycott, especially those who
were members of the union, stood to secure a direct economic benefit
if the boycott proved successful; it is thus far from clear that the Co-
ors boycott would be protected by Claiborne Hardware. Of course,
the safety net for political boycott activity created by the Claiborne
Hardware Court may not apply in light of the of the Trial Lawyers
decision.457 The Coors beer boycott was not unique,45 and many con-sumer boycotts today resemble that boycott. Many consumer boy-
455. The Coors beer boycott was initiated by the AFL-CIO in response to the Coors
company's anti-union attitudes and practices. Richter, supra note 453, at 1. Opposition to
the political views of Joseph Coors led to intensifying and broadening of the boycott. Id.;
see also Mark Stencel, Boycotts a Touchy Business for Targeted Firms, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
11, 1990, §D, at 2A; Helms Subject of Beer Boycott by Gays, UPI, Jul. 22, 1990, available
in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, UPI File.
456. See Richter, supra note 453. Many outside analysts, as well as company offi-
cials, believe that Coors's market share decline was attributable to the boycott as well as
to the aggressive tactics of Coors's competitors. Id. Over the last few years, Coors's mar-
ket share was substantially diminished. For example, Coors's California market share fell
from above 40% in 1977 to approximately 14% in 1984. Company profits dropped from
$67.7 million to $44.7 million. Tasini, supra note 7, at 19. The Coors boycott raises trou-
blesome issues for policymakers concerned with federal competition policy because the
boycott restrained the ability of Coors to compete in the market, a consequence which
could not be seen as the result of "competition on the merits." If a group of beer competi-
tors had engaged in the same boycott, the boycott would probably have been found to be a
per se violation of the antitrust laws. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S.
207 (1959) (holding that a group boycott is per se illegal under §1 of Sherman Act); cf.
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that an
agreement between beer distributors to eliminate short term credit formerly granted to
retailers is illegal per se).
457. See Garret G. Rasmussen & Kenneth L. Glazer, Boycotters Beware: Changing
Standards for Consumer Boycotts, 5 ANTITRUST, Spring 1991, at 22.
458. See William Raspberry, PUSH v. Nike.- Serious Issues and Hocus-Pocus, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 30, 1990, §1, at 27.
922 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
cotts may now be at risk as a result of Trial Lawyers.459
Labor-community boycotts, for example, can be seen to involve
expressive activity that is itself designed to both challenge and
transform the language, values, and myths of society that denigrate
and delegitimize social movements. Union-initiated community boy-
cotts, such as the one brought by grape pickers in California, repre-
sent attempts by organized labor to transform the baseline of a
traditional labor dispute into a broader political one so that the un-
derlying issues may be expressed in a language that the general
consuming public can understand. In doing so, labor organizers have
inteijected into the political discourse new symbols and new lan-
guage for valorizing labor's traditional goal of collective bargaining.
Their goal appears to have been based on an attempt to recreate a
"new labor institution" built on a new unionism of "decentralized,
highly democratic, responsive, and communitarian" values.6 0
On the other hand, it also true that boycotts requesting con-
sumers to withhold their patronage can be just as coercive as tradi-
tional labor and business boycotts, and in some contexts they may be
even more coercive." For example, a local chapter of the Girl Scouts
459. The problem with this development is that many consumer boycotts today re-
semble the Coors boycott, and for that reason, the Court's Trial Lawyers decision may
work to undermine the right of consumers to boycott. We tend to think of consumer ori-
ented boycotts as 100 percent political, thus differentiating them from traditional labor
and business boycotts that are thought to be 100 percent economic. The reality is that
many labor, business, and consumer boycotts can be seen to represent a common collec-
tive effort to transform legal, social, and economic structures that are perceived to be un-
fair or unjust. It is thus possible to imagine different metaphoric baselines for under-
standing similarities between these boycotts. Indeed, this is the point of the new union-
ism associated with labor-community boycotts that have involved consumer and union
groups, corporate campaigns, and community alliances to advance a new democratic labor
movement in an effort to promote and preserve traditional union organizational objec-
tives. Labor organizers have become involved in consumer boycotts and corporate cam-
paigns because they realize that the underlying political struggle is helpful in transform-
ing corporate driven cultural values that seek to render the traditional values of the labor
movement out of date and socially irrelevant. See, e.g., Pope, Labor Community Boycotts,
supra note 20, at 894-97, 901-14; see also HARDY GREEN, ON STRIKE AT HORMEL: THE
STRUGGLE FOR A DEMOCRATIC LABOR MOvEMENT (1990); CHARLES HECKSCHER, THE NEW
UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING CORPORATION (1988).
460. GREEN, supra note 459, at 300. The struggle for a new democratic labor
movement is likely to be frustrated by the new legal distinctions established by the Su-
preme Court's developing boycott doctrine. To be successful in its effort to create a new
unionism, labor must be permitted to tie the goal of the consumer campaign to the ulti-
mate goal of winning broad support for collective bargaining. Union organizers must, if
they are to succeed in saving the labor movement from extinction, transcend the econom-
ics/politics distinction by persuading others that the institutional interests of labor are
consistent with the broader social and political interests of other marginalized groups in
society. See Minda, Progressive Labor Politics, supra note 20, at 126.
461. Recent empirical evidence suggests that labor boycotts involving social issues
are more effective at damaging the wealth position of the target company's shareholders.
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of America was recently boycotted by a large pro-life group, claiming
that one of the Girl Scouts' programs allegedly discussed the subject
of abortion. Within 48 hours of the announcement of the boycott, the
Girl Scouts organization dropped from its programs all references to
abortion, apparently because it feared a negative effect on revenues
it receives from its annual cookie sales. As a spokesperson for Girl
Scouts explained: "The boycott was extremely threatening because
we were very vulnerable. A lot of people would not have been sympa-
thetic, and we could not recoup the losses .... "6 A similar story
could be told about the Idaho potato boycott, forcing the Governor of
Idaho to effect change in state abortion laws by vetoing legislation
he might have signed if the boycott had not pressured him to do oth-
erwise.
That consumer boycotts are inherently coercive or damaging to
the wealth position of their targets does not, of course, detract from
their political character.463 The boycotts against the Girl Scouts and
Idaho potatoes were coercive, but so was the decision of the Girl
Scouts' organization to provide instructional programs on abortion,
and the political decision of a Governor to sign or veto particular
legislation. In this respect one might argue that the right-to-life boy-
cott against the Girl Scouts or the ERA potato boycott were really no
See Pope, Labor Community Boycotts, supra note 20, at 905-08; see also Steven W. Pruitt
& Monroe Friedman, Determining the Effectiveness of Consumer Boycotts: A Stock Price
Analysis of Their Impact on Corporate Targets, 9 J. CONSUMER POLY 375, 381 (1986)
(discussing long-term study of consumer and union boycotts revealing that stock prices
declined by about 3.5 percent). But see Steven W. Pruitt et al., The Impact of Union-Spon-
sored Boycotts on the Stock Prices of Target Firms, 9 J. LAB. RES. 285, 289 (1988) (study of
union boycotts suggest that the negative effect of boycotts arising immediately after the
announcement of the boycott dissipated within one month).
462. Garrett, supra note 7, at 19.
463. One justification for consumer oriented boycotts is that these boycotts seek to
provide consumers with more complete information about the product than was offered in
the marketplace. The idea of consumer sovereignty suggests that consumers should have
full information about the products they consume, including the political practices their
purchases might support. This is an argument offered by Professor Harper in advocating
a right to boycott as political action. See Harper, supra note 30, at 421 ("Any secure basis
for a right to boycott must trump a state's efforts to protect its economy from disruption.
Any individual's decision to join a consumer boycott must be protected precisely because
it enables the individual to affect the economy, not in spite of such effects."). Professor
Harper acknowledges, however, that the notion of consumer sovereignty found in the
"microeconomic welfare doctrine is not a sufficient source for the right to engage in a con-
certed refusal to patronize," because "the doctrine rests on challengeable ethical and em-
pirical assumptions." Id. A more persuasive argument, would seek to establish that the
right to boycott is "a constitutionally protected political act" and that "tihe coercion in-
herent in political boycotts is simply an exercise of the influence that citizens as consum-
ers should be dncouraged to exercise." Id. at 425. The same arguments can be made in
advocating broader legal protection for consumer boycotts incident to labor disputes. See
id. at 438-53.
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different than the product boycotts brought against American corpo-
rations doing business in South Africa.4
One might see the boycotts against the Girl Scouts and Idaho
potatoes as efforts to subvert the normal market and political chan-
nels available for consumers to make known their wishes and pref-
erences. The Girl Scouts organization, dependent as it was on volun-
tary contributions and cookie sales, was vulnerable to the pressures
of the right-to-life group. The economy of Idaho was similarly de-
pendent upon potato sales through out the nation. What is troubling
about these boycotts, so the argument goes, is that they have the
potential of forcing political decisions without voter or consumer
consensus. One could argue that these boycotts fail to serve demo-
cratic purposes.
Indeed, these boycotts may look to some as acts of political ter-
rorism. The Girls Scouts organization and the Governor of Idaho are
seen to have caved in to the demands of their respective boycott only
48 hours after their announcement. Consumers hardly had an op-
portunity to voice their views about the underlying issues. We don't
allow people to engage in acts of political terrorism in other contexts,
even if such prohibitions have an incidental impact on the communi-
cative power of private parties. One reason for regulating boycotts is
to protect innocents from being coerced into certain forms of actions.
The image of political terrorism, however, assumes that the
boycott target was forced by fear and submission to accept the de-
mands of the terrorists. The force of the argument is thus dependent
upon the image schema of compulsory force and the CONTAINER
metaphors of labor law which, as we have seen, seek to persuade
that boycotts are threatening and coercive activities which should be
restrained by the legal order. The metaphors of political terrorism
would suggest that the Girl Scouts and the Governor of Idaho had no
choice but to submit to the demands of the right-to-life or pro-choice
group, but as a factual matter, they had a choice.
The Girl Scouts organization apparently decided that it was
simply more expedient to stop their programs that discussed abor-
tions than to risk a loss of revenue through cookie sales. Their deci-
sion, however, may have been wrong; there are some consumers who
would see the Girl Scouts' as siding with the right-to-life group.
There was also the possibility that cookie sales were lost to consum-
ers who stopped purchasing Girl Scout cookies because the programs
were eliminated. Similarly, the Governor of Idaho could have stood
firm and refused to veto recently enacted legislation if he really be-
464. In either case, the goal of the boycott was designed to bring pressure on private
entities that affirmatively support, through deeds or investments, political practices
which some find to be morally reprehensible. See Harper, supra note 30, at 410.
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lieved that it was the will of the majority to do so. The democratic
and market process in either case would correct such actions if these
decisions proved to lack popular support5.
46
It would be a mistake to automatically equate consumer boy-
cotts with marginalized and powerless groups. Today, everybody
feels powerless to some degree; even the right-to-life group that boy-
cotted the Girl Scouts probably felt powerless. Citizen groups of all
political persuasions engage in consumer boycotts because every
segment of American society has become deeply pessimistic about
the capacity of the political process to respond to the needs of vari-
ous individuals. Some citizens boycott because they believe it may be
the only way to gain a voice in the political process. Others boycott
because they believe it to be an effective and low cost means of forc-
ing change. Boycotts are simply a popular way to publicize a dispute
and garner public support.
In the Trial Lawyers case, however, the Supreme Court seemed
to be concerned that a boycott might prevent consumers from freely
making up their minds about the issues in the boycott. The Court
seemed to worry about the potential market restraint created by a
boycott. But in Trial Lawyers there was no proof that the boycotters
had sufficient market power to impose a restraint."6 Indeed, the
evidence suggested otherwise; the target of the boycott, the District
of Columbia, had monopsony power over the price of the lawyers'
services.
467
Justice Stevens' decision in Trial Lawyers may be understood
in terms of a fear that the lawyers' boycott was like the boycotts
against the Girl Scouts or Idaho potatoes: an act of political terror-
ism that exposed the government to "extortion" by suppliers of the
goods and services it needed.46 The Supreme Court may have felt
compelled to deny First Amendment protection to the lawyers' boy-
cott to protect the vulnerable position of the District, dependent as it
was on the retention of the lawyer's services.469 On the other hand,
465. Although an executive veto may pose obstacles that prevent the manifestation
of the popular will, this is a consequence of the current governmental structure that gives
executives the authority to veto legislation. Thus, the counter-majoritarian problem is
structural.
466. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 250-53 (D.C. Cir.
1988), rev'd in part, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
467. See Kindred, supra note 30, at 725.
468. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n (Trial Lawyers), 493 U.S. 411, 425
(1990). As Judge Ginsburg explained, "Congress surely did not mean to leave
governments so vulnerable to extortion by the suppliers of the goods and services they
need." Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d at 240.
469. See Minda, Interest Groups, supra note 89, at 998. Of course, in Trial Lawyers
there were alternatives available that would have enabled the District of Columbia to
protect its own interest in the face of the lawyers' boycott. Justice Brennan noted that
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the actual cultural practice of consumer boycotts in America today
serves to challenge these judicial understandings about boycotts.
Groups seeking to boycott for political and economic objectives have
boycotted to change corporate and governmental policy while at the
same time advancing their own interests. The act of boycotting is
understood by boycotters as expressive conduct designed to advance
alternative messages that are either not heard or not communicated
by those who possess power to make changes in society.
Those participating in boycotts have attempted to invoke dif-
ferent images and metaphors to transform and shift conventional
ways of talking about politics and knowledge. These images and
metaphors, derived from cultural practices, seem to cohere best with
Justice Brennan's understanding of boycott in his Trial Lawyers dis-
sent. In Justice Brennan's understanding, boycotts have become
"[like soapbox oratory in the streets and parks"470 or "traditional
means of 'communicating thoughts between citizens' and 'discussing'
public questions."47' Boycott activity today seeks to alter the public's
awareness, interest, and concerns regarding a protested issue or
topic. Through publicity generated by the boycott, individuals at-
tempt to further open up public debate and discourse now relegated
to the formal political arenas.
The publicly shared understanding of consumer boycotts may
therefore fit the understanding of boycott Justice Brennan attrib-
uted to the Trial Lawyers boycott. As Justice Brennan explained,
By sacrificing income that they actually desired, and thus inflicting hard-
ship on themselves as well as on the city, the lawyers demonstrated the
intensity of their feelings and the depth of their commitment. The passive
nonviolence of King and Gandhi are proof that the resolute acceptance of
pain may communicate dedication and righteousness more eloquently
than mere words ever could. A boycott, like a hunger strike, conveys an
emotional message that is absent in a letter-to-the-editor, a conversation
with the major, or even protest march. In this respect, an expressive boy-
cott is a special form of political communication.... [Aidvice to the Trial
Lawyers-that they should do 'something dramatic to attract attention'--
was sage indeed.?S
"[tihe government [had] options open to it that private parties [did] not.., the boycott
was aimed at a legislative body with the power to terminate it any time by requiring all
members of the District Bar to represent defendants pro bono." Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at
452 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The point is that it was not
necessary to sacrifice the interests of the lawyers, as well as their indigent clients, to
protect governmental interests. See Minda, Interest Groups, supra note 89, at 998.
470. Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 450-51 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
471. Hague v. Committee For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
472. Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 450-51 (citation omitted).
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The metaphors of boycott projected by the cultural practice of
those boycotting do seem to fit best with an image of boycott as a
form of action aimed at constructing and transforming political dis-
course.47 3 A culture based understanding of boycotts should support
new metaphoric images that understand boycott activity as serving
the creation of meaning itself, rather than serving the function for
some systemic purpose. The First Amendment significance of boy-
cotts can be discovered in light of the cultural practice boycotts have
played in American politics. The idea of boycott as soapbox oratory
in Trial Lawyers, or boycott as solidarity and self-advancement
characteristic of NOW's boycott to encourage ratification of the
Equal Rights Amendment, or labor boycotts of grapes, tuna, or the
Russian Invasion of Afghanistan in Allied International, serve to
raise images of boycott that cohere best with idea of boycott as a
political act.
An understanding of boycott as political act might enable the
courts to decide boycott issues in a more enlightened manner. Where
boycotters sincerely seek to publicize their boycott to the public, and
when a broad audience of citizens are asked to join in support of the
boycott, the courts should treat the boycott as a constitutionally
protected act. Boycotts by business groups seeking predatory market
objectives should continue to be regulated because these boycotts do
not involve political acts. "Very few economically coercive boycotts
seek notoriety both because they seek to escape detection and be-
cause they have no wider audience beyond the participants and the
target."474
Labor boycotts should not be treated different; they should be
granted a First Amendment defense for political activity. When
workers boycott for economic objectives they also are seeking to gain
control over what happens to them at the workplace; at stake are
substantive and democratic values that transcend the desire for
money. Economic boycotts by labor groups should not be subject to
the same legal treatment accorded to economic boycotts by business
groups motivated by purely profit-seeking objectives. A new concep-
473. See Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 441-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Minda, Interest
Groups, supra note 89, at 992. Whilb consumer boycotts, like economic boycotts, can be
inherently coercive, that should not be an excuse for limiting the freedom of individuals to
boycott. The fact that boycotters may seek to intimidate their targets is also an insuffi-
cient reason for regulating their boycott. Antisocial behavior may simply be a way of
gaining media attention, the "poor person's way to gain access to mass media." Balkin,
Ideological Drift, supra note 243, at 64 n.74. If the law seeks to limit the right of consum-
ers to boycott because such activity is likened to an act of political terrorism, then those
who are now marginalized and excluded by existing social and political inequities will be
further denied the opportunities to promote and protect their own interests.
474. Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
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tual metaphor, one that would encourage judges to understand boy-
cott as a political act, would warrant greater First Amendment pro-
tection to secondary labor boycotts. Instead of relying upon bodily
experience, judges might come to discover new conceptual metapho-
rs in their attempt to better understand the way citizens participate
fully in the political community. The lifeworld of American political
practice of ordinary citizens may offer better metaphors for defining
the legal meaning of boycott.
The courts should, of course, consider whether the conduct in-
volved in boycotting is a legitimate political act or mere sham to
achieve an anticompetitive purpose. Boycotts aimed at influencing
governmental action should not be immunized under the antitrust
laws if such petitioning involves misrepresentations, falsehoods,
distortions of the truth, or unethical propaganda.47
If boycotts are condemned because they involve what judges
perceive to be illegitimate objectives,476 however, then it will be
475. See Minda, Interest Groups, supra note 89, at 1013 (arguing that the sham ex-
ception to the Noerr immunity doctrine should be broadened to cover petitioning efforts
based on misrepresentations, falsehoods, deceptions and other unethical techniques).
476. Michael C. Harper has argued that the right of consumers to boycott should be
denied legal protection if the boycott is aimed at illegal action. See Harper, supra note 30,
at 430. Boycotts that advocate violence and criminal conduct, of course, have never been
understood to be protected as political acts. The leading case for this view appears to be
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). It is quite a different matter, however, to as-
sume that judges have the power to determine when otherwise peaceful activity should be
enjoined or regulated because they have concluded that an unlawful object or a non-
criminal illegal means is involved.
Political action boycotts that are viewed as discriminating against certain groups be-
cause of race, sex, or religious preference, so-called bias-related boycotts, are especially
troublesome. The Korean grocery store boycott in Brooklyn, the "Red Apple boycott," il-
lustrates this point. The Red Apple boycott has been characterized by some as racially
motivated, see, e.g., UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES
FACING ASIAN AMERICANS IN THE 1990S 34-40 (1992), and the boycott undoubtedly in-
volved deep racial overtones involving long-standing resentment between Blacks and Ko-
reans. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Little Support Across Races for Boycott, NEWSDAY,
June 15, 1990, at 4; Merle English, Boycotters Plan Rally, NEWSDAY, Jan. 18, 1991, at 38.
The Red Apple boycott was generated by mixed motives, one of which constituted an ille-
gal discriminatory motive. Furthermore, it could be said that the Red Apple boycott in-
volved questionable discriminatory and unlawful objectives. In Hughes v. Superior Court,
339 U.S. 460 (1950), the Supreme Court held that a state could enjoin a boycott that
sought to implement a racial quota, since the boycott's objective was itself prohibited by a
valid state law, a result that would now (probably) be prohibited by federal law. See
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). Justice Stevens took
pains to distinguish Hughes from the civil rights boycott involved in Claiborne. See
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915 (1982).
A new legislative amendment to New York City's Human Rights act has been inter-
preted by some as creating a new private right of action for individuals who believe that
they have been the victims of a bias-related boycott. See N.Y. City's Human Rights Law,
§ 465-A (1991); see also Barbara Franklin, New Human Rights Law Seen Adding Legal
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judges who will ultimately determine which objectives are permis-
sible and lawful. The problem is that judges may fail to realize that
the law they apply is shaped by deeply ingrained values structured
by partial cultural understandings of what is or is not acceptable
political behavior for groups. Such a view is troubling because it
would surely serve to immunize the legal images of boycotts against
social forces which seek to advance different images and under-
standings. What better manifestation of legal hegemony than to al-
low judges to determine from their perspective which boycotts are
legitimate and which are illegitimate.477
Because boycotts invariably raise ambivalent feelings about the
nature of the activity involved, there will always be ways of under-
standing economic boycotts in different ways. What we can learn to
discover is how the cognitive process in legal decisionmaking works
to disguise underlying political choices by reaching conclusions that
are the product of an imaginary and cognitive process that cannot be
resolved by objectivist notions about legal reasoning. Objectivity in
law should require rising above our personal prejudices, idiosyn-
cratic points of view, and dogmatic claims to truth. Objectivity in
law should not require taking up "God's perspective," which is after
all impossible; rather, it should entail an understanding of how
shared human perspectives are tied to reality through our embodied
cognitive imagination.47
The path to the development of a political right to boycott be-
gins with a commitment to the values of a deliberative democracy,
the idea that citizen self-government is a guiding principle to be pre-
served by the First Amendment. Only by protecting the right of all
groups to participate in the deliberative affairs of government can
we hope to promote values which the Constitution and federal and
Work, N.Y. L.J., June 13, 1991, at 5. The new framework of analysis established under
the Supreme Court's Trial Lawyers decision would seem to support such a view, given
that bias-related boycotts are like economic oriented boycotts in that they fail to pursue
goals that transcend the boycotters' self-interests.
477. It is unlikely that legal intervention to restrain a protest boycott would encour-
age citizens to respect the law, or end the boycott. It is more likely that the social and
economic tensions generated by a boycott can only be resolved by the parties themselves
through mutual understanding of each side's position. Illegal activity, independent of the
boycott, should not be condoned. But what if it is law that is the source of violence? The
point is that violence may be necessary to preserve law. See Jacques Derrida, Force of
Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 921 (1991). As Walter
Benjamin has argued, "[t]he state fears this violence simply for its lawmaking character,
being obliged to acknowledge it as lawmaking whenever external powers force it to con-
cede them the right to conduct warfare, and classes the right to strike." See Walter Ben-
jamin, Critique of Violence in REFLECTIONS: ESSAYS, APHORISMS, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL
WRITINGS 283-84 (Peter Demetz ed., 1978).
478. See JOHNSON, BODY IN THE MIND,-supra note 45, at 212.
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state law seeks to enshrine. This is, I believe, the inspiration to be
found in Justice Stevens' decision in Claiborne Hardware. The only
real obstacle to its attainment is the existence of an imaginative
process and a politics of representation that posits distinctions be-
tween politics and economics and ignores the reality of domination
and subordination in the social order.
VI. CONCLUSION
Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law
becomes not meely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which
we live.479
Justice-Stevens' metaphor of the chameleon is an apt one for
the law of .oycotts because the indeterminacy of boycott doctrine
can best be u.imderstood as a system of symbolic representations ca-
pable of generating different idealized cognitive models and socially
constructed understandings about real world events based on an
embodied experience of the body. In the metaphoric world of boycott
doctrine, law and metaphor are inseparably related to imagined un-
derstandings about experience.4"° Like the color of a chameleon,
which fades and changes as context changes, boycott doctrine in-
vokes different body metaphors to project different legal meanings of
boycott in different contexts.
Metaphorically constructed meaning can be seen as the source
of law's determinacy, but because the underlying metaphors used in
the law are themselves partial and incomplete, the system of rele-
vant legal rules continually exhibits a highly contingent and open
texture. The problem is that other ways of understanding the world,
other knowledges, other subjects and images that project different
ideas or conceptions about the nature of human relations and behav-
ior are never considered. These excluded understandings of reality,
relegated to the borders of legal analysis, continually seek to chal-
lenge the dominant images and metaphors frozen within legal cate-
gories through the telling of counter-factual narratives that employ
different metaphors, metonymies, and imaginative images appealing
to the felt experiences of different groups.
479. Cover, supra note 247, at 4-5.
480. See Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 35, at 1231 ("For us, the pro-
duction and maintenance of legal meaning is dependent upon lived human experience. To
make meaning, one must do meaning .... "); see also Steven L. Winter, Without Privilege,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1064-65 (1991) ("All meaning is meaning in a context, and that
meaning-conferring context is the field of human action."). By examining how cognitive
metaphors have been used in legal decisions for grounding different understandings
about the nature of reality, we can discover aspects of the various "worlds" that judges
have socially constructed for the law of boycotts. An examination of those "worlds" can be
the basis for constructive reflection and criticism.
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By examining cultural practices we can discover different me-
taphors which advocates can use to persuade legal decisionmakers
to see a situation in a substantively different way. Paradigm shifts
can be brought about by establishing new models created from dif-
ferent metaphoric understandings of reality. The awareness of ex-
clusion can sometimes become the spark that galvanizes individuals
to organize and promote their own interests through collective self-
action. In this way, one can come to understand how groups seeking
to boycott for political and economic objectives might boycott to
transform a legal and social system that is itself constructed out of
ideas about the world that reinforce existing social practices that
exclude and marginalize others.
Clarifying choices about different interpretative methods and
approaches for understanding the legal meaning of boycotts can be
enormously helpful for understanding the inevitable politics of legal
doctrine. Understanding boycott law as the product of metaphoric
reasoning may also provide clues for developing new progressive le-
gal strategies for countering the culturally conservative premises
now dominating the imagination of the new conservatism of the cur-
rent Supreme Court. For Judges, lawyers, and legal scholars, such
an awareness might be all that is needed.481 Awareness of the con-
tingent nature of legal meaning can be the basis for rethinking so-
cially constructed understandings in the law. By invoking different
images and metaphors, advocates can persuade legal decisionmak-
ers to see a situation in a substantially different way and thus lead
to a better understanding about law's indeterminacies.
Awareness of constraint or exclusion may also become the
spark that galvanizes judges to see different qualities and facets of
group boycotts. Paradigm shifts can be brought about by establish-
ing new models created from different metaphoric understandings of
reality. Awareness may provide an opportunity for gaining insight
into the constitutive role of law in reinforcing existing social prac-
tices that exclude and marginalize others. Awareness might lead to
a richer understanding of why group action in society may be a good
thing that the legal system should tolerate, if not protect. Judges
might then understand why some groups in society might perceive a
boycott as a transformative political act necessary to change a legal
and social system that is itself constructed out of partial and in-
complete understandings of the world.
481. See also Boyle, supra note 36, at 524.

